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Access control is a core component of any information-security strategy. Researchers
have spent tremendous energy over the past forty years defining abstract access-
control models and proving various properties about them. However, surprisingly
little attention has been paid to how well these models work in real socio-technical
systems (i.e., real human organizations). This dissertation describes the results of
two qualitative studies (involving 52 participants from four companies, drawn from
the financial, software, and healthcare sectors) and observes that the current practice
of access control is dysfunctional at best. It diagnoses the broken assumptions that
are at the heart of this dysfunction, and offers a new definition of the access-control
problem that is grounded in the requirements and limitations of the real world.
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One fundamental challenge in the study of secure computer systems is measuring
how well a given system works in practice. Because the major success criterion is the
absence of an damaging event — e.g., the absence of a data breach — it can be hard
to argue that a system has performed well unless one has concrete evidence that some
adverse event would have transpired in the absence of the system.
The task of evaluating the quality of a secure system becomes even more challeng-
ing when it is not just a technical system, but a socio-technical system. This term,
first used by Trist et al. in describing research into the impact of mechanization on
the coal-mining industry in the 1950s [92], refers to a system in which there exists
an interdependence between technology and the people who use it. Unlike a pure
computer system, whose performance can often be measured using clear and objec-
tive metrics (how much does it cost, how much data does it store, how fast does it
compute answers), the success of a socio-technical computer system is determined by
a wide diversity of human factors (are users happy interacting with the system, do
they understand it, do they see it as valuable).
One important class of socio-technical systems within the field of information se-
curity is that which addresses the access-control problem. I define an access-control
1
system as the set of mechanisms and processes employed to maintain the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of digital resources vis à vis the users who interact
with them. As I argue in later chapters, the need to protect digital resources from
harm inflicted by users (either malicious or unintentional) has long been recognized
in the literature, and significant work has gone into the study of access control over
the years as computers have gradually come to play a larger and more critical role in
our organizations and society. However, although both researchers and practitioners
recognize the importance of access control, and the literature is filled with access-
control models, little effort has been made to evaluate how well access-control models
actually work in practice. There exist proofs that the state transitions of a given
model preserve the security of the data, or that one model can reproduce the security
properties of another, but almost1 no attention has been paid to the critical question:
is any of this work on access control actually doing any good in the real world?
1.1 This research
My research represents an initial foray into this critically-important task of evaluating
the practical success of access-control tools. Armed with insights from the real world,
my work offers novel insights into the root causes of real-world problems. Finally, it
offers a new approach to thinking about the access-control problem, one which will
better align the work of researchers with the needs of practitioners.
1.1.1 Access-control realities
First, to understand how well access control is working (or whether it is serving the
needs of real organizations at all), I have conducted two qualitative studies of large,
dynamic organizations. The first is my Corporate Study (described in Chapters 4
1See Chapter 2 for descriptions of other recent work in this space.
2
through 6), which examines the practice of access control through semi-structured
interviews of practitioners at two investment banks and one software company. The
second is my Clinical Study (described in Chapter 7), which looks at similar topics
through interviews and ethnographic observations of both administrators and end
users in a large teaching hospital.
Combined, these studies reflect the personal experiences and opinions of 52 people
in a variety of industries, and represent one of the largest bodies of research to date
on the real-world practice of access control.
As my fieldwork observations indicate, I have found that access control as it is
practiced today is profoundly broken. Some of the symptoms of this dysfunction
include both frequent over-entitlement, where a user has greater access than she
needs, and regular under-entitlement, where users are prevented from doing their
jobs because they are incorrectly denied access. The risks associated with the former
are easy to imagine, but the latter is perhaps more troubling because it inevitably
drives users to circumvent controls — not because these users are malicious, but
because they will be (directly or indirectly) penalized by their organization if they
are unable to get their jobs done. More generally, and perhaps most distressingly of
all, organizations seem to have very little understanding of what types of access their
users are enacting — or even what types of accesses are appropriate for a particular
user.
1.1.2 The root of the problem
Informed by my fieldwork, I have also sought to understand why the current practice
of access control is so mired in dysfunction. Because my observations indicate that
the problems are rooted not (as many security researchers might suggest) in a lack
of willingness of organizations, laziness of administrators, stupidity of users, or mali-
ciousness of any party, I have sought explanations in our historical approach to the
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access-control problem. By examining the early literature and the environments for
which early access-control systems were developed, I have come to believe that the
source of current woes lies in the basic assumptions we have made about the access
control problem. In Chapter 8 I distill my observations into a set of nine flawed
assumptions that the community has made, and offer 14 “new wisdom” maxims to
counteract them.
1.1.3 Toward better solutions
Finally, after documenting the issues with access control and diagnosing their source,
I have embarked on a path toward fixing the current dysfunction.
First (in Chapter 9) I recast the problem of access control as one of access me-
diation, in which an organization brings to bear any technologies or processes that
will help it mitigate the potentially-negative impact of users on its digital resources
(not just technologies that preemptively control users’ access). This more expansive
definition allows us to consider for the first time on a single scale the three basic
approaches to the access-mediation problem:
• ex-ante systems, which work by allowing or disallowing access based on policies
defined before the user initiates access
• uno-tempore schemes, which rely on real-time access verdicts by human users
• ex-post systems, which incentivize users to act responsibly by allowing an orga-
nization to hold them accountable for the accesses they have performed in the
past
After introducing these three basic approaches, I offer the first characterization of
their relative strengths and weaknesses, and suggestions on the situations for which
each is most appropriate.
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# Title Earlier versions
2 History and Related Work —
3 PKI Devices: Secure Dongles and PDAs Published as a chapter of Phishing andCounter-measures [43]
4 Qualitative Methods and CorporateStudy Design Some results reported in “Informationrisk in financial institutions: field
study and research roadmap” [85] and
in a chapter of Insider Attack and
Cyber Security [89]
5 Corporate Study Results: TheOrganization Against Itself
6 Corporate Study Results: FactorsExternal to the User
7 Clinical Study Design and Results
Released as a technical report, “Access
control realities as observed in a
clinical medical setting” [84]
8 Old Assumptions and New Wisdom
Revised and extended from “What’s
wrong with access control in the real
world?” [82]
9 Rebooting Access Control —
10 Organization Profiling —
11 Future Work and Conclusions —
Figure 1.1: A summary of the chapters in this document and their prior-publication status.
I continue this guidance in Chapter 10 by providing what is to my knowledge
the first taxonomy of features that can determine the success of an access-mediation
approach within a particular organization, and whose consideration can assist an
organization seeking to deploy or improve an access-mediation solution. I believe
that a review of these factors by an organization, with consideration of itself and its
digital resources, is the first step in avoiding the problems I have documented in my
fieldwork.
1.2 This document
As summarized in Figure 1.1, the remainder of this document progresses as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a brief history of the development of access control, and de-
scribes a variety of relevant prior work, including research in secure systems, the
usability of secure systems, and qualitative research from other fields.
Chapter 3 is a revised version of a text that was co-authored by my advisor and
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published as “Secure dongles and PDAs”, a chapter of Phishing and Counter-measures
published in 2006 (Jakobsson and Myers, eds.) [43], which was itself was an expanded
version of a paper presented at ACSAC in 2005 [83].) It offers a survey of second-
factor authentication mechanisms, including the PorKI system that we devised early
in my graduate career. It serves as an example of the type of research I originally
expected to pursue in starting discussions with the organizations that eventually
became participants in the Corporate Study.
Chapter 4 describes the qualitative methods I used in both the Corporate and
Clinical Studies, and introduces the design of the former. Chapters 5 and 6 convey
my observations from the Corporate Study, some of which were previously described
with multiple co-authors in “Information risk in financial institutions: field study
and research roadmap” (published in the proceedings of FinanceCom in 2007) [85]
and a chapter called “Preventative directions for insider threat mitigation via access
control” in Insider Attack and Cyber Security [89], a volume for which I also served
as a co-editor.
Chapter 7 was released as a technical report in April of 2012 [84], and describes
both the structure and the results of the Clinical Study.
In Chapter 8 I present my diagnosis of the issues uncovered in my fieldwork by
observing a number of outdated assumptions the research community has made about
the access-control problem. This first section of the chapter is a revised version of
“What’s wrong with access control in the real world?”, co-authored by my advisor and
published in IEEE Security & Privacy in 2010 [82]; the second section is new with
this document.
Informed by my fieldwork observations and driven by my diagnosis of the root
cause, I offer initial solutions to the issues I document by rebooting our understanding
of the access-control problem in Chapter 9 and offering a taxonomy in Chapter 10 of
the factors that impact the success of a particular solution within an organization.
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The work described in these chapters has not previously been published.
Finally, in Chapter 11 I conclude by describing directions for future research and
by offering a few final remarks on this work.
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Chapter 2
History and related work
2.1 The beginnings of access control
The phrase “access control” has its origins in the transportation literature of the first
half of the twentieth century. Limited-access roads [1] (also referred to as “controlled
access” highways), such as the Bronx River Parkway, started in 1907, offered an urban
center “a permanent outlet for its fast-growing motor traffic, from the cramped and
growing metropolis to the open country” [32].
Although early automobiles were not fast by today’s standards, they did allow
drivers to achieve speeds that turned the mixed-use roadways of the day into literal
death traps. By forcing cars to enter and exit via one-way ramps, controlled access
highways reduce the probability of cross-traffic accidents, and increases the speed
at which traffic flows. Although some drivers must have considered the new traffic
pattern an inconvenience, they were willing to adapt in exchange for better overall
safety and efficiency. (The public quickly demanded that the few intersections on the
Bronx River Parkway that were not originally grade-separated be converted [37].)
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2.1.1 Introduction to computer systems
By the early 1960s, advances in multiprogramming resulted in systems with more than
one input device. Hopner et al. filed a patent in 1961 describing a “keyboard access
control system,” for “limiting the number of keyboards accessible to the multiplexing
system at any given time” [39].
Corbato’s 1964 description of MIT’s Project MAC touches on memory protection
in early timesharing systems, and foresees that “the average commercial user has no
desire to let his competitor browse in his records, the project manager doesn’t want
his staff to accidentally see each other’s personnel records and salaries” [13]. The next
year Dennis described segmentation, which he advocated as a protection mechanism
for shared systems that could otherwise be brought down by a single user’s rogue
code [17].
By 1969 Hoffman makes the distinction between access controls that are “necessary
for a properly operating time-sharing system” (which “protect [...] computer memory
from alteration by an errant program”) and those which “enhance data privacy” [38].
Early access control thus served the goal of both the larger community (preserving
the correct operation of the system) and of individual users (keeping secret data from
one another).
2.1.2 Philosophical groundwork in the protection boom
The literature of the 1970s reflects a surge of interest in computer security. Scien-
tists (and a variety of government agencies) recognized the utility of computers, but
wanted assurances that sensitive data would be protected from compromise during
computation. Given the literature’s focus on this protection, I think of this period as
the “protection boom”.
Lampson’s 1971 “Protection” [51] offers a particularly cogent survey of coetaneous
work. In it, he defines protection as:
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“a general term for all the mechanisms that control the access of a program
to other things in the system, [... including ...] a supervisor/user mode,
memory relocation and bounds registers, some kind of file numbers for
open files, [and] access control by user to file directories.”
Early papers of this period use “protection” and “access control” interchangeably,
perhaps because, as Lampson states,
“... the original motivation for putting protection mechanisms into com-
puter systems was to keep one user’s malice or error from harming other
users.”
As layers of software abstraction distanced the user from the low-level operation of
the machine, the concept of protection expanded to cover the automated interaction
of various computer subsystems, while access control (or “authorization”) maintained
a focus on mediating users’ actions. During this period, the community came to see
access control as one of several mechanisms necessary for achieving security properties
(e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) in a computer system.
Design principles for protection systems
Figure 2.1 summarizes eight principles assembled by Saltzer and Schroeder in 1975
to guide the design of protection mechanisms [75]. The authors draw many of these
principles from the decade of protection literature that preceded their publication;
several on the list have their roots in security knowledge that predated the computer
age. While not all are directly applicable to questions of access control, they are
representative of the conventional wisdom that came out of the protection boom. I
argue that these principles make sense for the computers of the protection boom,




1. Economy of mechanism Keep the design as simple and as small as possi-
ble.
2. Fail-safe defaults Base access decisions on permission rather than
exclusion. (Default deny rather than default al-
low.)
3. Complete mediation Every access to every object must be checked for
authority.
4. Open design The design should not be secret.
5. Separation of privilege Where feasible, a protection mechanism that re-
quires two keys to unlock it is more robust and
flexible than one that allows access to the pre-
senter of only a single key. (Avoid single points
of failure.)
6. Least privilege Every program and user should operate using
the least set of privileges necessary to complete
the job.
7. Least common mechanism Minimize the amount of mechanism common to
more than one user and depended on by all users.
(Minimize the trusted code base.)
8. Psychological acceptability It is essential that the human interface be de-
signed for ease of use.
Figure 2.1: Saltzer and Schroeder’s principles for the design of protection mechanisms
(compiled in 1975) [75].
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Before moving on to describe the major formal reference models for protection
systems in the following section, I would like to quote from Saltzer and Schroeder’s
description of the eighth principle, psychological acceptability. It is easy to forget
(particularly when reading about access-control models) that even early designers
were focused on the usability of their systems. Although the literature of the protec-
tion boom could not foresee the usability challenges we face today, they understood
that the success of any secure system is profoundly dependent on its ability to meet
the needs of its human users.
“It is essential that the human interface be designed for ease of use, so
that users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms
correctly. Also, to the extent that the user’s mental image of his protection
goals matches the mechanisms he must use, mistakes will be minimized.
If he must translate his image of his protection needs into a radically
different specification language, he will make errors.”
The early 60s saw access control primarily as a mechanism to ensure availabil-
ity of the system. As the protection boom progressed, confidentiality and integrity
quickly became important, particularly in computer systems within the military and
intelligence communities. With time, though, the efforts to achieve these goals came
to focus on the more abstract notion of “authorization”: whether or not an individual
user was sanctioned by the organization to perform a particular action.
In some ways this abstraction simplified things, for it allowed system designers to
have confidence that their data would be protected as long as their system restricted
access to users who were authorized. On the other hand, this posed a different
challenge: how does one translate the human notion of authorization into terms that













































Figure 2.2: The classic vision of access control. Adapted from Sandu and Samarati’s
“Access Control: Principles and Practice” [78].
2.1.3 Mandatory access control (MAC)
Perhaps the most famous access-control model from the protection boom is Manda-
tory Access Control, or MAC. A multi-level security version of MAC (one which
relied on users and data objects being assigned a security clearance) was definitively
described in the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Crite-
ria, colloquially referred to as the “Orange Book” [66].
Figure 2.2, adapted from one in Sandu and Samarati’s “Access Control: Principles
and Practice” [78], depicts the basic structure of a MAC system. There is a central
policy administrator who defines whether a user is allowed to access a particular dig-
ital object. When the user seeks to access the object, she must first identify herself
to the system via authentication. Her access request is mediated by a reference moni-
tor, which queries the authorization policy defined by the administrator to determine
whether the access should be allowed.
Note that this vision of access control was somewhat stark: it was assumed that
a user’s authorization was determined by a careful, well-governed process, so any
user who truly needed access to data would get it — and inversely, users without
appropriate clearance had no reason to access sensitive data. Moreover, it assumed
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that there was a single source of truth — that the system’s central administrators
would be able to figure out a workable policy for the whole organization.
2.1.4 Discretionary access control (DAC)
The Orange Book also defined an alternative model to MAC, one that does not
assume that the access-control policy is managed by a central authority. As Jordan
summarized in 1987 [44], Discretionary Access Control (or DAC) is:
“... discretionary in the sense that that a subject with a certain access
permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on
to any other subject.”
The discretionary model allows for there to be more than one data owner in the
system: even if the computer is owned by the organization, Alice and Bob may have
their respective files to which they manage other users’ access. This approach to
authorization management was more scalable, as it allows the administration to be
distributed across a larger number of people, and makes it possible for the users who
are most familiar with the data to define the policy for accessing it.
This in turn allowed the system to be more flexible, and adapt more quickly
as the set of users who needed access to a particular resource evolved over time.
However, even when policy management was decentralized, adding or removing users
from the system (and updating the policy to reflect these changes) could still be
time-consuming for data owners.
2.2 Role-Based Access Control
Since the introduction of MAC and DAC, the alternative (and dominant) access-
control scheme has come to be Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [23]. This ap-
proach aims to reduce the overhead necessary for managing permissions for large
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numbers of users by first assigning users to one or more roles, and then assigning
permissions to those roles (rather than individual users). Since its introduction, sig-
nificant work has been done to prove that the basic form of RBAC can (in theory,
at least) be used to achieve certain data-protection goals, such as separation of du-
ties [81], or simulate MAC [76], DAC [77] or other models.
NIST commissioned a study of RBAC and its economic impact [65], which found
that it is “arguably the most important innovation in identity and access management
since discretionary and mandatory access control”. Among international companies
participating in a survey conducted under the study in 2009, 41% reported some use
of RBAC; the authors estimate that “just over 50% of users at organizations with
more than 500 employees ... [would] have at least some of their permissions managed
via roles” by the end of 2010.
2.2.1 Role engineering and role mining
One challenge of deploying an RBAC system is role engineering, which is the process
by which an organization defines roles and assigns permissions to them. Approaches
to address this problem are generally either top-down (i.e, starting with a high-level
understanding of the organization, its users, and their access needs) or bottom-up (i.e.,
built from existing permissions) [23]. Some efforts focus on providing structure to top-
down approaches, e.g., by providing a scenario framework to allow an organization to
understand users’ access needs [63].
However, top-down engineering in a large organization is expensive, even with
such frameworks; in recent years many researchers have started exploring bottom-up
approaches, frequently referred to as “role mining”. Frank et al. [30] identify require-
ments for an automated role-mining system, including “minimality, interpretability,
and generalizability”. During the Corporate Study I conducted, some organizations
were exploring the purchase of role-mining tools, but it was not clear that they would
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produce roles that were meaningful (or “interpretable”) to the humans who manage
the access-control system. There exists some work that seeks to augment automated
role-mining techniques in order to produce more meaningful roles [98], and that even
applies algorithms to real-world permission data [12], but real-world validation of
roles produced using these methods is scarce.
2.2.2 RBAC extensions
The literature describing extensions to the basic RBAC model is extensive. Some ex-
amples include efforts to model the introduction of obligations [69], and the delegation
of privileges from user to user [95] or also from role to role [102].
Significant work has gone into introducing the notion of temporal [45] or geo-
graphic [5] constraints in RBAC policies, so that one might restrict access not only
to users with a certain role, but to users in that role at specific times of day or at a
particular physical location. Some attempts have been made to motivate these types
of extensions by describing concrete use cases in which they might be applied [91].
However, I am not convinced that these motivating cases can really attest to the
practical utility of such increasingly-complex models, because they leave so many
questions unanswered. What is the administrative overhead associated with gath-
ering this additional data, with writing these rich policies? How well can human
administrators reason with the primitives provided by these models? How frequently
will these policies need to be updated, and how easy is that process?
With the possible exception of models that extend RBAC to interoperate between
disparate systems within an organization [46], I thus observe that the majority of
extensions are presented without empirical evidence that they would actually be useful
in the real world.
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2.3 Other access-control models
The research community has proposed a number of non-RBAC access-control models.
While many of these are couched in terms of how they might operate in an RBAC
environment, they are not necessarily dependent on the existence of roles in a system,
and could also work in the presence of user groups or even simple access-control lists.
2.3.1 Attribute-Based Access Control
In recent years there has been a particular interest in the use of attributes in access-
control policies. XACML (an “extensible access-control markup language”) [64], ex-
emplifies the trend by allowing policy-writers to specify arbitrary attributes of users
(subjects) and resources (objects) and write rich rules limiting access based on dif-
ferent combinations of attributes.
Kuhn et al. [49] explore the possibility of combining RBAC with an attribute-
driven approach. They note that the increased flexibility of attributes could mitigate
some of the expense associated with role engineering, and reduce the number of roles
necessary to capture workflows in dynamic organizations (i.e., prevent “a ‘role explo-
sion’ to cover every possible contingency for permission sets that might be required by
users”). They suggest that a role structure could be defined on slow-changing “static”
user attributes (e.g., office location), and attribute-based policies be defined for more
dynamic properties (i.e., the time of day). However, they do not offer commentary
on the manageability of dynamic attributes, nor evidence that the organizations that
are currently prone to experience “role explosion” would be able to define and update
appropriate attributes over time.
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2.3.2 Optimistic Security
Povey introduced the notion of optimistic security [70] addresses the complexity of
defining policies in advance by simply abandoning them — or, at least simplifying
them to the point that they are manageable, and relying on after-the-fact evaluation to
regulate access behaviors. He declares that optimistic security makes “enforcement of
the security policy retrospective” by relying on administrators “to detect unreasonable
access and take steps to compensate for the action”, including “undoing illegitimate
modifications”, “Taking punitive action (e.g. firing, or prosecuting individuals)”, and
“Removing privileges”1.
Although Povey’s description is formal and his practical motivation for the model
brief, I find that this approach has a strong potential to be applicable in the real
world. (Apparently so do Dekker [15] and others, who have re-invented varieties of
the scheme for specific domains, as described in Section 2.6.) In later chapters I
discuss systems with this after-the-fact flavor as performing ex-post access mediation.
2.3.3 Break-Glass
Several authors have described ways to introduce “break-glass” controls to existing
models [8] and RBAC in particular [25]. The concept behind break-glass is relatively
simple: if a user finds she does not have sufficient access to do her job, she can “break
the glass” and temporarily escalate her privilege level. A break-glass option can be
provided for all actions and users or only a subset, depending on the risks associated
with such privilege escalation; it thus has the potential to strike a balance between
the inflexibility of classic policy systems and the (potentially too-extreme) openness
of optimistic security.
1This last bullet seems to imply that there still exists a non-“optimistic” policy — i.e., what
we consider a normal access-control policy — at work, although the formal system as described by
Povey excludes this notion.
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2.3.4 Real-time access-control systems
Many other systems exist to help users share data without necessarily requiring a
traditional access-control policy, or that allow users to adapt a policy in real time.
One of the simplest is email, which Voida et al. [94] document to be a favored
file-sharing mechanism for many users, even in the presence of more specialized al-
ternatives. They observe that users “select which tools to use based on how well the
affordances and features of those tools map to the sharing situation at hand”, and
that email effectively “constrains the sharing to a specific set of users” and “provides
the recipients an explicit cue that new content is available”. Furthermore, email al-
lays fears around “availability of a sharing technology for all recipients” or “problems
communicating through a firewall”.
The security pitfalls of email as a sharing mechanism — including the ease of
re-distribution and the lack of coherent auditing — pose problems in a corporate
setting.2 However, the flexibility of email allows it to respond to users’ needs in
real time; Jane sends a message to Bob asking for the latest profits report, and Bob
responds with the report attached.
Bauer et al. replace physical keys to a campus building with the Grey System [3],
which leverages smartphones to provide a more structured form of on-the-fly policy
management. Grey users unlock doors with their phones, and can request access to
a room from another user; in this latter case, the other user receives a notification on
their smartphone and choose to grant short-lived access, long-lived access, or deny
the request altogether.
Similarly, Mazurek et al. [58] study dynamic policy management by creating a
simulated “reactive” access-control system. They first solicit from participants a list
of contacts and digital resources, and also a policy for the matrix of contacts and
2This may be why one study in the same year found that up to a third of companies were
monitoring their employees email [60] — a number that has undoubtedly gone up in intervening
years.
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resources. Over the course of a week they then and simulate requests over email
or text message from randomly-chosen contacts seeking access to randomly-chosen
resources; users are given a choice to grant short-lived access, long-lived access, deny
the request, or ignore it. The authors find that 12% of requests are met with an answer
that conflicts with participants initially-stated policy, and that 62% of conflicts are
due to the reactive decision being more permissive than the initial one. Their survey
of participants at the end of the study period reveals a generally positive reception
of the experience using the simulated system.
These studies reveal that reactive systems can, in the words of Mazurek et al.,
“supports many [users] policy creation needs, including the desire for more control and
interactivity”. As I discuss in Chapter 9 (where I refer to such systems as enabling
uno-tempore access mediation), reactive schemes seem well-suited to discretionary
access access management, in which control is given to distributed data owners who
have a high probability of personally knowing the requestor. I also echo Bauer et
al. and Mazurek et al. in observing that real-time management seems best-suited to
situations where the total number of requests is likely to be small.
2.3.5 Economic approaches to adaptive models
Some efforts to understand adaptive access-control models have taken an economic
approach. Zhao and Johnson [103] use game-theoretic analysis to evaluate the utility
of both penalties and rewards in incentivizing users to only escalate privilege levels
when it is in the best interests of the organization. They find that while penalties
can discourage undesirable escalations, they can also stifle desirable ones — but that
bonus incentives tied to the performance of the organization can compensate. More-
over, they find that in such systems that this need for bonus incentives can be traded
off with an improvement in the organization’s ability to accurately and reliably audit
user behavior.
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With “Fuzzy MLS” (an extension of the MAC-flavored Multi-Level Security model)
Cheng et al. [10] attempt to treat risk as a quantifiable resource by measuring the
relative gap between a subject’s security-clearance label and the label of the object
they wish to read. Each user is then allowed a “line of risk credit”, which they
can spend to achieve a limited amount of privilege escalation. Over time users’
access and their credit spend is evaluated (and adjusted depending on whether their
accesses were justifiable). I find this work compelling, but am not convinced that one
could realistically quantify risk in systems that do not share MLS’s strict hierarchy
of monotonically-increasing access levels.
2.4 Usability in access control
Aside from the large variety of formal access-control models that have been proposed
by the research community, the literature pertaining to the usability of access-control
mechanisms is relevant to my work. In this section I address the topic in general;
in later sections I examine work on user compliance and work targeted to healthcare
settings in particular.
2.4.1 Authentication
The literature on the usability of authentication schemes is particularly rich. Al-
though a plethora of password alternatives have been proposed (and I myself discuss
the merits of replacing passwords with usable PKI authentication in Chapter 3), I
choose to focus instead on work that analyzes current user behavior surrounding
passwords.
Inglesant and Sasse [41] conduct a study of password practices among end users
from two different organizations by asking them to maintain a “password diary”. They
find that, despite significant advice and admonitions by administrators or “security
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experts” to the contrary, password sharing is alive and well today. They document
the lost productivity users experience in struggling with strict password policies, and
note that the context in which a password is to be used (e.g., entered multiple times
per day on a mobile device) plays a strong role in determining its burden on the user.
Singh et al. [86] conduct a qualitative study of the sharing of banking passwords
and ATM PINS among a diverse group of 108 people. Their study includes individuals
drawn from populations traditionally under-represented in the HCI literature, such
as indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and subjects of lower socio-economic
status. They find that sharing a bank password or PIN is often the only way for
users to conduct basic banking operations. They argue that, rather than trying to
prevent end users from sharing passwords, “security design should take into account
social and cultural practice and enable the sharing of passwords. The design should
minimize the risks, while allowing customers to personalize the degree and limits of
sharing”.
2.4.2 Policy-authoring
Maxion and Reeder [57] and Reeder et al. [72] explore the usability of interfaces for
managing filesystem permissions. They compare the interface included with Windows
XP with novel interfaces that provide “an accurate, clear and salient external repre-
sentation of the information needed to achieve the user’s primary goal” [72]. They
find that these systems vastly outperform Windows XP in terms of user accuracy and
time-to-completion for a variety of tasks, including viewing permissions for individual
files, making simple and complex changes, and resolving policy conflicts.
Inglesant et al. seek to create a “virtuous circle” of policy authoring [40] by em-
ploying controlled (i.e., limited) natural language for crafting policies for distributed
computing environments. Their interface allows users to specify a policy with natu-
ral language, a graphical interface, or directly in XML — and switch between them.
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Most interestingly, the tool allows users to verify the policy crafted using the GUI
or a complementary “wizard” workflow by describing the policy back to the user in
controlled natural language, with mixed but generally positive results.
2.4.3 Access-control case studies
Whalen, Smetters and Churchill [96] present survey and interview data pertaining to
user management of file-sharing permissions. They note that “people have to manage
access control policies that are both social and technical”, and their study focuses on
“how people manage file sharing among various groups, organizations, and tasks”.
An initial survey of 56 employees of a medium-sized (approx. 200 person) technical-
research organization revealed an overwhelming majority engage in file-sharing of one
type or another (98% via email, 55% via network file-sharing, and 25% via each
commercial content-management systems and portable devices). 71% reported that
access-permission problems interfere with their work; seven users described intense
frustration, which is exacerbated when they encounter the same problems repeatedly.
The authors note that “even in a highly technically competent group, with good tech-
nical support, problems arise regularly, leading to frustration and difficulty”, and that
they found “little correlation between skill level and experience, although it was clear
that technical competence led to improved understanding of the issues at large”.
Follow-up interviews with twelve survey participants underlined that, in a tech-
nologically diverse environment where users have multiple options for sharing data,
social conventions play a strong role in how users manage others’ access to files. The
authors also note that interview subjects “revealed a wide range of ‘mental models’
or belief systems around digital content protection and a concomitant range of prac-
tices”, and that they were surprised to see such variety among a small sample drawn
from a single organization.
Among the design recommendations they offer, I particularly appreciate the fol-
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lowing advice:
“Support, rather than replace, social controls: social conventions are a
powerful, real-world tool for managing appropriate access, which can pro-
vide a simple and flexible shorthand for access policies.”
Overall, Whalen et al. observe that the majority of subjects engage in the manage-
ment of file-sharing access, and that they do so repeatedly over time.
As user self-reporting of behaviors is not always accurate, Smetters and Good [87]
take a “cyberethnography” approach to understanding how users manage permissions
to shared files, by applying automated data-mining techniques to ten years’ worth
of one medium-sized (approx. 200 person) company’s access-management logs. The
organization’s access model is discretionary across the four file-sharing mechanisms
studied, in that users can manage other users’ access to files. However, the authors
observe that “administrative users are often the last people to modify the majority
of groups, suggesting that it is they, not the regular users, that take on the more
mundane task of “cleaning up” old access rights”.
In later chapters I discuss the notion of “over-entitlement”, which is when users
have more access than they need to get their jobs done, often because this “cleaning
up” is not done (or not done thoroughly); Smetters and Good note that their data
reveal “a number of classes of such ‘ghosts in the machine’ in our sample; groups
with no members, old user accounts that still belong to active groups, or groups
corresponding to management functions for parts of the organization that no longer
exist. In an extreme case, a user account belonging to a dead person was still active
on the system”. They also note that having a limited number of software licenses for
one system (DocuShare) appears to have created an incentive for administrators to
remove old user accounts, whereas no such incentive existed in the classic OS-shared
filesystems (Windows and Unix).
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The authors hypothesized that users configure relatively simple access-control poli-
cies, but discover more complexity than expected. However, they note some of this
complexity can actually be explained by the frequent occurrence of user errors: “users
end up defining policies with effects other than what they might have intended, or
redundant policies that could in fact be expressed in much simpler ways”.
Unlike the majority of access-control research, which is conducted in the absence of
real-world validation and which seems keenly focused on adding features or otherwise
enriching access-control models, the authors use their cyberethnographic observations
to call for increased simplicity. In particular, they argue that limiting the policy
language to only include positive grants of access, simplifying the inheritance model
for access-control changes, and limiting the types of permissions that can be granted
can go a long way toward making access-management by end users more usable and
less prone to errors.
2.5 User compliance
One important observation from my fieldwork is that users will not only fail to comply
with access-control policies that get in the way of doing their jobs, but that they will
actively circumvent controls that they believe to be unreasonable. Other researchers
have also studied why users fail to comply with security policies or advice.
2.5.1 Compliance budgets
Beautement, Sasse and Wonham introduce the notion of a compliance budget [4] to
help understand why users do not always comply with an organization’s security
policy.
As summarized in Figure 2.3, they argue that users can internally perceive a
number of costs and benefits associated with compliance. For example, a user may
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choose to comply because she does not want to be responsible for a security breach
in general, but may avoid compliance at the end of a tiring day because it represents
an additional cognitive burden. They note that compliance can be seen as a type of
“organizational altruism” when it imposes “pain but no [perceived] gain” to end users,
and that individual users may have different thresholds for enduring that pain — i.e.,
different compliance budgets.
Beautement et al. also note a number of external factors that can influence an
individual’s compliance budget. Among them, the design of the security system, the
visibility and quality of the organization’s monitoring, and both the availability of
sanctions and the consistency with which sanctions are imposed are within some mea-
sure of the organization’s control. Other factors, such as user awareness, the efficacy
of user training, and the organization’s culture can be harder for an organization to
change. (Beautement and Sasse later explored some of these themes in a solidly-
constructed study of employees at a utility company [79]. Among other results, they
found that there were significant differences in user behavior between the US and
UK employee populations, even though both populations held similar attitudes with
respect to compliance with security policies)
Most importantly, the authors argue that non-compliance among non-malicious
users is an expected and predictable outcome of several observable phenomena, and
not a result of user stupidity or laziness.
2.5.2 Rational rejection of guidance
Hurley [36] argues that average users are often acting rationally when they choose to
ignore the guidance currently given to them by security experts. He examines three
such classes of canonical guidance, pertaining to:
1. choosing a strong password3








The “hassle factor” ’
Benefits Avoiding consequences of a security breachProtection from sanctions
External factors
System design
Awareness, training, and education
The culture of the organization
Monitoring
Sanctions
Figure 2.3: A summary of factors that go into users’ compliance budget calculations, as
described by Beautement et al. [4].
2. protecting against phishing by carefully examining web URLs
3. defending against man-in-the-middle attacks by heeding certificate errors
By carefully comparing the benefit each type of guidance is intended to achieve with
the actual experience of users, Hurley makes a convincing case that this guidance on
the whole causes more harm than good. However, he also notes that “security advice
that has compelling cost-benefit tradeoff has real chance of user adoption”, but that
“the costs and benefits have to be those the user cares about, not those we think the
user ought to care about”.
In that vein, Engelman, Molnar, Christin, Acquisti, Herley and Krishnamurthi [20]
describe an experiment through which they examine factors that can impact users’
tolerance of computer delays. They asked subjects to “count the total number of
times a certain term was repeated in a multi-page document” (a task that lends itself
well to cheating) using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service, and exposed subjects in
the experimental groups to delays that made the task take longer.
organization should impose on its users’ passwords; I include the document I gave him in response
as Appendix A.
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They found that “subjects were significantly more likely to cheat or abandon the
task when provided with non-security explanations or a vague security explanation for
the delay”, but that subjects who were first primed with detailed information about
the type of attack that the supposed “security delay” was designed to protect against
had a similar occurrence of cheating or task abandonment as members of the control
group.
This indicates that providing a user with a more concrete understanding about the
nature of a security delay may make her more tolerant of it. However, it is not clear
that this result would be replicable in conditions where users experience repeated or
regular delays as part of their daily life.
2.6 Access control in healthcare settings
Recent years have seen significant interest in the security requirements of healthcare
organizations, and the operational constraints that the healthcare setting places on
secure systems.
In the context of a European trend toward digitization of health records, Ferreira
et al. [24] survey publications on 1) access control in healthcare and 2) access control
in general, and find that the focus in the domain-specific work closely mirrors the
generalized research. In particular, they note that “there is a great interest in defining
and studying access control models”, but observe that “this kind of academic modelling
approach works because the vast majority of the models were not implemented in
practice”, and that “proper system evaluation is needed before one can conclude that
these models are either appropriate or effective”. The conclusions they make as part
of this survey closely mirror those I have observed directly during my fieldwork.
Heckle [35] describes her observations studying the deployment of a SSO (single
sign-on) technology in a regional hospital. As I did in my Clinical Study, she employed
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ethnographic observation to capture “the interplay between formal and informal sys-
tems”; her work focuses on the process of adopting a single technology, from the initial
vendor selection to organization-wide deployment.
She documents “policies that were ill defined for the work environment”, and in-
stances of what I call “product” thinking instead of “process” thinking (e.g., hospital
officials expected the SSO rollout to take six months, but experienced significant de-
lays “as the complexities of the implementation began to unfold”). She reports that
the hospital in question experienced significant benefit from conducting a pilot study
of the SSO technology, but that the team deploying it was caught in a fundamental
conundrum: were they “to design the SSO system to correspond to organizational
policy or to fit with the actual work practices”? I find the following quote to be
particularly evocative of the spirit of my own Clinical Study findings:
“In clinical areas, management must accept that staff can’t always follow
policy 100 percent, and systems can’t be 100 percent secure for quality
multipatient care.”
2.6.1 Auditing
Dekker and Etalle [15] describe an “Audit-based access control for electronic health
records”, which is very similar to Povey’s optimistic security [70] (described in more
detail in Section 2.3.2), although motivated by and crafted specifically to satisfy
HIPAA requirements. In describing this work they note that medical records must
be both available and confidential, but that HIPAA “does not require that every risk
of an incidental use or disclosure of protected health information be eliminated”.
While they offer a cogent analysis of some of the strengths and weaknesses of
an audit approach to access management in comparison to a policy-based approach
(i.e., one offers flexibility while the other aims for strong prevention of misbehavior),
their work is firmly grounded in the theoretical. In particular, they do not appear to
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consider the burden that the additional logging tasks or formalized auditing process
would have on users of the system.
Mashima and Ahamad [56] describe and prototype a “patient-centric monitoring
agent” that allows users to audit the way their health data is used by notifying them
when their records are shared. While the protocol is interesting, the authors do not
validate their assumption that patients can be reasonably equipped to “determine
whether the sharing is reasonable”. (In fact, although the human factors would seem
to be critically important to the success of any scheme in this vein, their evaluation is
focused solely on the performance overhead associated with the protocol they define.)
2.6.2 Mining roles and policies
Zhang et al. [101] describe the application of a role-mining algorithm (which they
inexplicably re-name “role prediction”) to three months of health-record access logs
from Northwestern Memorial Hospital. They attempt to measure the accuracy of the
algorithm by first defining three levels of “correct” roles for each user based on 1) the
user’s formal job title and 2) the opinions of “several clinicians at Northwestern”. The
levels are designed to be of augmenting abstraction, such that a user with a “Unit
Secretary 1” job title could be classed as the increasingly general “Unit Secretary 1”
(the “specific position” role, of which there were 140) “Unit Secretary” (the “general
position”, of which there were 62), “Admin” (the “conceptual position", of which there
were 5).
Training and testing the algorithm at each of the different levels of role abstraction
yield 51% and 52% accuracy for the “specific position” and “general position” roles,
and 82% accuracy when evaluated at the “conceptual position” level (at which a
given user can be grouped into one of five roles). When allowing for some users to
have roles defined at a different level of abstraction, and optimizing the algorithm for
accuracy, it predicts “correct” roles for 63% of users. Given that the authors expect
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this role-mining approach to be used in conjunction with break-glass controls, and
that they maintain the current state-of-the-art for role engineering in organizations is
to adopt a user’s job titles as her roles, perhaps this approach could prove beneficial in
helping manage the number of times users need to employ the break-glass mechanism.
However, without further evidence I remain skeptical of the practical benefits of this
approach.
Malin et al. [53] take a different approach to the application of data-mining in
support of access control. Rather than trying to directly derive an access-control
policy, they mine access logs to deliver data that “enables the review of predefined
policies, as well as the discovery of unknown behaviors” that can occur in the orga-
nization’s dynamic teams, which are “more complex than the pairwise relationship
typically expected by access control frameworks (e.g., provider-patient)”. Their min-
ing of user-to-data and department-to-department relationships finds that:
“(1) [Healthcare organizations] are dynamic environments in which associ-
ations fluctuate over time, (2) departmental interactions [e.g., those where
members of one department access data originating in another depart-
ment] are more stable than those of [individual] EHR users, and (3) intra-
departmental relations tend to be more likely than inter-departmental.”
Gunter, Liebovitz, and Malin argue that this sort of data mining can be repeatedly
applied by an organization to evolve its access-control policies over time [34].
2.7 Commentary
The work in access control and information security for specific domains is extensive
and varied. However, it is dominated by formal models and theoretical frameworks
that are rarely grounded in empirically-demonstrated need, and even more rarely
validated in real-world settings. The usable security literature offers insights into
31
some aspects of the real-world access-control problem, but is often focused on end-
user experiences with graphical user interfaces. I believe that understanding the real-
world practice of access control requires both a broad understanding of the challenges
that users and administrators from a variety of domains experience and an effort to
reconcile those challenges with the current trends in formal access-control research.
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Chapter 3
PKI Devices: secure dongles and
PDAs
This chapter reprises a body of work that that our lab published in 2006 as “Secure
Dongles and PDAs”, in Phishing and Counter-measures: Understanding the Increas-
ing Problem of Electronic Identity Theft (M. Jakobsson and S.A. Myers, eds.) [43],
and for which I was the lead author. I include1 this work here because it is indica-
tive of the type of research I had planned to conduct after initial fieldwork with our
financial partners: inspired by a problem at the intersection of human factors and
information security (phishing and credential exposure in general), we designed a
tool that leveraged usability insights to increase the overall security of the system.
I still think that work crafting tools in this vein would be valuable, but the rest of
this dissertation deals primarily with problems that currently obstruct the utility of
development efforts in real-world organizations.




Humans are, generally speaking, poorly equipped to distinguish situations in which
it is safe to use their credentials from situations in which their credentials could be
easily compromised. For example, when a user is asked to enter her password into a
web page authentication form, she will likely judge the trustworthiness of the website
based on its look and feel, qualities that are easily spoofable. Moreover, the passwords
themselves are vulnerable when disclosed to an untrusted party; once the secret is out,
there is no way for the owner to get it back. Some ways of shoring up the strength
of the password mechanism have already been presented, such as Ross et al.’s hashed
password scheme [42] that creates a custom password for every site to which the user
authenticates, and which includes a hash of the website name in the password itself.
SecureID tokens use a device-generated PIN for authentication. Users must provide
their username, password, and current PIN to log in to the website; because the
PIN is short-lived, many current phishing attacks are prevented [73]. Other schemes
rely on a trusted third party and an extra device, such as Wu et al.’s [59] work
with cell phones and proxy servers to bypass the workstation while entering private
information.
A user authenticating with her public key cryptography credentials2 in a public key
infrastructure (PKI) also does not disclose private information, even when the party
she is authenticating to (the relying party) is untrusted. This safe authentication
can combat many phishing attacks. (We review below the building blocks of a PKI,
and explain how it can be applied to fight phishing.) However, PKI is difficult for
the average user to understand and use [97], and thus is not currently a practical
2Throughout this chapter I use the term “credentials” to refer to the data a user has or can
generate to authenticate herself to a relying party. In PKI, this almost always means a certificate
and a proof of possession of the private key that corresponds to the public key in the certificate. We
assume that when PKI credentials are being used, there is an appropriate protocol in place for the
authenticating party to offer proof of private key possession without actually revealing the private
key. Such protocols are standard in public key cryptography.
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replacement for passwords. Furthermore, it brings with it new vulnerabilities of
key compromise that are at least as bad as password compromise. Also, PKI does
not offer a solution to the fundamental problem of users being unable to judge the
trustworthiness of the environment in which they are using their credentials: if they
store their private keys on untrusted workstations, those keys can be compromised
and abused by attackers.
In this chapter we consider the use of personal hardware devices (smart cards, USB
dongles, and PDAs) to protect, transport, and use PKI credentials for authentication,
with the goal of using a PKI-enabled hardware device as a full-on password replace-
ment. We focus on the experimental system PorKI, developed in the PKI/Trust
Laboratory of Dartmouth College3. PorKI not only provides secure authentication,
but it also enables enterprise users and the relying parties to whom they are authen-
ticating to make informed trust decisions about the workstation from which they are
authenticating. Because PorKI and the specialized PKI devices we discuss in this
section are particularly applicable in enterprise environments, they would be a good
countermeasure against spear phishing or other context-aware attacks, although could
also be deployed to prevent more generalized attacks as well.
3.2 The promise and problems of PKI
PKI researchers often talk about generic users Alice and Bob. Alice, as a user in a
PKI, has a keypair composed of a private key and a public key. Alice can use her
private key to decrypt data or generate digital signatures on data.4 (For this reason,
we can also refer to a private key as a decryption key or a signing key). Another user,
Bob, uses Alice’s public key to encrypt messages that only she can read, as well as
verify digital signatures that she has generated. (We can thus call a public key a
3Later work on the PorKI project that is not reflected here is discussed by Pala et al. [68].
4In many cases, users will have separate keypairs for signing and encryption purposes.
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encryption key or a verification key.) As long as Alice’s private key remains private,
when Bob successfully validates a signature with Alice’s validation key, he can be
sure that Alice really did the signing. If Bob has never seen Alice’s public key before,
he can establish her identity via the keypair if she presents him with an identity
certificate signed by a party he trusts (this is traditionally a Certification Authority
(CA) in Alice’s PKI). This certificate contains Alice’s verification key, as well as some
form of identifier, such as her name and email address. Through a carefully designed
protocol, Alice proves to Bob that she has the corresponding private signing key; if
her signing key has not been compromised, this shows that she is the person identified
in the certificate.
Public key cryptography algorithms are designed such that, no matter how many
times Alice authenticates to Bob, it would be very difficult for Bob to guess Alice’s
signing key. As long as the cryptographic algorithms are sound, this means that even
when she authenticates to a malicious party, her private credentials are not exposed.5
A PKI thus allows Alice to authenticate to remote services without compromising
her credentials, and allows her to usefully sign and encrypt data, among other things.
However, its effective application in large enterprises requires several precondi-
tions, including:
1. Private keys must remain private.
2. Private keys must be used only for the operations the users intend and authorize.
(If the user does not have good control over the private key, an adversary can
trick him into using it when for things he would not normally want to.)
3. The PKI must integrate with the standard desktop/laptop computing environ-
ments users and enterprises already employ.
5In the past, flaws with cryptographic padding functions have caused this assertion to fail. The
development of efficient factoring today would affect the integrity of modern cryptosystems, too.
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4. Users should be able to use PKI from any machine in the enterprise. Some
users, such as system administrators, are responsible for machine maintenance;
average average users may have more than one workstation, or one computer
for each home and work.
5. The PKI must accommodate the fact that these machines may have varying
levels of trustworthiness. (For example, in a university environment these ma-
chines may range from dedicated, well-maintained single-user machines all the
way to de facto public access workstations.)
The keyjacking work of Marchesini et al. [55] shows that the first two conditions
fail in situations satisfying the third: storing and using private keys on a standard
workstation opens then to compromise through the operating system’s credential
access API. However, even if an enterprise solves the problem of securing a user’s
private keys at one standard machine, the fourth condition requires that user PKI be
portable: users should not be limited to using their private key to a single machine,
but be allowed to use their credentials in a variety of environments as they desire.
(Imagine if we told users who are used to working from home that they could only
access their email account from the office.)
3.3 Smart cards and USB dongles to mitigate risk
Portable PKI devices can both protect credentials and allow them to be used on
many different machines. They also provide two-factor authentication: users can
prove to relying parties that they both have something (the hardware device) and
know something (usually the password to unlock the device).
For example, smart cards (also known as chip cards) are thin plastic cards that
resemble credit cards, only they have a computer chip embedded in them. Smart
cards can be used for a variety of purposes; in Europe, they are the standard format
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for debit cards. When used in PKI applications, they can store credentials as well as
perform signing and verification operations. (In theory, this should prevent malicious
workstations from gaining access to the credentials, although it is still possible to
keyjack them in many implementations.)
Similarly, a USB dongle is a small, portable device that interfaces with a com-
puter by plugging it into a USB port, similar to a USB thumb drive. Like smart
cards, dongles can be used in PKI applications for storing credentials and perform
cryptographic operations using them. The dongles’ larger form factor makes room
for more credential storage and computation power, as well as additional function-
ality. For example, the Sony Puppy has an embedded fingerprint reader, and some
manufacturers include the ability to store passwords in addition to PKI credentials.6
An enterprise that uses smart cards or dongles for PKI will generate (or have the
user generate) a keypair on the device, issue a certificate to the keypair, and put the
certificate on the card. The user can use these credentials on any computer equipped
with the appropriate reader (for smart cards, a special card reader is required; USB
dongles require a USB port). Once the device is plugged into the workstation, the user
must unlock it by typing in a password on the workstation. Dongles or card readers
that have a built-in biometric reader allow for alternative means of unlocking, which
does not require the user to remember a password and decreases the chance of that
password being stolen by a workstation that has a keylogger installed.
Having the device be locked by default prevents someone from easily accessing the
credentials if it is lost or stolen. Some devices will even lock themselves permanently
if a wrong password is entered a certain number of times, which prevents an attacker
from using a dictionary attack to gain access to the credentials. These devices are also
usually resistant to physical attacks, by which an attacker might try to pry the data
6This could help users remember secure passwords, and thus decrease the probability that they
reuse passwords or choose insecure ones. However, this does not solve the problem of users being
unable to recognize when their credentials are being phished.
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from the physical memory using specialized tools. (Although, of course, designing a
commodity device whose hardware cannot be cracked by a dedicated adversary is a
very hard problem.)
Dongles are generally more expensive than smart cards, although they are also
more durable. They are easier to deploy for enterprises with a large number of
existing workstations, because they do not require specialized readers like smart cards
do. Both technologies make PKI credentials more portable, although dongles offer
greater security and functionality possibilities because they are not constrained by
the single-chip design and thin form factor of smart cards. For the rest of this section
we concentrate on dongles because their features are a superset of the smart card
features, and are thus the more interesting technology.
3.3.1 Experiences in PKI hardware deployment
Dartmouth College deployed its PKI in 2003. At that time, it started issuing cer-
tificates to users with a Dartmouth email address. These credentials can be used for
authentication to a number of online campus resources, as well as for email signing
and encryption. The College’s CA initially issued certificates online, and users stored
them in their operating system’s software keystore. However, in 2004 the College
started issuing dongles to new students and to the staff of certain departments. Ad-
ministrators decided to use dongles for credential storage and transport both because
they were concerned about the security of private keys on average workstations, and
because much of the campus population (the students) use public terminals as much
as they use their personal computers.
The USB dongles that Dartmouth employs are designed to be used in an enterprise
environment. Their manufacturer provides the College with two software packages,
one for the client side and one for the administrator side. The client software must
be installed on a workstation before the credentials stored on the dongle can be used
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there. The token must be initialized with the administrator software (which includes
loading it with credentials) before the credentials can be used, too.
In choosing to migrate to tokens, Dartmouth took great care in evaluating the
usability of both software packages. Administrators wanted the technology to be
both compatible with existing software and user-friendly enough that the average
user could easily use their credentials anywhere on campus. While both packages
were generally compatible and usable, administrators found that deploying a new
dongle requires a complicated ceremony of passwords, ID cards, and mouse clicks for
the administrator to identify the user and issue her credentials. This ceremony proved
to be a bottleneck during the first year of dongle deployment, and few of the 1,000
freshmen who were supposed to receive the devices during orientation week actually
got one. However, during orientation of 2005, administrators managed to overcome
the bottleneck and reach about 75% of the students by issuing dongles to students at
the same time they received their computers, and by having multiple dongle stations.
The ability of the administrators to deploy to such large numbers of students bodes
well for eventually requiring all Dartmouth users to have dongles.
Deployment to staff in the administrative departments went more smoothly than
with the students. This was in part because it was easy to find the staff and have time
to give them the tokens. However, staff seemed to have more trouble with learning how
to use their tokens, particularly in choosing and remembering a password. Students
are likely more used to signing up for various accounts on the web, which explains
why they had less trouble with authenticating to their device using a new password.
3.3.2 Advantages and disadvantages
Although deploying these devices proved to be a logistical challenge, their use on
campus offers distinct security advantages (and will offer even more when users can
only authenticate using them). The alternative to dongle credential issuance (in
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which the certificate is stored in a workstation’s software keystore) is done through
a web interface to which a user authenticates using his email password. If that
password is phished, the phisher could get credentials in the user’s name. Having
users authenticate to administrators using a college-issued photo ID makes dongle-
stored credentials much less likely to fall into the wrong hands. Furthermore, once a
user is required to have a token to authenticate, she will notice and report when she
loses it, because she will not be able to access anything she needs. Thus, someone
who has the dongle and knows the password to unlock it has a very high probability
of actually being the owner of the credentials it contains (although there are ways in
which dongle credentials might be keyjacked, as discussed below).
In addition to providing an extra level of assurance over alternative credential
storage schemes, USB dongles are much more portable than an operating system
keystore or a smart card (the latter because the dongles only need a USB port to
interface with the workstation instead of a specialized card reader). However, a
workstation must be installed with the client-side software before a dongle can be used
on it. This works well in enterprise environments where all machines are under the
control of an administrator, but does not easily allow the credentials to be used on a
home computer or outside of the normal enterprise network, for example a consultant
working at off-site at a client’s location. Furthermore, the software currently available
to support the dongles is only available for a limited number of operating systems. A
user clearly cannot use her credentials if she cannot install the necessary software, or
if the software is not available for the given platform. For a hardware authentication
device to be a viable replacement to passwords, the user should be able to safely use
it anywhere she wishes to.
Current implementations of dongles are also limited in their ability to replace
passwords in that they cannot carry credentials from more than one organization.
For example, a user cannot have her dongle loaded with credentials from both her
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bank and her web email provider. Users may one day be able to authenticate to
all remote resources using a single set of credentials, but in the immediate term we
should assume that they may wish to keep sets from multiple issuers on the same
device. The device must also then provide a user with a way to identify which set of
credentials he would like to use for a given operation.
Credential security is one of the main motivators for considering the use of PKI
devices. As we noted previously, the fact that the dongle provides two-factor au-
thentication — requiring something you have and something you know in order to
authenticate — increases the security of the system. Also, moving the credentials
out of the operating system keystore prevent rogue programs from stealing them or
using them improperly. In theory, moving the credentials to the dongle prevents this
kind of keyjacking. In reality, because the operating system still provides the dongle
with data to be signed or decrypted, a malicious program could still keyjack the cre-
dentials by tricking the user into authorizing unsolicited credential operations, which
the keyjacking work in [55] shows. This means that relying parties must know that
a workstation is totally trustworthy–that it is guaranteed to not have such malicious
programs–before they can really trust authentication from a dongle user. Guarantee-
ing that a workstation has no malicious programs installed is a very hard problem.
This means that the security of current dongle systems rely on users’ ability to
recognize a trustworthy machine. Since we know from the success of phishing attacks
that users are not good at recognizing the trustworthy websites, it is a fair assumption
that users will not always make good decisions when asked about workstations. It
would be nice to have a solution that allowed for the portability of credentials, without
exposing the credentials to keyjacking by potentially compromised workstations.
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3.3.3 SHEMP: Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy
In an effort to improve upon the security of existing software and hardware credential
stores, Marchesini et al. followed their keyjacking work with a partial solution [54],
Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy (SHEMP). This system does not make use of
a portable PKI device, but it motivates our discussion of the PorKI project below.
SHEMP addresses the keyjacking problem by automatically and transparently limit-
ing the damage that a weak client can cause. Instead of distributing long-term cre-
dentials for use on workstations, SHEMP keeps them in a central repository and uses
them to issue short-term, temporary credentials called Proxy Certificates (PCs) [93].
Workstations have a set of credentials describing characteristics useful in making trust
decisions–such as where the machine is located and how many people have access to
it–and users have Key Usage Policies (KUPs) describing how their credentials should
be used on workstations with certain characteristics. The SHEMP server limits the
powers of PCs based on the KUP, depending on the characteristics of the workstation
from which the user is working.
This means that the workstation never has access to the long-term credentials; only
the temporary credentials can be keyjacked, which presents a compromise of limited
duration. Because SHEMP allows users to automatically limit the capabilities of the
temporary credentials based on the workstation environment, the system does not
depend so much on users’ ability to recognize trustworthy machines. Limiting the
capabilities of credentials on less trustworthy machines also mitigates the potential
damage from keyjacking on those machines.
However, SHEMP requires the deployment and scalability overhead of this cen-
tralized repository. It also provides no effective way for a user to authenticate to the
repository via a potentially untrustworthy client: in the SHEMP prototype, authenti-
cation is by password, which could be keylogged if the workstation is compromised. It
would be nice if users could authenticate to the repository without going through the
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workstation. Inspired by this idea and the portability of USB dongles, we designed
PorKI as a portable implementation of many SHEMP concepts.
3.4 PorKI design and use
The goal of the PorKI system is to present users with a usable and secure way to
store and use their private keys, without requiring them to purchase special devices,
but while enabling them to make safe trust decisions in heterogeneous environments.
PorKI accomplishes this by building on the SHEMP framework, but with some ad-
ditions and modifications.
PorKI is essentially a software application for a Bluetooth-enabled PDA (personal
digital assistant, or hand-held computer) that manages long-term credentials. This
makes the repository portable, instead of centralized as in SHEMP. General-purpose
PDAs are a departure from the specialized smart card and dongle devices that we
considered above. However, as is indicated below, the additional computation power
and display capabilities allow a more rigorous solution to the problem of portable
PKI.
There may also be a workstation software component in the PorKI system, which
offers information about the workstation to the PDA before credential transfer, and
which can help manage the credentials when they are on the workstation. However,
under the current design any workstation that accepts the Bluetooth file transfer pro-
tocol can interface with a PorKI-enabled PDA, as we indicated below. Any server that
supports X.509 certificate-based authentication and accepts proxy certificates can in-
terpret PorKI-generated credentials, although advanced functionality (parsing KUPs
or workstation credentials from the proxy certificates) may require modifications to
the server software, again discussed below.
Because the PorKI credential repository is kept on the PDA, the user can authen-
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ticate to it directly instead of going through a potentially untrusted workstation, as
in SHEMP. The PorKI program on the PDA then transfers a set of temporary cre-
dentials (again a temporary keypair and a proxy certificate) to the workstation over
Bluetooth. As with SHEMP, if the workstation has itself a set of credentials attesting
to certain characteristics, PorKI can limit the privileges of the temporary credentials
according to a policy defined in terms of these characteristics. Instead of just allowing
users to define a KUP, however, PorKI can also pass the workstation characteristics
on to relying parties, who can also choose to limit the privileges of the user while she
is authenticated from that machine. Often, administrators of the servers to which
users are authenticating to are more qualified than the users themselves to define a
usage policy, so it makes sense to offload the decisions of whether or not to trust a
workstation to them.
We have implemented a basic prototype of the PorKI system, although it does
not yet include the complete set of the features specified by our design. To better
illustrate how PorKI might eventually be used, we consider two example cases of
authentication using it according to its current design. In Section 3.5, we elaborate
on the challenges of bringing PorKI to actual deployment in the real world.
3.4.1 Example 1: Bob and an untrusted machine
Bob is an XYZ Bank customer, and his bank has issued him an X.509 certificate he
can use to authenticate to their online banking site. He is visiting a friend and wants
to check his balance before going out to dinner. He sits down at his friend’s computer,
takes out his PDA, and launches the PorKI application on it. He authenticates to
PorKI by inputting a password into the PDA, which unlocks the credential repository.
He makes sure that the Bluetooth device on the computer is set to be discoverable
by other Bluetooth devices, and tells PorKI to search over Bluetooth for available
workstations. When PorKI displays the list of available computers, Bob selects the
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appropriate one, selects his XYZ Bank credentials from the list available in the PorKI
repository, and chooses to “Generate Credentials”.
Because the computer does not have its own set of credentials, PorKI considers it
to be the default “untrusted”. PorKI generates a new keypair and a proxy certificate
(the latter of which specifies the value “untrusted”), and transfers these credentials to
the workstation using the Bluetooth file transfer protocol. Because the workstation
might have a malicious program that looks for unprotected credential files and tries
to exploit them, PorKI protects the credentials with a one-time password before
transferring them, and displays that password on the PDA screen once the credentials
are transferred. On the computer, Bob imports the credentials into the operating
system’s keystore by double clicking on the transferred file and entering the password
that PorKI has chosen. He turns off his PDA, opens a web browser on the computer,
and goes to XYZ Bank’s website. When he presses the “authenticate” button, the
web browser detects his credentials in the operating system keystore and uses them
to authenticate to the PKI-enabled web server.
Because Bob’s temporary credentials say he is authenticating from an untrusted
workstation, XYZ Bank lets his view his balance, but does not display other personal
information or allow him to transfer money out of his accounts. (If he were authen-
ticating from a more trusted workstation, the bank site would likely give his more
privileges.)
When Bob is done, he logs out of the website. He can choose to remove his
temporary credentials from the computer, but they have a short default lifetime and
he can be reasonably sure that no one else will try to use them. Even if someone else
did use the computer and gain access to his credentials, the worst that the attacker
could do would be view Bob’s bank balance, because the website compensates for the
insecurity of the workstation by limiting the credentials’ privileges.
Because XYZ Bank uses PKI for authentication, its users’ credentials cannot be
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phished. Because Bob has PorKI installed on his PDA, he can carry his credentials
with his and use them on any Bluetooth-enabled computer without installing special
software first.
3.4.2 Example 2: Alice and an enterprise workstation
Alice is an IT professional at a university who is installing new software on a work-
station. The workstation already has a set of credentials issued to it, which identify
it as being in one of the campus libraries and open to use by any campus user. It is
also installed with a lightweight software program to interact with PorKI at a more
advanced level than in the previous example.
Alice launches the PorKI software on the workstation, turns on her PDA, and
instructs PorKI to search for available PorKI-enabled workstations. Instead of estab-
lishing a file-transfer connection with the workstation, PorKI instead establishes a
PorKI-specific connection over Bluetooth.
The workstation passes its credentials (a certificate attesting that the workstation
has certain characteristics, and proof that the workstation is in possession of the
signing key that corresponds to that certificate’s verification key) to Alice’s PDA,
and the PorKI application compares the characteristics they detail to the personal
KUP that Alice has defined. She has specified that temporary credentials issued
to workstations in public places should have a shorter lifespan than default, so this
information, along with the workstation credentials, are put into the proxy certificate
that PorKI generates and passes to the workstation along with the new keypair. PorKI
again protects the temporary credentials with a one-time password, which it displays
on the PDA for Alice to enter on the workstation when importing the credentials
there.
When Alice goes to connect to the university’s software server, the web application
interacts with the workstation PorKI software to perform the authentication. Because
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Alice is authenticating from an enterprise workstation, but that workstation is public,
the server might choose to allow her to download software, but limit the number of
applications she can download. If she were trying to authenticate from an untrusted
workstation, the server might let her view the applications she could download, but
would likely not let her actually obtain copies. In this case, the administrators of
the server would hopefully provide an informative message letting her know that the
reason she could not download software was because of the characteristics of the
workstation from which she was authenticating. Informing users in this way would
help them figure out how accomplish the tasks they want to.
3.5 PorKI evaluation
A key repository and delegation system like PorKI could better enable the deployment
of PKI as a password replacement, because it improves the usability and portability
of traditional PKI systems. Using PKI credentials offers significant security advan-
tages over using passwords; the PorKI system also allows for additional information
to be inserted into trust decisions programatically, thus reducing reliance on users’
judgment. However, as we saw with the PKI token deployment, even a well-designed
system meets hurdles when implemented in the real world. In this section, we evalu-
ate the design and the preliminary prototype in terms of issues that will be relevant
in a real-world deployment.
3.5.1 Keypair generation
Generating a long-term keypair for a PKI device could take place in at least three
different locations: the device itself, the workstation, or the certification authority’s
server. The first option requires a mechanism to remotely certify the keypair; the
second two options require a secure protocol to transfer the credentials. Section 3.6
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elaborates on ways to enhance PorKI to better enable communication between the
PDA and remote parties.
Generating the temporary keypair could also be accomplished on either the PDA
or the workstation. The credential transfer protocol under which it is generated on
the PDA is significantly simpler (and enables PorKI to use the Bluetooth file transfer
protocol if it is interacting with an untrusted workstation not installed with PorKI
workstation software).
To determine whether it is feasible to expect a PDA to handle keypair generation
in a reasonable amount of time, we measured how long it takes to generate the
temporary credentials on preliminary PorKI prototype, which was implemented on
a notebook computer with a 1.33 GHz PowerPC processor. We found that it took
1.67 seconds to perform both the key and proxy certificate generation and signing,
with slightly over half that time being spent just on the key generation. If we assume
all other things being equal, transferring the PorKI software directly to a PDA with
a 200 MHz processor7 would yield credential generation time of roughly 11 seconds,
about half of which is dedicated to the keypair.
This amount of time is significant, and would likely frustrate users if they were
trying to authenticate quickly. Moreover, the battery life of portable devices becomes
an issue when performing compute-intensive tasks. For these reasons, we explore
ideas of offloading key generation to the workstation in 3.6. Perhaps one day hardware
improvements will not make this necessary. Boneh et al. [6] cited 1024-bit RSA key
generation (the same task being performed in PorKI) as taking 15 minutes on a
PDA in 2000; this improvement in five years indicates that the key generation lag
may evaporate in the near future, although the future of mobile battery lives is not
certain.
7This was the speed of a lower-end Bluetooth-enabled business model at the time of this research.
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3.5.2 Client and server integration
Integrating PorKI into existing client applications would likely prove to be a difficult
problem. Authentication through web browsers, which have well-defined APIs for
accessing the operating system’s keystore, is easier, so a system like PorKI would
be more easily deployable for web-based resources. Client applications, into which
password authentication is heavily embedded, would need to change to accept PKI
authentication from credentials in the OS keystore (or user-defined keystores) before
PorKI could be used with them.
In order for a remote server to accept authentication using PorKI temporary
credentials, that server needs to be configured for general PKI authentication, as well
as be able to parse extensions specific to proxy certificates and treat them accordingly
during certificate validation. The proxy certificate IETF standard was developed to
better enable distributed computing in grid environments. Because these certificates
are of a standardized format already in use, it seems likely that commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) software developers would be willing to integrate the necessary parsing
into their products. However, this integration would likely take time.
Parsing PorKI-specific data in the proxy certificates, such as information on the
workstation characteristics, would have to be explicitly implemented in the server
software in order for the server to limit privileges accordingly. Many web servers
provide APIs with which developers can create modules that manage access permis-
sions; this indicates that we could develop a plug-in to allow major web browsers to
understand the PorKI-specific data.
3.5.3 Repository protection
The major advantage of PKI-specific devices is that they are separate from users’
machines, and thus not as likely to be vulnerable to the same attacks just because
they are not connected to the network. If a system like PorKI were to be deployed
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on a PDA with wireless capabilities, it would become more open to attack, but there
seems to be little malicious focus on PDAs in comparison to user machines. This will
surely change if the number of people using PDAs grows.8 However, because PDAs
are frequently synchronized with a workstation in order to back up the data they
contain, we could eventually envision having the workstation evaluate the PDA for
changes between synchronization, thus reducing the risk of malicious programs that
trick users into using their credentials for unintended operations.
In the case of device loss or theft, USB tokens and smart cards are designed
to be resilient against both software and hardware attacks: they are protected by
passwords (and USB tokens lock after too many failed password entries); they are
designed to break and lose data if tampered with. The PorKI repository is also
protected by a password; this prevents the possessor of the PDA from automatically
having access to the credentials, provided that the password is non-trivial and not
shared. However, entering a password into a PDA is not a very quick process, either
by stylus or miniature keyboard. In the future it would be advantageous to consider
alternatives that are more usable, such as a series of gestures with a stylus or other
forms of “graphic passwords” [90] or a biometric password, if the PDA was equipped
with a fingerprint-reading device (such as the Hewlett-Packard h5500 handheld is).
It is possible that mechanisms in the PDA’s operating system could be used to
better protect the repository, although any solution implemented in pure software
runs the risk of being compromised by some sort of rootkit. The only way to truly
provide information assurance on a PDA would be for it to have a secure hardware
component. No such device is currently available, although the U.S. Government
has contracted to have one built [88]. Such a solution would offer much stronger
assurance against advanced hardware attacks if the device were stolen, and would be
8With the advent and proliferation of smartphones, malicious software for mobile devices has
certainly become more common than it was when this was first written. Time will tell whether
mobile operating systems prove more resilient to malware than some desktop operating systems
have thus far been.
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recommended for any truly high-security situations.
3.5.4 Bluetooth transfer
The Bluetooth protocol is a widely deployed and easy-to-implement for portable de-
vices. However, despite these benefits, there is considerable concern regarding Blue-
tooth’s security; the pairing process and its use of PINs has come under particular
scrutiny recently, with Shaked and Wool [80] describing a passive attack that cracks
4-digit PINs used in pairing in 0.06 seconds on a Pentium IV.) The current PorKI
design does not integrate additional security measures for the credential transfer.
However, this is one of the top priorities for future work, as is discussed in Section
3.6.
3.5.5 Usability
One of the most important design goals of PorKI is to make a system that is truly
usable. On our notebook prototype, we did some rough measurements to estimate
how many times a user would have to interact with the system in order to generate
temporary credentials, transfer them, and import them into the workstation’s oper-
ating system keystore. The prototype required a total of four clicks and a password
on the PDA end. The number of clicks required to import the credentials on the
workstation took varied by operating system: Windows took eight and a password,
where OS X took four and a password. Once the system is implemented on the PDA,
the number of clicks could be reduced there; having PorKI client software on the
workstation could similarly reduce the amount of interaction necessary.
This interface is not as seamless as that of a USB token or a smart card systems,
which usually just require a few clicks and a password on the workstation. However,
PorKI offers the added functionality of being able to store keys and certificates from
many different sources, in addition to the added benefits associated with policy state-
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ments about the workstations. Thus, we feel that any additional interaction is worth
the increased functionality.
It is also important to consider overall usability and applicability of the PorKI
model to the average user. While PorKI (like dongles and smart cards) seems well-
suited to enterprise environments, it is also important that it be useful to individual
users who need to authenticate to remote web resources. These users do not have a
system administrator to install software for them, and they are less likely to have a
machine that can securely keep a set of credentials. These users are the ones most
susceptible to the widest-spread phishing attacks; can PorKI work as a password
replacement well enough to protect them from these attacks?
When you consider the ease with which the home user uses passwords and that he
usually does not check his email or bank statements anywhere other than his home
computer, it would seem that PorKI is not an ideal scheme for him. The number of
steps necessary generate and transfer temporary credentials would likely frustrate him
when required for each individual authentication. Moreover, it would be unnecessary
if his computer is properly protected: given a well-designed operating system that
keeps his credentials in a truly secure keystore, with a trusted path to that keystore
so he cannot be tricked into authorizing unwanted credential operations, there is no
reason to try and move his credentials to a different device.
However, PKI is likely to be adopted for authentication before average user com-
puters become this secure. When phishers can no longer target password credentials,
they may turn to operating system exploits to get software-stored PKI credentials.
PorKI could allow the user to store multiple credentials securely.
If we can develop an implementation of PorKI that is small enough to fit on a
cell phone9 — much more common devices than PDAs — this solution would become
even more applicable to the average user. Other expansions to the PorKI project,
9Our lab later demonstrated the feasibility of adapting PorKI to smartphones by implementing
it on an iPhone. [68].
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particularly the stateful browsing and trusted path ideas discussed in Section 3.6,
could also be useful in adapting PorKI for use in the home environment. Although
the forms of protection they would provide are different, they could mitigate the risk
of using private credentials from a poorly-protected workstation to authenticate to
remote resources.
3.6 New applications and directions
In this section, we consider some areas of future work for PorKI.
3.6.1 Offloading keypair generation
As we noted above, offloading the temporary keypair generation to the workstation
could improve the usability of PorKI by reducing lag time and battery usage. Work
by Boneh et al. [6] includes a scheme for generating keypairs on PDAs with the help
of an untrusted workstation; luckily, because PorKI allows the workstation full access
to the temporary key without risk, the entire task of key generation could take place
on the workstation. In order for PorKI on the PDA to issue the proxy certificate
using the long-term credentials, the public part of the temporary keypair needs to be
transferred to the PDA, and the user needs to verify that the public key received is
the same one the workstation transmitted (to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack).
This would impact the usability of the system as a whole, as it would increase the
amount of user interaction.
3.6.2 Trusted path and stateful browsing
Programs such as SSH provide security in part by remembering the identity of the
servers to which they have connected. (Identity is based on a server’s name as typed
on the command line, paired with its public key.) The user is notified whenever she
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is about to make a connection to a site that the program does not know, and asked
if she wants to continue. As this message is rarely seen– only once for each server,
unless the server is re-keyed or a man-in-the-middle attack is being enacted– it is a
useful way to provide users with more information with which to make trust decisions.
If there were some way for PorKI to communicate directly with the remote party
via a trusted path, PorKI could emulate SSH. Perhaps the first work to propose,
prototype and evaluate trusted paths for web browsers was [100] by Ye and Smith;
recent work described in [18] builds upon the principles presented therein. Previous
work on trusted paths specific to portable devices includes [67]. When a user connects
to what she thinks is her PayPal account, if PorKI notifies her that she is, in fact,
connecting to a new server that has never before been seen, this could help her identify
a phishing site. Garfinkel and Miller refer to the SSH metric for evaluating the security
of a connection as key continuity [31]; in this application, we might refer to stateful
browsing, which could grow to encompass not only useful security information, but
also things like bookmarks or browser preferences. Efforts to put an entire web
browser on a USB thumb drive include Portable Firefox [21]. Such an approach
could limit the risk of a malicious program modifying the browser by ensuring that
only parts of the filesystem (for example, the bookmarks) are modifiable. A trusted
path between the PDA and the remote party could also eventually enable the use
of the long-term keypair for highly sensitive applications, as well as digital signing
and decryption, with the potentially untrusted workstation acting only as a transfer
agent.
3.6.3 Wireless certificate issuance
In a PKI, a user’s certificate for their long-term keypair is issued by the PKI’s CA.
With PorKI, once the certificate is issued it must join the keypair in the PDA repos-
itory to complete the long-term credentials. The current PorKI uses an intermediary
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workstation to transfer the credentials, but it would be much cleaner to have them
be transmitted in some streamlined fashion directly from the CA. Dongle deployment
practices often require users to receive their tokens in person, so this would not be
more of a burden than current technology. The user could interact with the PDA and
the administrator with the server, and share data over Bluetooth, instead of trying to
share a single interface (as with dongle deployment). It might even be possible for an
administrator to issue certificates to a room full of people at once, given the proper
protocol of real-word identification and measures to ensure that no one outside the
room could receive a certificate.
3.6.4 Human-to-human delegation
Another application that could harness PorKI’s wireless interface as well as its capac-
ity for issuing proxy certificates is the delegation of a user’s credentials. For example,
a user might choose to delegate the right to access an online resource–a payroll server–
to another user temporarily, while she’s on vacation. If both users are equipped with
a PorKI-enabled PDA, this could be accomplished directly over a Bluetooth connec-
tion. The temporary credential could also be issued directly to a workstation as in
the original PorKI design.
3.7 Conclusions
Phishing exploits the mismatch between human perception of a system and what is
really happening under the interface; humans rely heavily on simple visual clues to
judge trust, and are under-qualified to evaluate the trustworthiness of programs and
machines they authenticate to or through. Using hardware devices, such as USB
PKI dongles or PKI-enabled PDAs, affords a level of protection to users’ private
credentials that the users themselves cannot. Expanded uses of these technologies,
56
including programmatic workstation and website evaluation, stateful browsing, and
person-to-person credential delegation, enable users to re-use their intuitive notions
of trust while making decisions and communicating in the digital world. Enabling
our security systems to follow human trust processes reduces the mismatch between
what a user expects and what the system is really doing– and with that mismatch
also reduces the opportunity for phishing to exploit it.
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Chapter 4
Qualitative methods and corporate
study design
The body of work I describe as the Corporate Study started out as an effort to
get inspiration for research like that presented in the previous chapter. As noted in
Chapter 1, though, it quickly became apparent that the problems participants were
having with access-control technology were far greater than we had anticipated. The
engagement with participants thus morphed from a case study of a single financial
institution into two1 full-on qualitative research efforts exploring the factors that drive
and constrain the practice of access control in large and complex human organizations.
In this chapter I describe the qualitative research methods I employed in conduct-
ing these two studies, and present an introduction to the Corporate Study, whose
results I describe in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 Qualitative methods
As described in Chapter 2, researchers studying human-computer interaction (and
HCI in the context of information systems) have made significant use of qualitative
1The Corporate Study and also the Clinical Study, which is described in Chapter 7.
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methods to understand the human environments in which a computer system is to be
deployed (e.g., to gather requirements for the design of that system), and to evaluate
how well a computer system is meeting the needs of the humans who use it. In this
section I detail the research goals I wished to attain in employing qualitative methods,
and offer details on the specific methods I used in the course of the Corporate and
Clinical studies.
4.1.1 Objectives in qualitative research
The goal of qualitative research is similar to that of quantitative research: to gather
information that offers insight into the nature of a problem or phenomenon. Qualita-
tive research methods achieve this goal by observing the qualities of (and interactions
between) the factors and processes that contribute to the phenomenon, rather than by
measuring their magnitude, frequency of occurrence, or other quantifiable attributes.
When embarking on this research I did not have a particularly well-defined set of
questions I wanted to answer; I instead had a problem — the apparent brokenness
of access control as it is practiced in real-world organizations — that I wanted to
understand better. I chose to employ qualitative methods that seemed to offer a
good path toward better understanding nature of this problem.
4.1.2 Semi-structured interviews
Both the Corporate and Clinical studies feature semi-structured interviews of individ-
uals from participating organizations. This type of open-ended interview is designed
to facilitate exploration of one or more themes. It starts with a series of questions,
but emphasizes flexibility to enable researchers to ask unscripted follow-up questions,
thus allowing participants and researchers to shape the discussion in whatever way
seems most natural or interesting. This is in contrast with a structured interview,
which relies on a pre-defined set of questions to elicit information.
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Semi-structured interviews work best when the interviewer has identified a broad
set of themes they wish to ask questions about; for this research a number of central
themes quickly developed:
1. The tools participant organizations use to manage access control
2. How access-control tools come to be developed or purchased, configured, and
deployed within the participant organization
3. Participants’ broad experiences managing and using access-control technologies
4. Anecdotes where participants were surprised or frustrated in their interaction
with access-control technology — either by the design of the tool itself, or by
unexpected interaction patterns exhibited by users
5. Participants’ vision of what it would mean for an access-control technology to
be successful within their organization, and whether their current tools meet
that standard
6. How participants perceived the community of access-control researchers, and
the body of research literature on the subject
The open-ended nature of semi-structured interviews makes them well-suited to
the discovery and exploration of an issue or phenomenon. When conducted with large
participant populations, they can offer a relatively complete picture of participants’
experiences. In this research I sought to gather information that was both detailed
and accurate. While I believe that the results I have highlighted apply to many
organizations similar to those that participated in these studies — and practitioners
from multiple non-participant organizations have informally affirmed this opinion —
we should not take these results as being a comprehensive catalogue of the experiences
such organizations face.
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Like any data collection method that relies on self-reporting, we must also antici-
pate that the results revealed by semi-structured interviews may have been influenced
by the individuals doing the reporting; I expect that it may even be possible to iden-
tify systematic biases in participant reporting. However, by seeking qualitative rather
than quantitative data from participants — in seeking to document the existence of
phenomena rather than to measure their frequency or prevalence — I believe that the
potential for such biases does not reduce the importance of these results.
I used transcripts of recordings from interviews with software-industry partici-
pants to study their perspectives, but relied on my own and others’ field notes while
analyzing the perspectives of other interviewees.
4.1.3 Ethnographic observation
In an effort to bypass some of the limitations of participant self-reporting one encoun-
ters while conducting interviews, I also engaged in a small amount of direct ethno-
graphic observation of participants, particularly during the Clinical Study. Ethnogra-
phy in general seeks to describe the nature of the participants, their interactions, and
their environment by becoming an accepted (if temporary, and often relatively quiet)
member of the community being studied. In both studies this included sitting in on
regularly-scheduled meetings as a silent observer; in the Clinical Study, it also meant
spending time at nurses’ stations watching them go about their jobs as normal.
The product of my ethnographic observations were field notes, which I then classi-
fied and analyzed using standard methods for qualitative data analysis, as described
below.
4.1.4 Qualitative data analysis
A qualitative researcher who has gathered transcripts and field notes seeks to bring




The process of coding qualitative data consists of choosing words or phrases to rep-
resent chunks of source text; depending on the goals of the study and the nature of
the data, researchers may choose from among a variety of coding schemes; Johnny
Saldaña’s Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers [74] offers a nice overview of
major ones, and is the source of quotes below.
In this work I applied a mix of two coding methodologies to my raw data (my
transcripts and field notes):
• Descriptive coding, which “summarizes in a word or a phrase — often a noun —
the basic topic of a passage of qualitative data”. Saldaña notes that the topic
of a passage is not the same as its content ; for example, it is possible for two
participants to discuss role-based access control but say very different things
about it.
• In vivo coding, which “uses words or short phrases from the actual language
found in the qualitative data record” to encapsulate meaning.
My process for applying codes to data thus consisted of breaking the data into logical
passages, and identifying a phrase (either an in vivo quote or descriptive words of my
own) that summarize each passage. To help me in my task of indexing my data, I often
parameterized codes with additional information; I would thus tag a passage not just
as pertaining to “provisioning” or “org structure”, but “provisioning: mechanisms” and
“org structure: awareness of”. Figure 4.1 offers a small sample of the codes derived
from Corporate Study data, to give a flavor of what they look like.
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business relations: buy-in
business relations: “language of the firm”
business relations: tech-savvy person to interface with
data ownership awareness
dogfood: internal product deployment as sales tool
entitlement granularity
entitlement review: drop-dead date
HIPAA
IT support: escalation
org maturity: inflated sense of
org scale: # employees
policy changes: testing
product expectations
provisioning: copy/paste and adjust
provisioning: deprovisioning during transfer
provisioning: deprovisioning process
risk management: philosophy
role definition: “if it starts at IT it’s going to fail”
role definition: dependence on local laws
Figure 4.1: A small sample of the codes I used to organize raw qualitative data (field notes
and interview transcripts) from the Corporate Study.
Developing themes
I then used these codes to develop a set of themes, using the following process:
1. Skim through the list of codes
2. Identify a theme or unifying idea that seems to connect a group of codes
3. Read carefully through the codes (referring if necessary to the sections of the
transcripts and field notes to which they refer) to capture all the codes that are
associated with the theme
4. If possible, identify connections between the current theme and others that have
been previously identified
5. Iterate until all significant themes have been extracted
6. Review the resultant set of themes and their connections, with an eye toward
splitting themes where necessary and combining them where possible
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The set of themes that resulted from this process form the backbone around
which I build my presentation of the study results in the next few chapters. While
the experience of doing this analysis was somewhat laborious, it provided me the
opportunity to examine my observations from a wide variety of angles, and ultimately
has offered me a deeper understanding of the information that participants shared in
taking part of these studies.
4.2 Corporate study design
The fieldwork I refer to as the Corporate Study2 consisted largely of semi-structured
interviews of employees from three large companies (two investment banks and one
software vendor). This section offers more an overview of the study: its focus, its
structure, and the organizations who participated in it. This information sets the
stage for the study results presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.2.1 Preliminary work
At the outset of the work that eventually became the Corporate Study, our research
group was inspired by anecdotes from professionals in a variety of industries who
reported users circumventing security controls in order to get their jobs done. As
a computer security researcher, these accounts were surprising and troubling: were
users really doing this? What types of controls were they circumventing, and why
were not organizations trying to stop the circumvention? Was there something we,
as researchers, could do to improve the security systems — perhaps make them more
flexible, so users did not have to work around them?
I sought to interview information security practitioners to verify these reports of
user circumvention, and identify any related phenomena. I anticipated my research
2Here I use “corporate” to describe office-and-cubicle environments, which are in contrast to the
hospitals and exam rooms of the Clinical Study.
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path would consist of three broad phases: 1) Observe practitioners in the real world
and document the challenges they encounter. 2) Build a new tool or solution (such
as those discussed in Chapter 3) that addresses one or more of these challenges. 3)
Take my tool back to practitioners and try to evaluate whether it would actually be
useful to them.
Focus and scope
We first pursued collaboration with a high-level information security professional at
a large investment firm. Preliminary discussions indicated that the firm did indeed
struggle with providing access control that met the needs of their users, so we focused
our interviews on identity and access management (IAM) systems.
In an effort to gain broader perspective on these problems, we also initiated col-
laboration with another investment bank of similar size to the first one. Although the
scope of this second collaboration is considerably smaller than the first, its results do
serve to validate that our findings are not unique to a single organization.
After collaborating with these financial organizations, we also had the opportunity
to interview infosec practitioners at a large software company. This organization not
only develops products in the IAM space, but uses its own products internally, and
thus offered a new double perspective on access-control tools.
Section 4.2.2 offers more details on the individual participant organizations and
our fieldwork with them.
Evolution
It quickly became apparent that participants were not concerned with — or even really
interested in — many of the the issues academic researchers were focused on in this
space. We entered the fieldwork expecting to offer novel insights and helpful solutions;
instead, practitioners gave us lessons on the realities of their world. Academics were
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looking at all the wrong problems. The basic forms of many of our pet technologies
(e.g., end-user PKI) were neither used nor considered useful in practice. Our set of
technical vocabulary was disjoint from their own. The formal literature of what we
considered to be well-established access-control models (e.g., RBAC) was generally
useless in building actual systems.
Because I started these interviews looking for problems I could solve with tech-
nology, I was initially surprised at how much participants talked about human and
business factors in describing their challenges with identity and access management.
While I expected that the usability of security tools would play a role in the organi-
zations’ problems, I did not anticipate that the relevant human factors would extend
so far from the individual user’s computer screen.
Given these early surprises, I quickly changed my approach from one of finding
a solvable problem to one of documenting participants environment and experiential
wisdom. I still wanted to build technology to help practitioners with identity and
access management, but clearly needed to re-learn what IAM was all about first.
4.2.2 Participant organizations
We collaborated with three organizations during the course of this study: two invest-
ment banks and one software company. We made contact contact with key “gate-
keeper” individuals at each organization through the professional networks of our
PIs. These gatekeepers then helped us establish the collaborative relationship and
get access to interview their colleagues.
Primary investment bank (P-Bank)
I refer to the investment bank that played the larger role in this study as the primary
investment bank, or P-Bank. This bank is a large (approximately 30,000 employees
worldwide) investment firm that provides a variety of financial services to organiza-
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tions and individuals.
In 2006 an M.B.A. student and I conducted a two-week field study at the P-Bank
headquarters. This included in-depth semi-structured interviews of 18 employees,
including one Managing Director (a C-level executive), two Vice Presidents, and a
variety of associate- and analyst-level participants. The minimum length of each
interview was an hour, but we conducted multiple interviews with approximately a
third of participants, including daily wrap-up interviews with our VP-level primary
contact. Two participants occupied non-technical positions within the organization;
the remainder were employed within various technical branches, including software
development, general IT support, information security, and infosec policy definition.
I base my analysis on the field notes of that the M.B.A. student and I each took
during these interviews.
Employee participation was limited by professional availability during the site visit
(e.g., employee vacations and meeting conflicts), and was arranged in all cases by our
primary contact. Initial participants were selected by our primary contact based
on pre-visit discussions of the study’s goals. Additional participants (most of whom
were interviewed during the second week) were selected either by explicit referral from
initial participants (e.g., “You should talk to Henry R., he is deeply involved in that
process”) or by our primary contact in response to specific researcher requests (e.g.,
"Could we talk to a manager on the business side who had to perform an entitlement
review?"). Researchers took field notes while interviewing participants, but the the
interviews were not recorded using audiovisual equipment.
Secondary investment bank (S-Bank)
The second participant investment bank (which we refer to as S-Bank) is also a large
(approximately 50,000 employees worldwide) investment firm that provides a variety
of financial services to organizations and individuals.
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We interviewed two S-Bank employees, and each interview lasted roughly an hour.
We conducted the interviews during one of the weeks we spent doing deeper interviews
at P-Bank. I base my analysis on the field notes that the M.B.A. student and I each
took during these interviews.
The interviews did not go into as much depth as those at P-Bank, but we had the
opportunity to both solicit their own perspectives on the challenges they faced and
check that their experiences mirrored those reported by participants from P-Bank.
SoftCorp.
I conducted interviews at the participant software company (which we refer to as
SoftCorp) in collaboration with a team of three researchers from another academic
institution in 2009. I base my analysis on the transcripts of those interviews produced
by my collaborators.
We interviewed a total of 5 SoftCorp employees. Participants reported that the
organization had an employee population of approximately 14,000, give or take 5-10%
for short-term contractors.
One participant was involved in the development of the identity management
product that was the focal subject of the interviews. The other participants were
part of the internal IT organization responsible for the operation and management of
the internal deployment of that product.
4.2.3 Background observations
Chapters 5 and 6 reference a variety of systems and problems that came up during
interviews. This section offers a brief overview of those topics, and serves to pro-
vide additional context that is useful in understanding observations and participants’
comments in the later chapters.
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Organizational and interpersonal notes
As mentioned above, participants spent a considerable amount of time discussing
the human externalities that impact the success of identity and access management
systems. Participants brought up phenomena that are rooted both within individual
humans (e.g., emotional state, perception of the IT department’s goals) and without
(e.g., the organization’s philosophy and culture).
The organization. Participants often provided us with background information
about the organization while discussing particular IAM topics; participants from P-
Bank in particular had much to say about the driven, no-nonsense culture of their
firm. All three organizations seemed to prioritize information security — but this is
likely part of the reason they were willing to partner with us in this research. P-Bank
participants espoused the belief that “cost is not the issue” when it comes to providing
information security.
“The business would love to give [the infosec] group three times the fund-
ing if they could solve security issues completely transparently, without
changing everything.”
The infosec team. Most interviews reflected a certain degree of cohesion among
the organization’s infosec team, even when viewed from the outside by participants
who were not themselves infosec professionals. These teams varied in size from ap-
proximately thirty people at SoftCorp to ninety-eight people at P-Bank. The high-
level executive who headed the P-Bank infosec team said that the size of his organi-
zation was strategic. If he had a group larger than one hundred people, other groups
might get the impression that he was there to do the heavy lifting; they might tell
him that “you should be helping solve all my risk”. With a small team, he was able
to force different units within the business to take ownership of their own security
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issues instead of pushing it off on him:
“... other people can’t turn around and say, but you’ve got this huge team,
you do it!”
The executives of P-Bank had also recently removed this participant from the
technology management team in an effort to force other managers to engage in security
management within their respective organizations.
“... the senior tech managers, any time security decisions came up, they
turned to me. Once I left, the CIO grilled each of them on their security
stuff, then they went back and called me to ask me and my team to help
them.”
Infosec team relationships. Participants also spent significant time discussing
the relationship of the infosec team to other players, including users, vendors, and
regulatory compliance staff. The results chapters discuss some of the relevant aspects
of interaction with users and vendors; it is also worth noting that participants from
P-Bank had a particularly dim opinion of the competence and efficacy of regulatory
enforcement. During an informal meeting early in the research collaboration, one
participant told me a story about a compliance audit, and how easy it had been to
sweep what he considered to be serious problems under the rug. At the end of the
exercise — when he realized how little the auditors understood about the systems
and the threats they faced — he wanted to tell them, “Hey, when you go to [the retail




Corporate study results: the
organization against itself
Popular understanding of information security holds that it aims to protect computer
systems from the “bad guys,” be they external attackers or malicious users working
from the inside. At the outset of this study I expected to observe a degree of opposition
between the infosec staffers and the business users — I expected that on some level, in
the effort to protect organization, its members would be working against each other.
While there is some evidence of this dynamic — particularly in the interviews with
lower-level infosec professionals — higher-ranking interviewees uniformly focused on
cooperation and support of their organization’s business users and processes. As one
information executive said of the challenges his group faced, “It’s not how to get stuff
done, it’s how to not mess stuff up”. Rather than worrying about malicious users,
interviewees said they “assume[d] people will do the right thing,” and strived to “make
sure [the security systems] won’t annoy them in the process”. The goal of the team
was thus to facilitate the organization in its larger efforts; in some ways, they viewed
themselves as “stewards of the company”.
This study supports the belief that a deep understanding of business processes
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helps IT groups achieve their infosec goals. However, in documenting the successes
of this cooperative philosophy, it also highlights ways in which well-intentioned but
insufficiently-informed infosec practices can put the organization at tremendous risk.
In this chapter I discuss specific examples: Section 5.1 considers instances in which
users have circumvented security controls in order to get their jobs done, and Sec-
tion 5.2 explores why access-control settings consistently defy organizational policy
and tend over time toward a “system high” configuration. While troubling on their
own, these phenomena indicate that real-world organizations may suffer from a deep
mismatch between the official de jure and practical de facto policies, and thus a pro-
found disconnect between the the perception and reality of the organization’s state
and security posture.
5.1 Users circumvent controls
Participants frequently mentioned the use of controls — mechanisms to constrain or
regulate users’ actions — to achieve the organization’s infosec goals. Some controls
are built into computer systems, including the set of technologies we refer to as “access
controls” and the separation of duty (SOD) constraint described by one participant
below. Organizations also implement “manual-type business controls,” which shape
user behavior by dictating processes to be followed; SoftCorp falls back on manual
controls when there are too few staff members within a department to provide the
preferred automatic SOD control.
“[The] treasury application, for example, they don’t want anybody at the
service desk handling stock. So there could be people in the business that
do it. There is a rule though. The person who approves — the person
that requests the person that approves and the person that executes [that
approval] cannot be the same person unless there is a staff issue and there
72
is only one person. In which case there has to be other mitigating controls
in place — generally manual business-type controls, someone has to do a
sign-off and whatnot.”
As their name implies, manual business controls depend heavily on the human
users that interpret and enforce them, as in the case of controls placed on entitlement
provisioning:
“So it is really relying on the service folks [...] to correctly identify the
process in there as being acceptable and then the help desk people actually
follow through with it.”
The vast majority of participants had encountered cases in which users circum-
vented controls (either automatic technological controls, manual business controls, or
both). Many of the stories these participants relayed, however, involved situations
where users were not censured for their circumvention: organizations often perceived
that the user was acting not from malice, but in the best interests of the organization.
Rather than being seen as breaking organization policy, users were often perceived as
optimizing around unreasonable controls.
5.1.1 Routing work through the cloud
As a first example, let us consider a scenario in which users at one of our participant
financial organizations circumvented a software vetting process by using a cloud-based
document-sharing application.
This firm had a well-defined approval process for all software purchases; thus, for
example, if a consumer investment department received a request from high-value
client to communicate using a new video chat program, company policy required that
the department request a review of the program before using it. This review process
included an examination of the program’s security: e.g., is the video communication
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encrypted? is it built on a peer-to-peer infrastructure, or is all video routed through
the software company’s server in North Korea?
At the time of our interviews, most users shared documents within the organiza-
tion over email or networked drives. However, a set of users — a participant who
shared this anecdote conjectured that they were likely new employees fresh out of
business school — started using SharePoint, a enterprise content management sys-
tem provided (at the time) for free by Microsoft. Files uploaded to SharePoint were
stored on Microsoft’s servers, and could be shared with a simple URL, which was
much easier than waiting for a large file to load, as with email, or trying to navigate
to the correct file in a networked filesystem. SharePoint files could also be accessed
anywhere, including from machines not managed by the firm, and were thus were
particularly convenient when sharing information with external partners.
Of course, when they discovered the use of SharePoint within the firm, members
of the infosec team viewed these features as potential security threats, and believed
that employees using it were in violation of the spirit (although perhaps not the
letter, as SharePoint was not actually an application installed or running on users’
workstations) of the organization’s software review policy. However, their analysis
of the situation focused less on the behavior of the users, and more on the drivers
behind that behavior. Our conversation included questions such as the following:
• Awareness: Were users aware of the software review requirement? Did they
realize that a security review of SharePoint would be in the firm’s best interest?
Did they act knowingly, or in ignorance?
• Cost of compliance: Software review was tied to purchasing, and initiated
by sub-organizations within the business, not individuals. If a user saw a free
tool like SharePoint that they believed could improve their productivity, what
steps did they have to go through to initiate a software review request? If the
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software review process was faster or otherwise less onerous, would that have
impacted users’ decision to not engage with it?
• Actual outcome: Would it be reasonable to provide the SharePoint function-
ality users desired, or were there some features that were fundamentally incom-
patible with the organization’s security goals? (E.g., under what circumstances
is it acceptable for users to share internal documents with external partners,
and is the organization willing to accept the risk posed by allowing users to
make those decisions individually?)
Taken at face value, the organization’s software review policy would lead an au-
ditor (or a literal-minded computer scientist) to believe that a user’s desire to use a
particular program could be judged in stark, binary terms: either the user was using
approved software, or she was not. Either the organization sanctioned the software,
or it did not. Either the software was secure, or it was not. From the perspective of
real-world practitioners, however, users’ circumvention of the software review policy
existed in a grey area that begged further investigation.
5.1.2 Password use and abuse
Many participants shared stories about users circumventing security controls through
the “misuse” of passwords; this is not surprising, as passwords are the single most
commonly-used authentication mechanism in the corporate world. Many organiza-
tions have policies regarding password use: passwords must be of a certain length and
complexity, they must be changed with a certain frequency, they must not be written
down, etc. (Appendix A offers a more thorough summary and commentary on current
password policy practices; I originally prepared it as a stand-alone document for one
of our partner organizations in another study that was seeking to revise its password
policy.)
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One financial participant shared a story about his organization in which it had
become apparent that users did not know the Active Directory passwords they were
supposedly using to log in to their workstations each day; when asked to authenticate
in another environment as part of a new business procedure, they were unable to do
so. In the past the firm had trouble with passwords being written on sticky notes and
attached to computer screens, but the monitors of the users in question appeared to
be free of such policy-violating flags. After some sleuthing, the participant discovered
that large numbers of users had adapted their strategy after the earlier crackdown,
and were now taping password-laden sticky notes to the undersides of their keyboards.
From the perspective of a security professional, it would seem that users were not
only going out of their way to violate the password policy, but were actively engaged
in deception to hide the violation! However, a deeper investigation of the situation
revealed that up until that point users had only needed those passwords for initial
daily workstation authentication; they were still required to use a variety of other
passwords to access email, internal databases, and other business resources. Users
perceived that the value of the workstation passwords were comparatively low, and
had a hard time remembering them because they were used comparatively rarely; in
this situation, their decision to violate policy was actually quite reasonable.
Infosec professionals from participant organizations seemed to value this sort of
insight into users’ decision-making, in part because it helped them craft security poli-
cies that made it easy users to do the right thing. Many participants addressed user
password management by citing an ongoing focus on improving their organizations’
use of single sign-on (SSO) technology; although compromise of a SSO password poses
a greater risk, it was easier for the infosec team to quantify and deal with that cen-
tralized risk than it would be to cope with the possibility that users throughout the
organization were constantly finding new and creative ways to make single-system
passwords vulnerable.
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In the case of the users who cleverly hid their passwords under their keyboards,
the organization sought to make passwords more memorable. Given that users had
a hard time remembering infrequently-used passwords, it explored requiring users to
log in multiple times a day. If implemented using inactivity timeouts, this approach
would have the added benefit of reducing time when workstations were left logged
in while unattended (i.e., when the user was at lunch). Timeouts and forced re-
authentication were reasonable for some areas of the organization, but disastrous in
others; for example, users in some departments spent long periods of time watching
stock market data flow across one computer screen, using a different computer or
a telephone to react to the market’s fluctuations. Users in that environment did
not react well to being locked out of their real-time data feed because they had not
moved a mouse or typed on a keyboard, and given the importance of those users to
the profitability of the organization, executives mirrored their negative reaction.
The infosec team explored alternatives approaches to making workstation pass-
words more memorable — or at least manageable — in these departments, but their
intense culture had offered some important insight: users in these environments
worked in close contact with their peers (and would thus easily recognize an in-
terloper), and it was vanishingly rare for the floor to be empty on a weekday during
the business day. The organization was thus able to rely on informal social control
to protect unattended workstations during operating hours, rather than resorting to
a timeout.1
Password sharing
Many participants reported encountering users who circumvented password-based
controls by sharing passwords, although few were able to give concrete example sce-
1Apparently the nature of the work (i.e., its dependence on the stock market being open) meant
that users in those departments simply did not try to conduct business during off hours. The
organization thus implemented an automatic logout as part of the daily machine refresh after the
markets closed.
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narios. Of course, instances of password sharing come up periodically in the popular
press. For example, Jérôme Kerviel made headlines in 2008 for conducting 50 billion
euros’ worth of fraudulent trades at his then-employer, Société Générale; in 2010,
he was sentenced to three years of jail time and monetary restitution of 4.9 billion
euros, which is what the bank estimated it lost as a result of his actions [11]. Al-
though the organization did not officially sanction password sharing, Kerviel claims
that his supervisors largely turned a blind eye as long as he his trades were prof-
itable, and that he used passwords of fellow traders to disguise his activities in the
official records [47]. If password sharing was indeed tolerated by Kerviel’s supervisors,
the mismatch between the bank’s official policy (“Don’t share passwords”) and their
functional policy (“It’s ok to share passwords if you make lots of money”) certainly
contributed to auditors’ inability to detect the fraud taking place.
Although few of our study participants were able to give concrete details about
password sharing within their organizations, one participant from the software indus-
try did spend time on “generic” or “service” accounts, used “for letting various services
and things that need to run that you need an account to run because Windows re-
quires accounts to run”. Unlike user accounts, generic accounts are not affiliated with
an individual human, but may be shared by several people who interact with a spe-
cific software program or business process. Because this represents a sanctioned form
of password-sharing within the organization, we can use it to gain insight into some
of the reasons users are motivated to share passwords illicitly, and into the challenges
password-sharing poses for the organization.
The participant explained that generic accounts are popular because they allow
users to transparently share access to data and functionality without having to pro-
vision individual user accounts: if Alice, Bob, and Carol need to manage the LDAP
server, it is probably easier to create a single LDAP_admin account with the correct
permissions than it is to add entitlements to each user’s existing account. If Susan
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joins the team, or needs to help out in an emergency situation, it is quick and easy
for Bob to give her the access she needs: he just tells her the password for the generic
account.
The participant estimated that for the roughly 14k employees in his organization
there were a total of 5-6k provisioned generic accounts. While not all of these generic
accounts were used regularly by humans to log in to machines — some were used to
run automated background processes — they represent a significant proportion of the
total accounts in the organization. Despite this prevalence, the participant reported
trying to phase out their use:
“They are hard to maintain — ownership rules change and the passwords
are shared, sometimes a business support group and there might be five
people that support a service and runs generic accounts. Now five people
know the password. It could be owned by a person that changes roles now
you have to keep track of that. [...] There’s a lot of overhead and we are
looking for ways to better manage that. It’s one of the larger problems we
have and it was a source of many findings for us in as well in the past.”
In other words, although generic accounts provide greater flexibility for users dur-
ing their day-to-day activities, they also require additional management effort from
administrators. The organization has well-defined processes that streamline the man-
agement of traditional user accounts, but these processes in turn represent overhead
to users seeking to provision their peers for a specific task at hand. If the organization
phases out generic accounts without taking additional measures to make individual
accounts more flexible, it would seem likely that some users might start sharing
passwords to accomplish their operational goals. I believe this would ultimately be
counter-productive: although the organization might appear on paper to be more se-
cure after removing generic accounts, ad-hoc and concealed password-sharing provides
an effective backdrop for the rogue actions of the next Jérôme Kerviel.
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5.1.3 Modeling the circumvention of controls
The factors that motivate users to share passwords — and, indeed, to circumvent
controls in general — are too complex to address fully in this study (although I do
touch on them again with the results of my clinical study in Chapter 7). However,
we have sufficient information to provide at least a rough sketch of how users might
make the choice to circumvent, and what the ramifications are for the organization.
From the user’s perspective
Figure 5.1 shows my model of what happens when a user Dana encounters a control
while trying to accomplish a particular task. She may choose to attempt to satisfy
the control (e.g., enter her password, place her eye in front of a retinal scanner), which
carries with it a cost CS (e.g., the hassle of remembering the password or taking off
her glasses); her attempt to satisfy the control may or may not succeed.2 Dana may
also choose to give up, although this guarantees that she will not complete her task,
and thus carries a cost CU (e.g., fallout for failing to do her job). If she does not think
she will be able to satisfy the control — if, for example, she was not provisioned with
sufficient entitlements and has failed to satisfy the control in the past — she may
protest the control (or, more exactly, the control’s outcome), which carries a cost
CP (representing lost time, embarrassment explaining the situation to her supervisor,
frustration at having to call the helpdesk, etc.). Finally, Dana may choose to attempt
to circumvent the control, which may or may not succeed, and which carries a cost
CC , which will likely include the time she spends trying to circumvent the control. CC
also represents any potentially negative consequences for choosing to circumvent the
control, scaled by the probability that her circumvention is detected. If she attempts
but fails to satisfy or circumvent the control, she finds herself back in her initial state
2Note here that “success” is defined from Dana’s perspective: she aims to achieve a task, and



















Figure 5.1: A user’s perspective on encountering a control. CP represents the cost the
user perceives she will experience if she protests the control, CU the cost of abandoning her
task, and CS and CC the costs of she attempting to satisfy or circumvent the control.
before the control,3 minus the CS or CC “spent” enacting her choice.
From the organization’s perspective
When designing the system from the perspective of an infosec researcher, we intend
to have users provisioned correctly, to have the controls be accurate in their verdicts,
and — in the rare cases where a user is incorrectly unable to satisfy a control —
that the process for rectifying the situation is swift and painless. In such a system
we anticipate that Dana’s infosec team would try to minimize CS and maximize CC ,
i.e., have users perceive that it is easy (inexpensive) to do the right thing and work
with the control, and and hard (expensive) to try and circumvent it. They would
also aim to have CP < CC , and scale CU to incentivize users to draw attention to
problems rather than silently circumventing them or giving up (users who protest
increase the organization’s ability to fix those problems and improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of the system over time).
Unfortunately, my fieldwork indicates that users in real organizations frequently
3This model does not reflect systems that keep track of multiple attempts to satisfy a control. A
system that refuses access after three failed login attempts, for example, would likely include distinct




Attempts to satisfy ProtestsAttempts to circumvent Gives up
Access logged Inaccuracies Feedback Indirect
Figure 5.2: My model of an organization’s perspective a user’s reaction to a control. When
the user “attempts to circumvent” the control or “gives up”, the organization is unlikely to
have an accurate record of her action.
encounter systems that do not meet these optimal specifications. Systems with in-
correct entitlement assignments or inaccurate controls frustrate users, and increase
the expected value of CS relative to CC . Systems with higher CP relative to CC or
CU make it harder for the organization to get the feedback it needs to improve the
system. As modeled in Figure 5.2, a choice to circumvent or give up in such a system
not only fails to provide the organization with accurate records or feedback, but can
even corrupt the streams of information coming from users who attempt to satisfy
or protest controls. (Unwinding Jérôme Kerviel’s fraud was likely difficult in part
because the logs could not distinguish between actions initiated legitimately by his
colleagues and actions initiated by him using their credentials.)
This means that getting the incentives balanced correctly to genuinely discourage
users from circumventing controls is not just a desirable part of the design process,
but a critical one: systems that facilitate circumvention are at constant risk of silent
self-sabotage.
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5.2 Nature abhors under-entitlement
The first half of this chapter considered ways in which an organization can work
against itself by inspiring, tolerating, or ignoring user circumvention of security con-
trols. We next consider another problematic phenomenon, one that seems practically
universal4 among large organizations: user over-entitlement.
Professionals from the financial industry were the first study participants to point
out that users not only tend to be over-entitled, but that they tend to become more
so with time. They noted that it was possible to trace the career path of a senior
users who had been with the company for many years by looking at their current
entitlements. Figure 5.3 shows a sample of entitlements currently assigned to a hypo-
thetical user, Carol Jones. Although she is currently an “Associate Vice President”,
many of her entitlements are typically associated with positions she held earlier in
her career. A person familiar with the organization’s entitlement descriptors could
easily reconstruct Carol’s path from an entry-level user support person to her current
job via multiple supervisory and management positions.
Being able to trace an employee’s career path is not in and of itself necessarily
worrisome. However, it indicates that users are not being deprovisioned when they are
promoted or transferred to new positions. In Carol’s case, her promotion from “Group
manager” to “Associate VP” spanned a separation of duty constraint designed to con-
trol purchasing; because she did not lose the ability to perform PurchaseRequest_L3
when she gained ApprovePurchase_L3, it may now be possible for her to both request
and approve a high-level purchase by herself.
4I have been conducting an informal study of security professionals from large organizations
wherever I encounter them; thus far, every one has said that their organization was either recently
or currently struggling with rampant over-entitlement.
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Figure 5.3: Participants reported being able to trace a senior user’s career through a
company by her currently provisioned entitlements. In this sample of hypothetical user
Carol Miller’s entitlements, we see evidence that she once worked a user support consultant,
and progressed through several other positions since starting with the company.
5.2.1 A parallel with “system high”
The tendency toward over-entitlement in large organizations would seem to paral-
lel the tendency of multi-level security systems to operate in “system high” mode,
described here by Landwehr et al. in work on military message systems [52]:
Military message systems are required to enforce certain security rules.
For example, they must insure that users cannot view messages for which
they are not cleared. Unfortunately, most automated systems cannot be
trusted to enforce such rules. The result is that many military message
systems operate in “system-high” mode: each user is cleared to the level
of the most highly classified information on the system. A consequence of
system-high operation is that all data leaving the computer system must
be classified at the system-high level until a human reviewer assigns the
proper classification.
84
Operation at system high — which requires maximal user clearance — seems
antithetical to the multi-level security approach, which aims to protect data while
maximizing authorized users’ access to it. However, the phenomenon exists in mili-
tary settings (among others) for entirely understandable reasons; certain facts about
the organization’s goals and the capabilities of computing systems combine to make
convergence to a state of system high somewhat predictable. Landwehr does not state
these points explicitly, but I believe that they implicitly underlie his discussion.
MLS Conjecture: It is difficult for an automated computer program to accurately
classify real-world data, but relatively easy to do so approximately.
MLS Conjecture: Accurate manual classification of data, or reclassification, is
expensive (in person-hours) compared to approximate automated classification.
MLS Conjecture: Given a choice between assigning a data classification that is
likely to high and assigning one that is likely too low, it is preferable in military
environments to err on the side of higher classification.
MLS Conjecture: Resources (i.e., person hours) are limited.
The system high phenomenon sacrifices users’ access to data in exchange for pro-
tecting that data more rigorously. As I will now argue, I believe that organizations
experience systematic over-entitlement because they make the opposite exchange:
they sacrifice rigorous limitation of privilege, but guarantee that users have sufficient
data access to fulfill their business expectations.
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5.2.2 Entitlement errors
As it is difficult to accurately classify data in a multi-level security system, it is also
hard to automatically provision users with appropriate entitlements. Participants,
such as this infosec team member from the software industry, reported that the ma-
jority of provisioning in their organizations is done manually, but that they would
like to see the process become more automated:
“[Provisioning] involves somebody figuring out what [the users] need access
to, creating a ticket in Service Desk, and waiting for someone else to figure
out which systems they are referring to and then going in and provisioning
that access. And there is some document ultimately about what — who is
the owner of the system, who is the access approver of the system. Here is
the method that you give access to. That is largely not automated today
and that is what the other products that we are trying to implement will
help us do.”
In this instance, the participant was focused on automating the information-
gathering aspects of the provisioning process, rather than the actual approval or
rejection of the provisioning request they proceed.5 In his vision for the future, there
would be a quick and easy way to identify what people “need access to,” to specify the
system in question, and to identify the system’s owner or access approver to whom
the request should be routed.
Assume for a moment that the participant’s organization achieved this perfect
information availability. Like any manual task, the provisioning decision itself would
still be subject to a certain error rate: we consider it normal that humans periodi-
cally make typos, misread instructions, or experience other imperfect operation. If
5At first I was surprised by how much trouble organizations seem to have keeping track of basic
information about themselves. Now I believe that this self-understanding is a key factor in the
success of organizations’ access management efforts, as I discuss at greater length in Chapter 6.
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a provisioning error produces a change in users’ ability to access data, it will likely
result in one of the following cases:
Case 1: The error prevents the user from accessing certain data where an error-free
provisioning would have allowed such access; i.e., it results in under-entitlement. If
the discrepancy makes it difficult or impossible for the user to complete her job, she
will likely draw attention to this fact.
Case 2: The error allows the user to access certain data where an error-free provi-
sioning would have prevented such access; i.e., it results in over-entitlement. If the
discrepancy allows the user to access data that she does not need to complete her
job, she may or may not become aware of the over-entitlement, and may or may not
draw attention to it.
If the user does not draw attention to the error, it would likely remain in place
until the next time the user’s access permissions are reviewed (e.g., the next time she
requests additional entitlements). Because the user is more likely to draw attention
to errors when they result in under-entitlement, errors of over-entitlement are more
likely persist.
5.2.3 Goldilocks is hard: modeling provisioning pressures
Reports from participants indicate that provisioning errors are common in practice;
it is easy to overprovision or underprovision, but hard to get entitlements “just right”.
The case-based analysis of provisioning errors above is somewhat simplistic, because
it assumes that errors of over-entitlement and under-entitlement are equally likely; in
reality, Goldilocks is more likely to choose to overprovision, just as military systems
are built to err on the side of overclassification.
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User Bob has been promoted to a new position called "Senior Analyst." 
His new boss Alice, a "Managing Analyst" leaves a message asking 
that Bob be provisioned with entitlements to reflect his new duties. 
Alice tells Susan that she wants Bob "to be able to do everything I do."
Susan sees that there are roles defined for "Analyst" and "Managing 
Analyst," but none for "Senior Analyst."  What does she do? 
Susan responds to Alice 
and asks for more details.
What entitlements does 
she assign?
Alice responds back, but is 
not intimately familiar with 
the entitlement structure, and 
cannot offer a clear answer.
The minimum permissions 
than she believes Bob needs.
Fewer permissions than 
she believes Bob needs.
More permissions than she 
believes Bob needs.
Alice contacts Susan again 
because Bob does not have 
the entitlements he needs to 
get his job done.
E.g., Susan copies the permissions 
from the "Managing Analyst" role.
Susan creates a new role 
called "Senior Analyst." 
Figure 5.4: My model of the process that Susan goes through in processing a provisioning
request from manager Alice for user Bob. When deciding how many entitlements to assign,
Susan weighs the possibility that incorrect entitlements will result in another (potentially
more frustrated) request from Alice. Traditional security principles dictate that Susan should
err on the side of under-entitlement.
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The rest of this chapter is dedicated to describing the operational pressures and
user perceptions that contribute to this “Goldilocks” phenomenon by modeling the
decisions a provisioning user must make. Note that what follows is not an “access
control model” in the traditional sense; it focuses less on the internal workings of
authorization policy, and more on the operational impact of the humans’ decisions
on the prevalence of over-entitlement in the organization.
Scenario
Susan is a system administrator charged with provisioning users at the Acme Com-
pany. We assume that Acme has a centralized provisioning system that allows Susan
to easily see and modify all the permissions any given user has. (If she’s not able to
provision everything, costs in this scenario are multiplied by the number of admin-
istrators involved. If Susan not able to see all permissions, costs in this scenario are
multiplied by the number of different databases she has to consult.)
Figure 5.4 summarizes the process Susan goes through when she receives a request
from Alice to provide user Bob with new entitlements following his promotion. Based
on this outline, Figure 5.5 models the workflow and decisions Susan must make while
provisioning a user. In this model, we represent the cost or time penalty associated
with each action as Susan perceives them as C1...C10. This allows us to see how
Susan’s perception of the value of each cost is likely to influence her choices while
traversing this workflow throughout the day. Similarly, Figure 5.7 models the pro-
visioning process from the perspective of Alice, including the costs as she perceives
them.
Discussion
The costs C1, C3, C5, C7, and C9 are associated with the basic operations that Susan
































Figure 5.5: My model of the workflow and costs that Susan (the system administrator)
experiences in the given scenario. The table below contains a key to each cost C1...C10.
C1 Time spent on initial request processing.
C2 Time spent interacting with supervisor.
C3 Time spent during initial role creation.
C4 Time spent considering entitlements in the “too few” case.
C5 Time spent assigning entitlements in the “too few” case.
C6 Time spent considering entitlements in the “just right” case.
C7 Time spent assigning entitlements in the “just right” case.
C8 Time spent considering entitlements in the “too many” case.
C9 Time spent assigning entitlements in the “too many” case.
C10 Time spent processing the followup request.

















Figure 5.7: My model of workflow and costs associated with provisioning from the per-
spective of Alice, the manager requesting provisions for her employee Bob. The table below
contains a key to each cost C11...C14
C11 Time spent preparing and submitting the request.
C12 Alice’s lost productivity.
C13 Bob’s lost productivity.
C14 Time spent interacting with the administrator.
Figure 5.8: Key to costs depicted in Figure 5.7.
new role, and actually assigning entitlements to it). These are likely to be relatively
small, because software developers perceive that they will be performed frequently
and therefore try to optimize them for usability. Fieldwork indicates that they are
dwarfed by the costs of figuring out which entitlements to assign (C1, C4, C6, and
C8).
The cost C2 represents the time that Susan and Alice will spend exchanging in-
formation about the provisioning request. Traditional access-control models assume
that this interaction will iterate until Susan has enough information to provision Bob
appropriately; in reality, Susan will likely minimize this interaction if she perceives it
to be too costly (i.e., it takes too much of her time, of Alice’s time, or the interaction
is unpleasant.) The cost that Susan perceives can depend in part on how senior Alice
is in the organization (i.e., she will consider C2 to be quite large if Alice is the CEO).
This model assumes that Susan’s actions will be evaluated based on Bob’s ability
to get his job done (i.e., whether or not Alice must follow up with an additional
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provisioning request). This reflects what I observed in the field: system administrators
who provide services to business users are often evaluated based on how long the
process takes (C1, C2,C3, C5, C7, and C9) and how many interactions are required
before the issue is settled (C10). Susan thus has a strong motivation to try and
minimize P(followup).
5.2.4 Compliance budgets
My models of provisioning pressures do not currently reflect the frustration or fatigue
that administrators and users can experience while trying to make a computer system
do what they need it to. As explored by Beautement et al.’s work on compliance
budgets [4], hard-to-quantify costs such as these can dramatically impact users’ ability
to comply with an organization’s policies over time. In the scenario discussed above,
even if most of the other costs could be optimized to make the provisioning process
easy, it is easy to see how Susan the system administrator might quickly deplete her
compliance budget and err on the side of over-entitlement.
5.3 Implications and conclusions
The results I present in this chapter indicate that all is not well in the world of
corporate access control. More worrisome still is that my observations likely under-
represent the scope of the problem. Because the participants were almost exclusively
drawn from the information-security staff, these reports represent just one side of
the story. Participants were able to end most anecdotes by describing a modification
they made that allowed users to both be in compliance and get their jobs done; in
the clinical study, where we interviewed end-users in addition to executives, it is clear
that solutions are not always quite so tidy.
Many of the problems documented in this chapter could probably be addressed by
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better business processes. In Chapter 6 I examine some of the methods participant
organizations have implemented to combat the tendency toward over-entitlement,
and the specific mechanisms they have employed to bring current entitlements in line
with what employees actually need in the course of their jobs. We cannot, however,
focus our efforts solely on process — based solutions. Processes are implemented by
human users, and I argue that users are not the real source of the problem. (If they
were, better user education would suffice — but users already know that they should
not be circumventing controls, so additional browbeating is unlikely to change that
behavior.) We as system designers need to better understand the requirements of a
situation and the limitations of the users who operate in it before we start on a design.
A shallow usability analysis — i.e, one which looks at a graphical user interface and
users’ interaction with it — is not sufficient to uncover the multitude of pressures
that influence users in the real world. System design must be an iterative process,
conducted in cooperation with real users in the context of their real jobs. (Of course,
I recognize that it is much easier to call for this type of design process than it is to
implement it in practice.)
However, better design processes and the tools they produce cannot eliminate
all sources of error in organizations of this scale. Just as with other domains in
which an organization faces risk, we must accept the presence of errors and craft our
expectations accordingly. Right now, both the research community and the larger
population of information security professionals seem to grow a reality distortion field
around access-control systems. We design our controls, and our methods for auditing
compliance, and happily declare victory when the latter uncover minimal violations.
In documenting users’ circumvention and the tendency toward over-entitlement, I
want most of all to emphasize that we should expect phenomena like these in all
systems: rather than be surprised by them, we should seek them out, and hold
them as evidence that our methods have room for improvement. Until we do so,
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organizations will continue to fly blindly down a path of noncompliance, unable to
see sources of massive risk until they bear disastrous fruit.
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Chapter 6
Corporate study results: factors
external to the user
Chapter 5 presented two important results of the corporate study:
1. Users of participant organizations circumvent access controls when
they believe doing so will help them get their jobs done, and
2. Participant organizations tend toward a state of over-entitlement as
a product of trying to maximize individual productivity.
Both of these phenomena result from the aggregate decisions of individual users,
and can be better understood by modeling their decision-making process. However,
the models presented in Chapter 5 are too simple to capture the great diversity of
factors that can impact an organization’s access and identity management efforts.
This chapter explores factors that can influence individual users’ decision-making,
but that are themselves characteristics of the larger organization. It also explores
some of the methods and processes that organizations use to shape their information
security practices.
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6.1 Complications: culture, compatibility,
and clunkers
During my discussions with participants I learned about a variety of organizational
factors that can influence the decisions individuals make in relationship to information
security, including the organization’s culture, its desire to be perceived in a positive
light by external entities, the technological limitations it experiences, and its process
of growing through mergers and acquisitions. These observations focus on information
security writ large, but apply to identity and access management within that domain.
6.1.1 Corporate culture
Participants from one financial organization had much to say about the firm’s culture
and its influence on the infosec team’s efforts. In particular, they attributed much of
their understanding of business users’ needs to those users’ willingness to share their
opinions about new technologies. When we told these participants an anecdote from
another industry about users who found it easier to silently circumvent controls than
to complain to the IT department, they literally laughed out loud. They assured us
that their users (many of whom achieve great professional success by being assertive
in the workplace) do not hesitate to share their opinions with the IT staff, especially
when they perceive a computer system is getting in the way of them making money
for the firm.
The role of values It makes sense that users who are highly attuned to an orga-
nization’s profitability would feel empowered to speak up when they saw an infosec
control threatening that profitability — especially if their personal bonus was tied to
it. Other industries value other principles more highly; for example, I imagine that
members of the intelligence community consider it more important to preserve the
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confidentiality of sensitive data than it is to minimize costs in handling that data.
Variability within the organization Participants from this organization reported
that the culture and values of individual branches of an organization can also vary
significantly. While users had a strong ethos for doing “what is right for the firm”
on the whole, the responsibilities and management of individual departments impact
users’ definition of “right”, and thus the way in which they react to infosec initiatives.
In a similar fashion, an infosec team for a world-wide organization may experience
additional challenges that stem from the diversity in the cultures of employees. For
example, one participant said,
“In [this asian country], employees get very upset when they have to click
“too many” times. They want to do the work, but they want it to be
very easy to use. They also got pissed off when they didn’t have someone
above them who is approving their access; they don’t want anyone below
them in the company hierarchy to be approving them.”
6.1.2 Reputation risk
Another problem that taxes infosec teams is “reputation risk,” a term used by multiple
financial participants to describe the consequences associated with negative public-
ity. (A participant from the software company also referred to this as “brand risk”.)
When news of an organization’s infosec problems become public, it can reduce cus-
tomers’ and shareholders’ confidence in the organization. This can have severe finan-
cial consequences, as in the case of Exxon-Mobile and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. One
participant shared a conversation he had had with an Exxon executive:
“He said you could steal ten million dollars from me, I don’t really care
— we’ll prosecute you and everything else — he goes like god forbid a
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ship splits open because somebody fudged a maintenance log or the guy
was drunk and we didn’t test him correctly — as they did in Valdez. He
said I can lose ten percent of my stock overnight. He goes — that’s like a
trillion dollars. I ain’t never taking that again.”
Unfortunately, the specter of reputation risk can reduce an organization’s willing-
ness to sharing information with external parties about infosec problems they might
be facing. One participant in the financial industry told us that he was part of an
an exclusive group of financial infosec professionals from around the globe who used
private meetings to discuss common challenges and potential best practices. This se-
cretive venue was necessary, he said, to protect his organization from the reputation
risk it might face from an infosec problem leaking to the press.
Although we cannot remove the impact of reputation risk, we should be aware
that it can have a strong influence on organizations (and their individual members)
when they are deciding whether to report information security problems.
6.1.3 External systems and regulations
Participants also discussed ways in which external standards can pose additional
challenges for the infosec team. For example, the diversity of international infosec
regulations can make it difficult for multi-national organizations to develop a coherent
strategy that is compatible with the requirements of all jurisdictions. Although the
US and the EU have similar laws requiring organizations to regularly review users’ as-
signed entitlements, the penalty for not noticing small differences can be great. Even
within the US, where individual states have different reporting requirements for data
breaches, an organization may invest a lot of time and resources into understanding
the patchwork of laws.
Above and beyond legal requirements imposed by regulatory bodies, participants
described cases in which a decision by an external partner — for example, a commer-
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cial bank in a foreign country — could significantly impact the org’s efforts to roll
out larger or more sophisticated infosec technology.
Participant: “Some of these systems [...] their access list is a screen
shot. And I can’t do anything logically with a screen shot except look at
it. That’s because it’s a hosted application lets say.”
Interviewer: “Are there any efforts to try and standardize the types of
applications?”
Participant: “There is — there’s what they call an enterprise architecture
— it’s really sponsored through here, but it’s got the support of all these
other teams. And they try to standardize exactly that. But again we
deal with I don’t know how many countries, fifty some odd countries or
something. If the Bank of Japan or whatever, they say you must use this
system and we don’t get a choice. If we don’t get an access list, well that’s
pretty much it.”
Constraints imposed by well-intentioned regulators and contracted partners can
dramatically limit an information-security group’s ability to build or buy products
that actually meet its users’ needs. Even if the group can identify what those needs
are, they may not be able to act on this insight in practice.
6.1.4 The technology ecosystem
In addition to cultural, social, legal, and contractual factors, participants reported
that they struggle to develop identity and access management solutions that can work
with the variety of technological systems present within a single large organization.
I refer to the intricate web of interdependent programs, servers, and data feeds as
the organization’s “technology ecosystem”. Organizations participating in this study
have had computers at the heart of their business for several decades; after working
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in the complex ecosystem that results, participants cited the following as challenging
elements.
System age Some participants reported that their organizations depend on critical
systems built on decades-old mainframe machines. In most cases the number of users
who interact with these legacy systems was small, but as time goes on it becomes
increasingly difficult to interface them with newer, more advanced technologies.1
Diversity It is less expensive for an organization to maintain standardized sys-
tems (e.g., to have three basic builds from which an administrator might choose a
new server), but participants reported a tremendous diversity of operating systems,
applications, and hardware within their organizations. As one software-industry par-
ticipant said, “We probably have every flavor of Unix [...] somewhere in the company”.
Part of this diversity is due to the presence of legacy systems, but a decentralized
structure for IT purchasing and management can also exacerbate the problem.
GUI usability The usability of an individual interface can have a significant impact
on its practical utility. However, participants did not always feel that a good visual
and interaction design to be absolutely necessary for every application, especially if
an application’s users are highly-trained specialists, and they have only rare occasion
to use it. One participant did a demonstration of a policy-authoring tool that was
strikingly ugly; when we asked whether people ever actually got it to do what they
wanted, he responded “You wouldn’t think so — I know, I know — you would think
different, but it works”. The usability of end-user interfaces is important, but if an
organization has limited resources for improving interface designs, it should work to
1The reasons participants gave for still having such ancient systems warrants a study of its own.
In general, participants seemed to focus on the need for the critical systems in question to be highly
reliable. Some participants said that their organizations have tried to build replacement systems —
but that such efforts are in some cases a decade or more past their intended deployment date, and
do not show any signs of producing a system that works as well as the aged one still chugging away
in the basement.
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evaluate where a re-design effort will have the highest impact in practice (and not
just beautify designs that are functional but ugly).
Certified software Of course, this does not necessarily mean that a group can
purchase and use any software it wishes; one participant noted that “I worked for a
bank and it was... here are the five products you are allowed to buy because they
are certified”. He did not go into detail as to the exact certifications his former
employer required; what is interesting is that an information security professional can
be constrained from the start by standards that may or may not make sense as a
measure of the quality of an identity and access management product.
Source code availability I was surprised to learn that participant organizations
rely on software for which the source code is no longer available. Whether developed
in-house or purchased from external vendors (who then went out of business), having
just the executable form of an application seems to be a common impediment to the
development of patches to update the application’s functionality or interoperability.
Interoperability The previous factors — age, diversity, and source code avail-
ability — can combine and make it difficult to convince various computer systems
within an organization to interoperate. Interoperability is particularly important
when dealing with IAM products, as much of IAM benefit comes from automating
data management across different applications in the organization. Participants re-
port that vendors make grand claims about their products’ interoperability, but that
these assertions must be tested before trusted. A participant from the software indus-
try spoke with excitement about the company’s acquisition of technology to “make
all our products talk to each other,” although I noted to myself at the time that I
thought the problem was perhaps outside the scope of any single software solution.2
2This may be an example of an infosec professional having unrealistic expectations for the capa-
bility of a technical product to solve a problem that has both social and technical roots; Section 6.2.2
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Credentials and roles One interoperability challenge that is of particular concern
is the ability to reconcile different applications’ “local idea of roles” and credentials.
Participants from the financial industry described significant efforts to standardize
and disseminate entitlement data throughout the organization, so that applications
which had been configured earlier in the life of the organization could be adapted to
successfully operate using a common vocabulary.
6.1.5 Acquisitions and mergers
Another challenge participants reported their organizations facing is the speed at
which the population and structure of the organization itself changes. In particu-
lar, participants from the software industry cited their organization’s acquisition of
smaller companies as an impetus for change, as mergers require the combination of
two different sets of technology, business processes, and cultures. Mergers frequently
trigger a reorganization of the corporate structure, which can pose problems for in-
fosec professionals, both locally — in cases where the infosec team itself is reorganized
— and globally in their efforts to maintain secure systems that accurately meet the
needs of their users. One participant offered the following as an example of the
challenges mergers and acquisitions represent.
“[The company] basically grew through acquisition. So if you grow by
eating five companies a year and those companies have their own — you
know whose chief evangelist of technology — and now you bring them
into your organization. What they did is they inherited the title. So your
division was — we had a little piece we acquired and then from that you
had your title — and now I had people that had — six people in one




In addition to corporate culture, regulatory constraints, and the organization’s tech-
nology ecosystem, participants frequently mentioned issues that one infosec profes-
sional from SoftCorp described as relating to “organizational maturity”. This partici-
pant believed that an organization may need to achieve a certain degree of sophistica-
tion or phase of development before it can successfully deploy some IAM technology,
and that “you have to look at the organization’s readiness to accept a solution”.
This seems to contradict a basic belief about computer systems. As technologists,
we often view the systems we build as self-contained solutions; if an organization ded-
icates sufficient resources to a system’s configuration, deployment, and maintenance,
the system will necessarily help them achieve the goals it was designed for. In the
rest of this chapter I present observations indicating that participant organizations
should never expect to solve issues of identity and access management with a purely
technical or stand-alone solution — and that no deep solution can be deployed in a
short timeframe.
6.2.1 Incremental and iterative philosophy
Computer programmers frequently use an iterative method in building software: first,
one implements and tests basic functionality, then one repeatedly adds and tests
features until the final program is reached. Study participants seemed to have an
implicit understanding that they must apply a similarly iterative approach to engi-
neering socio-technical systems, too. Choosing realistic incremental goals for policies
is particularly important:
“But people who want to set a policy think all applications are going
through our centralized authentication framework by this day. But the
minute that day passes and that policy goes into effect and 50% of the
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apps still don’t comply they’ll be writing up a lot of policy exceptions or
handling it as auto findings which is an uncomfortable place to manage
your IT business from.”
Basic functionality in the case of new IAM products is simple replication of old
functionality:
“... don’t give me anything else I don’t need yet or want yet — just let
me replace what I have so I can remain compliant.”
This attitude meshes well with the policy-creation methodology of one SoftCorp
participant. In demonstrating a particularly confusing policy-authoring tool, we asked
him how he knew what the order of operations was for the policy language (i.e., how
actions were applied to the roles specified in the policy). He responded, simply, “trial
and error”. Participants largely did not expect to write a policy and then deploy it
in two convenient steps; they expected to pore over it in detail over a long period,
making minute tweaks over time until the policy had the desired effect.
Customization vs customizability
One SoftCorp participant noted that product customizability was a double-edged
sword:
“It’s very customizable. But it means that you have to customize it.”
Customization takes time, but is often necessary to achieve the full benefit of a
product. An understanding of the potential pitfalls of customizability would seem
useful in trying to shape executives’ expectations. While many products offer sample
customization templates, they are not guaranteed to make the task of customization
faster; the same participant noted of another product that
“You can do a lot out of the box, but you can’t do anything that we want.”
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Another participant noted that developers understand and anticipate the need for
customization of products when they are writing them:
“It’s impossible to write for everything. You have to write generalities
when you deliver code so there is a lot of customization and in the end, if
the expectation is set up that you are just going get it out of the box and
tomorrow you are going to be provisioning. That is a false expectation.
It is going to take some time. Now if we could do it in six months, we can
get that first hit down from six months. We could probably get it down
to say three months if you learn from that practice.”
6.2.2 Expectations of infosec
One of the most relevant aspects of an organization’s success with IAM systems seems
to be its expectations of the infosec team and technology. Participants reported
challenges rooted not only in software and in users, but in managing what corporate
executives believed was possible to achieve with technology. One banking participant
lamented that
“The business has no idea how long it takes to roll things out. They don’t
understand all the implications of what they’re asking. The business wants
to put more controls on email, wants to have it done right away. [Right
now they’re] pushing for passwords on attachments. [It’s a] relatively non-
technical change, a basic control on attachments... [but they have] no
idea what they’re getting involved with, because compliance can’t surveil
that. [They are] shocked to realize that it’s going to take out six months
at minimum to roll out an email solution [or to] to change [any] major
system like that. The business doesn’t totally recognize or understand
that.”
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One SoftCorp participant shared a story about the company’s internal adoption of
its own identity management product. After failing to meet an important deployment
deadline, members of the infosec team struggled in negotiating a new one with the
company’s management team:
“But the sticking point around it was they had these unrealistic expecta-
tions of what we could do with the technology and what was really — you
know — what our environment was ready to support and what the actual
technology was ready to do.”
I imagine this must have been particularly challenging for SoftCorp because they
were dealing with a product they themselves had developed. Participants in general
indicated that vendors have a reputation for making grandiose claims about their
products, especially before a potential client has decided to purchase licenses. Per-
haps executives of SoftCorp had internalized the sales-pitch understanding of the
product’s functionality — and perhaps this party-line understanding inhibited their
ability to perceive root causes of the problems at hand. The participant agreed with
this observation in explicitly attributing more blame to the software than to the
organization as a whole:
“At the same time I would say there was an almost unrealistic and unrea-
sonable expectation that this would be easy. I think there was a higher
level of esteem in the maturity of our solution in this space and a — I won’t
say it was an inflated sense of esteem about the maturity of our organiza-
tion, I would say it was just assumptions. People did not understand the
complexity of the problems as described.”
At the same time, another infosec professional from SoftCorp focused more on
the fundamental limitations of IAM technology independent of implementation. He
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seemed to believe that the company’s infosec team had also had unrealistic expecta-
tions for a software solution:
“We had been somewhat led to believe that identity policies could deal
with all sorts of magical things, but you really can’t and you can see why
they can’t.”
It is not surprising that an IT department generally struggles with managing exec-
utives’ expectations of technology. However, the task seems particularly challenging
when managing expectations of access-control solutions. Infosec professionals from
the banking industry reported that they have to lobby business executives to get
buy-in for new security initiatives, and “sell” technology hard to secure funding for
it. The academic literature and the professional press seem to agree that IAM is
essentially a solved problem, one for which remaining bugs can easily be worked out
during implementation.3
While trying to sell an IAM product internally an infosec team could easily inflate
its own expectations for that product (or at least suspend the skepticism with which
any IT professional must approach the sales literature of a software vendor). Infosec
teams that have been thus deluded by the promise of an IAM solution would be
hard-pressed after the purchase has been made to offer balanced timelines for deploy-
ment; in this case, they have basically undercut their own efforts to manage executive
expectations.
While this study reveals hurdles to reasonable executive expectations for IAM
technology, it also indicates that an infosec team can work to foster an organizational
philosophy that will transcend the hype of any one particular software product. One
3During the course of my studies I have directly encountered this perception from a variety of
academic quarters, including tenured computer science professors and one senior-level administrator
of a governmental funding organization. Perhaps the depth of the IAM challenge is only comprehen-
sible to people who have tried to deploy the vaunted solutions in practice: at the same conference
where academics argued during the session that the organizations I was studying had simply failed
to implement RBAC correctly, practitioners practically lined up afterward to tell me how strongly
my observations resonated with their experience.
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banking participant touched on this philosophy when he described what he considered
to be executives’ overreaction to an understandable mistake:
“It was a vendor we’d just reviewed, they have very good practices, but it
was just a minor screw up on their website, something we could’ve done.
Business doesn’t understand that this is a risk management space, just
like anything else.”
6.2.3 Fostering a vision of risk management
One banking participant described an ongoing effort to help the business view infor-
mation security as an exercise in risk management. He said that executives initially
expected the infosec team to be able to prevent all security problems; when a data
exposure occurred, management folks said, “We’ll give you money to make this never
happen again”. When he initially tried to explain that it was not possible to guaran-
tee with perfect certainty that a data exposure or adverse event would never happen
again, he was met with blank stares; these executives were used to requesting soft-
ware features, and had a hard time differentiating features of security software from
security guarantees.
Of course, there are other areas in which businesses are accustomed to managing
risk, and many participants made reference to existing practices of risk mitigation in
explaining the goals and capabilities of the infosec team. Roughly speaking, partic-
ipants said that their organizations adopted a process composed of four stages: 1)
Identifying the assets or things that are valuable, 2) Identifying the potential risks or
adverse events that could happen to those valuable things, 3) Estimating the proba-
bility or likelihood that those events will happen, and 4) Making decisions on how to
counter that risk.
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Anticipating change through risk ownership
Participants at SoftCorp described a particularly well-defined process in which mem-
bers of the staff took explicit “ownership” of risks that had been identified. This
notion of ownership was useful because it tied risk mitigation to individual account-
ability; explicit risk ownership also provided a mechanism to periodically reevaluate
risks even when the structure or composition of the organization changed. (Other-
wise, risk mitigation for threats to legacy systems could easily fall by the wayside
when focusing on risks posed to new systems, for example.) As another SoftCorp
participant said, it was important that they constantly “readjust [their] calculations”
of risk.
Perhaps one way in which an organization can experience maturity is by being
able to recognize of this potential for organizational change. Rather than simply
trying to mitigate the risks that an organization faces today, a mature organization
anticipates its own evolution by designing processes that will allow it to constantly
adapt its security posture to the new state of the organization. This aspect of ma-
turity is connected to an organization’s understanding of itself, which is discussed in
Section 6.2.4.
Security as cost savings
Participants reported that their position as infosec specialists was challenging be-
cause they could not produce direct financial benefits (profits or cost savings) to the
organization. Other business units — including other IT units — could; for example,
a non-security-related IT department might save the organization hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars by building or buying software that streamlines a critical business
process. Participants reported that the probabilistic nature of the threats they seek
to mitigate makes it difficult for them to express the potential benefits of investing
in their initiatives; if a security project saves the organization money, it will likely be
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because it prevented an attack — but how to quantify the value of a thwarted attack,
when one cannot know if such an attack has or will be attempted?
Because business executives are accustomed to measuring the value of an initia-
tive in monetary terms, participants can find it hard to get buy-in for their funding
requests. As one participant put it, “we’re just not a revenue center”.
However, members of one participant organization reported some success in op-
erating not as the owners of the security initiatives, but as a consultant tasked with
identifying problems that business organizations need to remedy with their own bud-
gets. This subgroup within the organization’s security department operated largely
without funding, for “[Our] program highlights risks. The funding issue [only] comes
into play when we’re actually trying to mitigate the risks, not just identify and catalog
them”.
Commoditization
Both of the previous examples — where risk ownership and risk mitigation were
farmed out to business or other IT groups — are generalizations of the principle of
commoditization. This idea was brought to a new level by P-Bank, whose infosec
group went so far as to spin off ownership of entire risk-management systems to other
teams within the organization. This allowed the infosec team to focus on new chal-
lenges — different, unaddressed areas of risk — while making sure the organization
effectively managed the known risks associated with business operations.
6.2.4 Self-understanding and structure
The final aspect of organization maturity that this study revealed as being critically
important to the success of identity and access management is the organization’s
documented awareness of itself. This self-awareness both includes and depends on
the structure of the organization; strong centralization lends itself to a standard
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Figure 6.1: Although we often consider organizations as having a strict supervisory hierar-
chy (left), management literature [61] recognizes that project-based operation and informal
supervisory relationships often contribute to a matrixed organizational structure in practice
(right).
classification of users, for example, which helps in maintaining consistent records
about the employees and their relationships across the organization.
Identifying supervisors
There are multiple levels of structure, however, and not all can be represented by tidy
organization trees. Before starting the study I assumed that supervisory information
— a mapping of employees to supervisors — would be readily accessible within an
organization. In practice, participant banks report embracing a more fluid matrixed
structure, which allows them to react more quickly to changes in the organization’s
priorities and its markets. As reflected in Figure 6.1, a user in a matrixed organization
may have multiple supervisors or project managers with whom she works daily (to
whom she is connected by “dotted line relationships,” as one financial participant put
it) in addition to her formal supervisor (whom she may see only a few times a year).
While conducting a firm-wide entitlement review4 the infosec team of one bank was
challenged with coming up with an authoritative source for supervisor information.
However, it was hard to identify exactly which supervisor should be able to approve
a user’s entitlements: the official supervisor often had no idea of the user’s daily
4I present these entitlement review in more detail later in the chapter; for now we note that they
require a user’s supervisor to regularly review and approve the set of entitlements assigned to the
user.
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activities, but the informal supervisors who worked closely with the user were neither
stable over time nor well-documented. Participants report that the infosec team was
not even able to reliably leverage users’ knowledge to gather supervisor information,
because the users themselves were unable to identify their supervisor when asked
directly.
Informal knowledge
As one financial participant said, “It took a long time to figure out who all was working
here”. Although the participant could find lots of information about various people
within the environment, getting a clean source of data was challenging. As is often
the case, much of the information that could be relevant to infosec professionals in
their efforts to build and deploy systems is managed or held informally within the
organization. For example, one SoftCorp participant was demonstrating a policy-
crafting interface for us, and he noted that there were a number of different groups
to which users could be assigned. He knew that although many users were assigned
to group Y, that group was not in fact provisioned with entitlements deeper in the
system; having these users in group Y was meaningless. The participant said “I just
happen to know that nobody is [in group Y] anymore”. This bit of knowledge was
not actually documented in the policy — although it may have been documented
elsewhere — but it is an example of the type of informal knowledge that human
organizations have about themselves.
As in the case of supervisors in the financial industry, the informal nature of much
of this knowledge can makes it challenging for the infosec team to design systems that
must integrate with the structure of the organization. Another SoftCorp participant
noted that the infosec team could not serve as a source for the information it needed:
“If it starts at IT it’s going to fail. [...] It starts at the business, and the
business is a mess.”
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Not only was it difficult for infosec professionals to gather the knowledge they
needed to deploy a policy, the nature of how that information is managed within the
business itself makes it challenging to extract it in an ordered way.
Formalizing knowledge
Participants from SoftCorp were eager to share information about the organization’s
recent centralization of human resources data, which contrasts with the struggles
I observed in the financial industry. Although the software org was not able to
centralize all of its provisioning and entitlement management systems — i.e., they
maintained a separate accounts and access-control policies for individual users on
different systems — they did architect a single, authoritative data feed for information
that was useful to all access-control systems throughout the org. This feed, which
was driven by a database maintained by their Human Resources department, provided
basic “demilitarized” information about employees’ names, employment status, and
geographical location, while restricting access to data on compensation, benefits, and
other personal information.
One participant remarked that centralizing the data feed made it harder for users
to circumvent provisioning controls: “Unless you are getting your human resources
from one source... you will have people going around the process all the time”. If
we consider provisioning as a potential opportunity for attack, it makes sense that
standardizing and hardening the process might reduce the number of potentially
exploitable interactions.
Along with its centralized data feed, SoftCorp maintained a master database of
all assets, including ownership information and processes for changing a system’s
configuration (including access permissions). One participant reported that “pretty
much anything that goes into [the asset database] if it wants to change, it has to go































Figure 6.2: Participants from SoftCorp reported that the organization had a centralized
database that was fed by information from the HR department. Systems across the organi-
zation relied on the central database for basic user information. Another central database
tracked information about technology assets, including computer systems, their business
owners, and the procedure for changing their configuration.
BAR [Business Area Reviewer, or business owner] to somebody else. It has to go
through an approval process — the information is highly managed”.
Although I am not convinced that centralization is absolutely necessary, I argue
later in this chapter that accurate ownership information is a critical component of a
successful access-control systems for our partner organizations.
Requirements gathering
Traditional software engineering methodology divides the software development pro-
cess into a number of phases, including one dedicated to requirements gathering.
However, participants expressed that it was tremendously difficult to define require-
ments for IAM systems before the software was actually built and being tested in
their environment.
Part of the challenge in defining requirements is the process of getting specifi-
cations from business users. One participant from the financial industry reported
asking business users “In this scenario, what would happen?” in an effort to root out
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complicated use cases. To the participant’s frustration,
“The business folks come back and say, ‘We never expect that to happen,
so don’t worry about it,’ but we can’t build code around that kind of
functionality!”
Of course, the challenge of soliciting requirements from non-technical users is not
new. What is more troublesome here is that even well-seasoned infosec professionals
seem to have a hard time telling in advance what they need IAM systems to do. That
same financial organization reports building long-term relationships with software
vendors who seem competent but who have no products that are currently of interest to
the infosec team. These ongoing relationships (and the frequent product demos they
include) allow the team to 1) see if the vendor has thought up new functionality that
seems useful, and if so, to 2) to work with the vendor to push the development of their
product to the point that the team might actually consider testing it internally. In
other words, these infosec professionals are sufficiently dissatisfied with current IAM
tools that they are constantly seeking better solutions from outside the organization.
However, even when they find a potentially useful tool, they assume that it still
requires significant improvement before they might actually consider using it. While
this relationship likely proves beneficial5 to both the bank and the software vendors,
it seems to go against orthodox software development methods; what if other fields
developed requirements using this ad-hoc approach?
The challenge of developing requirements for IAM is also evidenced by the Soft-
Corp’s enthusiastic practice of testing its identity management product in-house as
a path both to validate the software and advertise the its validation to potential
clients. Given that few clients will make a large purchase without evidence that the
product has been successfully deployed in a real organization, internal validation is
5Incidentally, participants from the bank report that these relationships have also proved useful
when the venture capital arms of the firm are considering investing in the vendor; in such cases, the
infosec team can offer a high-quality technical evaluation of the product’s market and viability.
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particularly useful when launching new products; of course, SoftCorp participants re-
port that internal deployment also provides them the opportunity to provide critical
feedback to the product’s development team.
While it is encouraging that participant organizations seem to have have found
ways to develop IAM requirements and subsequently useful systems, I believe that
they are unusually fortunate: both have an in-house development staff and large
budgets dedicated to IAM. These approaches are not useful for all organizations —
nor do their success answer the question of why requirements definition in this space
is particularly difficult to begin with.
Collaborative business insight
Having programmers and actual business users in close functional proximity seems
to make the iterative loops of IAM development tighter, and thus the overall process
faster (and hopefully more accurate). Participant investment banks had large in-house
development staffs that coordinated with business departments, and every SoftCorp
participant noted the organization’s policy of “eating our own dogfood”. A close
relationship is important for buy-in among business users:
“[We] need to make sure that encouraging folks to do security isn’t adding
stress or additional information to their day. Even if you try to squeeze
them, force them, fire them, you just extend the state. So, we take on the
burden and build things, bootstrap it and prove it, then when folks are
ready to take it on, they will be able to do so.”
This relationship can essentially allow an infosec team to anticipate the needs of
its users, and would seem critical to the build-it-and-they-will-come approach adopted
by participants:
“The same way when we built the single sign on system nobody wanted
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single sign on. Now most of my demand from my resources are for new
single sign on instances.”
My own experiences working at a large software company (not the same as Soft-
Corp of this study) have led me to believe that “dogfooding” is perhaps the single
most valuable source of information on how customers will use and perceive a software
product. Time and again I have watched teams of world-class engineers, designers,
and product managers have their assumptions refined rapidly (sometimes brutally)
by internal-user feedback. This process is easier when the product is broadly targeted
but being dogfooded by users who are themselves relatively technical, because they
are willing, able, and numerous enough to provide copious feedback. Products tar-
geted at non-technical users or at smaller populations of specialist users may be less
likely to benefit by a widespread, open-ended dogfooding process as it is practiced
at this company. However, with some additional effort, I believe the same principle
of early experimental testing among real target users should still be useful in the
development of most any software product.
6.3 Entitlement review and the IAM lifecycle
Participants often discussed entitlement management in terms of employee “lifecycle”
events, such as initial hiring, promotion or transfer, and eventual termination. This
perspective lends itself well to understanding IAM as a process: most actions in the
process are triggered by a lifecycle event. One important IAM activity that does not
fit into this schema, however, is entitlement review, which is mandated by Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOx) in the United States, the Eighth Directive in Europe, and similar laws
in other locales.
The study’s primary participant bank, P-Bank, was in the process of completing
one of its first mandatory entitlement reviews during the period I conducted inter-
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Date Step
February Work began on entitlement-review policies
April Solicited feedback from users via questionnaires
June Began building review trees
August Entitlement snapshot taken
December Corporate study interviews conducted
Figure 6.3: A timeline of the entitlement review as reported by P-Bank participants.
views there, and the rest of this chapter contains detailed information participants
reported about that experience. The organization has likely completed an additional
five entitlement reviews between that period and this writing, and should not be in-
terpreted as being representative of an investment bank’s current practices; despite
this, I believe this information offers important insight and perspective on the review
process and the organization’s state before reviews were required.
6.3.1 Entitlement review timeline
The laws mandating entitlement reviews provide organizations with a fair amount
of latitude in determining the specifics of the process, (e.g., the frequency of the
reviews). P-Bank had chosen to conduct entitlement reviews on an annual basis.
It had identified 200 applications and databases as containing data to which SOx
applied, and which were thus part of the entitlement review.
P-Bank brought in external consultants to conduct the review. The consultants
started working on policies to govern the review in February of 2006, started soliciting
feedback from users via questionnaires in April, and started building review trees
(mappings of employees to supervisors who would review their entitlements) in June.
They took a snapshot of actual entitlement assignments at the end of August, and
interviews for this study took place in December. The organization had originally
scheduled a “drop-dead” date for November 15th, but they eventually decided to
abandon it; especially with employee absences due to the holidays season, they feared
that hard stop date would make the review “too messy”.
118
6.3.2 Entitlement review results
The entitlement review resulted in a fifteen percent reduction of application-level
access entitlements across the 200 applications reviewed.
Managers who did not finish their reviews usually did not even start them; at the
time of interviews, about fifty percent of P-Bank employees had actually participated.
One important production department (which made up approximately 30% of the
firm’s population) did not participate at all; they said that they were “too busy”. One
participant told us that there was a “subplot” to this occurrence: managers from the
department in question had argued that “If we catch them on the way in, we don’t
[need to] review them”. Our participant noted that those managers had
“... missed an opportunity to reduce risk today. While they were think-
ing of the long term, this deals with the risk today, and makes people
responsible for understanding it today.”
Participants reported that the biggest challenge of the entitlement review was
figuring out supervisor relationships:
“[Internal provisioning application] is there to address one item. Before,
anyone could submit a request for app access, and there was no defined
approval process. Yes, someone might have approved it, but there was
no definite audit history. [...] In many other systems, users select their
manager from the list of active users, and then that designated person can
approve the user’s access. [...] This is one of the direct manager issues,
you don’t know who your manager is, so we can’t easily say who it is. [...]
It would be interesting to know if other firms have this same problem, or
if they have more clearly identified managers that make this easier.”
Of the users whose access was broken, about one hundred were by the same
manager, who had “disconnected them all from everything”.
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Some app managers were pleasantly surprised at the results of the entitlement
review, and reported being able to remove entitlements or users despite an earlier
concerted effort to manage provisioning carefully.
While looking at the review results, we noted (and infosec team members affirmed)
that many managers in the firm seemed to have over one thousand entitlements to
review in total. Many departments’ users had an average of over 100 entitlements.
6.3.3 Infosec team observations
Participants offered a variety of observations on their experiences with the entitlement
review process.
Success through broad support Participants noted that the entitlement review
came about not through executive mandate, but because members of the infosec team
were able to convince a variety of stakeholders that it would be a valuable exercise:
“There are market forces at play internally. It’s not all top down. [participant] and
[participant] did a selling job”.
Deciphering entitlement descriptions One problem that infosec team members
noted was that non-technical users had a hard time deciphering the description applied
to each entitlement. The importance of entitlement descriptions had been discussed
in the past, and the organization had made a policy that
“When a new entitlement is added, it’s the business owner that runs the
app that is responsible for a meaningful entitlement description.”
Business-understandable entitlement structure Infosec team members also
wanted to “Consider having business folks fill in the business role field, so it says
what they do in their jobs, not what a technologist would put in”. One participant
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suggested that it would be helpful if the app descriptions said “Only folks in this
department should have access to this,” or that “this app belongs to this division”.
“It would make much more sense to have reviewers be checking the state-
ment, ‘Alice is a salesperson’ instead of ‘Alice can do X and Y.’ ”
Duration and organizational change The entitlement snapshot took place in
August. One participant lamented “here we are in December. Much of the data has
changed.” An informal check revealed entitlement changes for 158 users in period of
just a few weeks, which caused uniform dismay among participants.
“If we had managed to get the thing done in three weeks, we wouldn’t
have to worry so much about people transferring, leaving, being hired,
etc. It’s a policy issue, and we have to get [policy specialist] in on it.”
6.3.4 The next go-round
Throughout our discussions, participants offered observations relevant to future in-
stances of the entitlement review effort.
Automated deprovisioning One alternative approach to reducing over-entitlement
could be to automatically “expire” an entitlement if the user has not exercised it re-
cently. When queried about the idea, participants stated that they had considered it,
but decided not to pursue it. “If you’re supposed to have the entitlement, you should
have it whether you’ve used it recently or not.” They gave the example of a user
is the backup administrator for an application who only exercised the entitlements
associated with this permission on rare occasions, when the other users listed as pri-
mary administrators for the application were out sick or on vacation. The participant
noted that “you don’t want her to lose access to that app in a month, especially since
when she needs to use it, she really needs to use it!”
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Automation We asked participants if it would be possible to use their recent expe-
rience to automate the entitlement review process. They said that for some aspects,
yes: they were meticulous about keeping records of the whole process so they can
deconstruct it later. “But, the source [review] trees haven’t been corrected”; they
“created local copies of the trees and updated them”. This means that copies of the
trees (the definitions of who reports to whom, and what permissions everyone has)
must be manually reconciled into production systems. Automation would require
additional work to streamline this process, or that the review itself occur on the
continuously-evolving production tree rather than a static copy.
System commmoditization One participant noted that “we do the technical
piece” — they make the system available — “we don’t own the business process”.
She said that her team was “happy to own the tree as long as someone maintains it
and there is a policy around it, not a free-for-all”.
This approach — offloading the business aspects of system management to appro-
priate business owners — is in line with the previously-discussed emphasis on system
commoditization by infosec groups.
Regulatory reaction During the “first year of [Sarbanes-Oxley] audits, they had
[internal provision management application], and no one else in the industry had any-
thing, so the auditors were happy. However, we can’t stagnate, because expectations
are being raised all the time.” It is fascinating that participants perceived regulators’
expectations as being relative (how well the organization performed in comparison




Real-work technology work is messy and complicated. An organization cannot always
just scrap old systems in favor of new ones. They cannot always find a vendor who
sells the products they want, and even if they can, that does not mean the product
is going to be compatible with the other systems the organization depends on. Other
complications (i.e., acquisition of a new company) only add to the complexity of the
problem. Academics often talk about a system in isolation: clean, fresh, and not-yet
deployed — but in reality every such systems must find their place in an organization
that is a delicately-balanced ecosystem of old and new, flexible and brittle, effective
and suboptimal solutions.
Efforts to deploy software as part of an information-security initiative face an
additional challenge; such initiatives cost money, but it is not always readily apparent
how they will help an organization save or make money on that investment. The
value they add— protection from data breaches — is realized when something does
not happen. This makes it difficult for an information security group to get support
for its initiatives from executives and leaders in other parts of the organization.
Even if that group has the wherewithal to manage its technical ecosystem and the
financial and logistical support of the organization’s management, large corporate
organizations face challenges in understanding the requirements that their systems
should satisfy. This extends from basic self-awareness — who owns this system? — to
deeper questions of functionality — in this scenario, how should the system behave?
This level of awareness cannot be achieved in a single sitting, but must be grown
over time, and be able to evolve as the organization evolves. For this reason I believe
that the heart of access control is an understanding that identity and access manage-
ment cannot be achieved by deploying one or more products, but that it is the result
of multiple socio-technical processes rooted in the organization’s core business. By
approaching IAM with process-based solutions, the organization has the possibility of
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accommodating its changing structure, its developing self-understanding, the evolv-
ing capabilities of technology, the expectations of business users, and the adapting
external regulatory requirements. As is the case with the entitlement review, an or-
ganization can work over time to refine and automate its processes and thus reduce
the work burden on human users, but in many cases it will not be possible to remove
humans altogether, because the flexibility of human reasoning is the very thing that
lends strength to the process.
While viewing access control as a process that requires constant care and feeding
may not be attractive to financially-conscious corporate executives (or academics
seeking provably secure, static solutions), I believe it is the only realistic way for a




Clinical study design and results
7.1 Introduction
After documenting and cataloguing problems reported by information security pro-
fessionals in the Corporate Study, I wanted to continue this line of research in a way
that would allow me to better understand the users’ perspective. I was curious: were
users aware that some of their actions worked against the organization? Did they
perceive the cultural and technical factors I identified as impacting the organization’s
identity and access management efforts? Could I find a way to share their experience
in a way that would be useful to the technologists who design the systems that hold
such sway over their daily professional lives?
It was difficult to arrange interviews with end users of the financial and software
organizations we partnered with. This was in part a problem of logistics — iden-
tifying users, getting approval from their managers, finding time on their calendars
— but I believe also a product of our partners’ generally circumspect approach to
collaboration. An organization could be reasonably confident that its trained infosec
professionals would not reveal information that would embarrass the company, but
the sorts of users who were likely to share interesting anecdotes with us also had the
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potential to let slip information that the organization might rather not get out. Al-
though we had rigorous confidentiality agreements that prevented us from revealing
any uniquely identifying information about participant organizations, I detected a
degree of hesitancy in exposing us to information that they believed could be truly
damaging to their reputations, particularly on the part of the investment banks. (I
conjecture that this hesitance was due at least in part to worries about reputation
risk, as discussed in Chapter 6.)
Happily, we were able to establish a relationship with an organization in the
healthcare industry — specifically, a teaching hospital (details below) — that was
willing to let us interview end users directly. Perhaps this organization was more open
than corporate participants because it had greater confidence that its employees were
doing the right things, or perhaps its intimate experience with deriving value from
empirical research into human behavior helped it perceive that allowing us access
could have wide-reaching benefits. In any case, this study generated observations
that both support and supplement those I have discussed in prior chapters. In this
chapter I touch on the observations that overlap, but focus principally on the new
insights.
7.2 The study
My approach to the Clinical Study had a much stronger ethnographic flavor than
the Corporate Study. This was in part because I had to engage emotionally with
participants in order to convince them to trust me while observing them; if I did not,
my presence made them visibly uncomfortable.
The results from this study are fewer than from the corporate study. This is
in part because the previous study involved a larger number of organizations, and
because the data gleaned from talking to IT professionals who deal extensively with
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access control can provide a variety of insights more quickly than can be uncovered
by direct observation of end users. However, I think that the access-control solution
used by partner organizations is the largest determining factor: because the clinical
partner puts comparatively few restrictions on users’ access to its systems, it faces
fewer challenges in the technical management of access-control policies.
7.2.1 Teaching hospital
I refer to the healthcare organization that partnered with us in this research as Teach-
ing Hospital; it is a tertiary care facility that has under 10,000 employees.
I conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of seven technical staff mem-
bers (two of whom are also practicing physicians) and directly observed approximately
twenty clinicians in their working environments. My observations were limited to ac-
tivities not at the point of care (i.e., when clinicians were not interacting directly with
patients), and focused on their use of computer systems. Of the twenty clinicians,
approximately four were physicians (including residents), one a nurse practitioner,
two medical students, and the remainder were nurses or other clinical workers. I was
also able to conduct semi-structured interviews lasting more than fifteen minutes with
approximately five of the participants I observed. (I categorize shorter interviews as
part of observation.)
Participant recruitment My sampling methodology — the process I used to en-
list participants — is sometimes described in social science research as “snowball sam-
pling”: new subjects are suggested (and sometimes directly recruited) from among the
acquaintances of existing subjects. If I were to conduct further research at Teaching
Hospital, there are a small number of participants whom I could clearly identify as po-
tential snowball “cores” for further sampling. As it was, my initial set of participants
were drawn from clinicians serving on an IT steering committee.
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Data-gathering For about half of my interactions with clinical users I worked by
myself, and relied on my fieldnotes for data. For the other half of interactions I was
accompanied by a fellow graduate student or an undergraduate research assistant,
and used their fieldnotes for data in addition to my own. One observation (of an IT
professional conducting a compliance check on workstations spread throughout one
wing of the hospital) was conducted by an undergraduate intern working under my
supervision.
Software training I was also able to sit in on a three-hour training session that new
employees attend to become acquainted with Teaching Hospital’s electronic medical
record system, which I refer to hereafter as Teaching Hospital Electronic Record
System (THERS).
7.3 Background observations
Structure Teaching Hospital is an academic medical center that includes a number
of specialty medical clinics as well as a multi-specialty physician group practice. IT
operations are overseen by a group of technical professionals and medical doctors.
Each department or clinic operates with a fair degree of autonomy, although IT
operations are centralized.
The medical cottage industry Domain experts from other institutions and par-
ticipants from Teaching Hospital have described healthcare as a “cottage industry”
in which each institution has its own distinct culture and practices. As one domain
expert who had extensive experience digitizing another institution’s medical records
said, “Once you know one academic medical center... you know exactly one academic
medical center”. The number of processes and practices that are so institution-specific
makes it hard to transfer personnel or knowledge from one organization to another;
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this divide also makes it difficult for information security professionals to directly
apply lessons learned in one place to another.
Supremacy of patient care Above all, Teaching Hospital values the safety of its
patients and the quality of care it provides to them. This focus shapes many of the
decisions they make.
Data permanence As one participant noted, a clinical organization “can’t ever
throw information out”. Medical records, including electronic ones, are legal docu-
ments. If a clinician makes an error an amendment is added, but the error is preserved
as part of the record.
7.3.1 Technical topics
Below is a sample of technical topics that came up during interviews with infosec
professionals at Teaching Hospital.
1. Authentication systems, including passwords1 and biometrics
2. Deauthentication (making sure users log out when they are done with a com-
puter)
3. Transferring patient data from old computer systems to new ones
4. Technical initiatives inspired by new regulatory requirements, including the
encryption of all Teaching Hospital laptop hard drives
5. The role and challenges of new devices in the medical setting, including iPads
and smart medical machines
1Appendix A contains a brief discussion of password policies that was relevant to Teaching Hos-
pital during its examination of its own password policy.
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7.4 Results: user perception and experience
Participants in the Clinical Study use computers every day as part of their jobs.
Teaching Hospital has migrated the majority of its record-keeping to the computer;
as its central electronic medical record (EMR) system, THERS is used in some ca-
pacity by every clinician in the organization. Individual departments within Teaching
Hospital also have specialty computer systems for handling inpatient data, obtaining
medical images, and other tasks that are outside the scope of THERS.
Even though participants make regular use of computers as part of their jobs, the
vast majority professed a degree of discomfort or perceived incompetence with the
machines: in first being introduced to me and my research, they would invariably
say something along the lines of “Oh, you shouldn’t talk to me, because I don’t know
anything about computers!” or “Don’t ask me, I can barely get them to do what I
want!” It was hard to sort out whether this reaction was actually a product of their
experiences with the computer, a response to being introduced to me as “computer
security researcher,” or simply a reluctance to take time away from their already-full
professional schedules to talk to me. In any case, I often responded by saying the
equivalent of, “Oh, don’t worry, I don’t need to ask you any technical questions. I’m
trying to make computer systems more secure while also making them easier to use,
so I’m actually looking for people to tell me about what annoys them or makes it
hard to get work done”. Participants usually responded in turn with an enthusiastic
or humorous attitude, and comments to the effect of “Well, I can certainly do that !”
or “I’ve got enough to fill that whole notebook of yours!”
It is not surprising that most clinical participants seem less comfortable with
computer systems than I do; after all, my work is focused on studying such systems,
and computers have been central to my life for much of my life — so my net experience
is greater than that of participants even ten or twenty years my senior. In observing
their discomfort, however, I do not seek to paint them as bumbling technophobes;
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in fact, most expressed that they enjoyed using computers in their personal lives. I
believe that their discomfort with computers in the workplace is largely a product of
fear : the fear of doing “the wrong thing,” of irrevocably messing up a critical clinical
system, and — most immediately — the fear of taking an action that will make it
hard for them to keep up the frenetic pace their professional environment demands.
I believe that this low-level fear is important to understanding many user behav-
iors, and particularly relevant in studying users’ interaction with identity and access
management systems: after all, access-control mechanisms regularly “challenge” users
by asking them to prove who they are, and when a user answers a challenge incor-
rectly, she is locked out of everything she needs to get her job done.
The rest of this section explores some of my observations on about clinical partic-
ipants’ beliefs and experiences, whereas Section 7.5 considers some of the participant
behaviors I observed surrounding identity and access management.
7.4.1 Relating to the machine
I observed one nurse manager in a small department for a period of about two hours:
she spent the whole time at her desk, either talking on the phone with patients, using
her computer, or doing both simultaneously. Although she did not employ keyboard
shortcuts, her actions in the programs she used frequently were as quick and confident
as those of any seasoned system administrator; it was clear that the volume of her
interaction had brought her a certain degree of mastery.
Despite this apparent confidence, she expressed a high level of anxiety about any
possible changes to the computer systems. In discussing updates to the interface of
THERS, she exclaimed,
“When anything — even the colors — is changed, it freaks you out!”
Now, this participant was not inherently opposed to changes in the system, espe-
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cially if she understood how the change could make it easier to do her job.2 At the
same time, she depended heavily on being able to interact quickly with the it, and
dreaded the possibility that something would confuse her and slow her down.
While the nurse manager had a concrete understanding of the capabilities and
behavior of the computer systems, other participants’ beliefs seemed to have been
shaped by trial and error, and had the potential to cause significant unnecessary
strife. One nurse who worked with medical images had to reboot her computer after
a crash, and was frustrated because the other workstations in the area were already
occupied. Normally, she said, she would use a different computer that was already
running so she did not have to start up particular software program again. Although
she had been using this program since early that morning on the machine in question,
she anticipated that it would take a long time for the program to get going, because
so many other people in Teaching Hospital were using it. She explained that “the
system” slowed down the closer to noon you got, and if you tried to launch it after
noon you were practically guaranteed to be locked out. When I asked her how she
knew this, she related that this had been her exact experience when she was first using
the program, but that she had avoided having to log on any time after 10:00 since.
She was surprised when the program started up quickly, and I wondered how many
times she had changed workstations because she had taken one negative experience
to be indicative of the general case.
One participant — a doctor completing her residency — lamented the fact that
she could not use her personal Apple computer to log in to THERS. She reported that
residents are often responsible for entering notes into patient records, and felt that
home access to THERS would allow her to both more happily complete her work
2When she lamented that her limited screen real estate made it difficult to use many programs
at once (i.e., when coordinating the schedules of multiple providers while also entering data into
THERS) I mentioned that many computer programmers use multiple screens at once. She jumped
on the idea, and said that she would love to experiment with such a setup, but that since her
department was not a high priority in the organization, she doubted she could convince the IT staff
to go for it.
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in the evenings and prepare in the morning for the upcoming day’s work. Strong
personal preferences about computer systems are likely to become more common as
the next generation of medical professionals enter their field. I wonder what impact
their experience (and increased comfort) with computers at an early age will have on
the role and expectations for clinical systems in the future.
7.4.2 The technology ecosystem
Participants frequently expressed frustration with aspects of computer systems that
were close to working, but that failed in small or irregular ways. For example, THERS
and department-specific systems were generally good about sharing data, but one
program periodically failed to update THERS, particularly if a provider quit out of
the program without explicitly closing a patient’s record first. Practitioners waiting
for the data to appear in THERS could be stalled unnecessarily — and when they
realized the problem, said they could not blame anyone other than the computer
system.
Participants described another frustrating feature in the mechanism by which
external lab results were imported into THERS. While it was convenient to have faxes
scanned and uploaded to the appropriate patient record, all entries were labeled with
a date and the generic title “Lab Result”. When a practitioner wanted to see the
results of an external blood test taken the week before, she had to potentially choose
from a potentially long column of generic “Lab Result” entries in the patient’s record.
An obvious source of assistance for users experiencing problems with computer
systems is the organization’s helpdesk. However, one participant reported significant
frustration even in dealing with helpdesk staff: she said that she had a favorite
helpdesker, and that if anyone other than this favorite answered the phone, she would
hang up immediately (only to try again a few minutes later). Given how much
organizations rely on helpdesk metrics to gauge whether users are successful in getting
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their jobs done with the software systems, this behavior — whether due to the user’s
computer anxiety, her perception of the helpdesk staff’s general incompetence, or
some other factor — would seem to be particularly problematic.
7.4.3 Of and for the patients
In the course of this study I came to believe that medical practitioners define and
measure nearly every aspect of their profession in terms of their patients. In expressing
a frustration, participants often grounded their complaint in its impact on patient
care; in praising a new computer feature, they often explained how it made the lives
of their patients better. Even though they are not computer experts, their wealth of
experience dealing with patients provides them with a better understanding than any
computer professional of how computer systems impact clinical settings. In discussing
electronic medical records, one practitioner said that she was enthusiastic to see them
more widely adopted. She noted that while some people believed that using computers
in exam rooms would introduce distance between providers and patients, she found
that the computers gave her the ability to share information — particularly charts
and images — quickly, easily, and intuitively, which actually brought her closer to
her patients. Once she said it, this made perfect sense — but it was a point that had
not occurred to me all the times I’d heard the subject discussed.
Sometimes the overwhelming focus on patients added unusual constraints to par-
ticipants’ patterns of computer usage. I observed the nurses in one department care-
fully negotiating and planning which laptop to use as a new round of patients were
scheduled to arrive. When I asked why it was an issue — were not all the laptops
the same? — they said that only one laptop had a music program installed on it.
At first I assumed that they were listening to the music for their own amusement,
and questioned their priorities to myself. They then explained that there was one
long and uncomfortable diagnostic procedure that some of their patients had to go
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through, and that they liked being able to offer music to help take their patients’
minds off the experience.
Patient access to data
As a computer scientist who takes an interest in the usability of security systems, I
thought I had a good basic grasp of the needs and motivations that drive users in
any environment. The insights that clinicians can offer about their computer usage
— more importantly, the insights that stem from their fundamental and primary
mission of patient care, which I did not understand but that they take for granted —
surprised me time and again.
At the same time, some participating physicians made assertions about their pa-
tients that I would like to see studied further. In particular, multiple physicians
expressed concern about the notion of providing a patient with the access logs of her
medical record; these physicians, who were well versed in the structure of the com-
puter system and the organization’s clinical, research, and billing processes, argued
that a patient would not understand that many hospital employees legitimately need
access to patient data in order for the patient to be seen, receive car, and have that
care paid for. A patient without this understanding, they argued, would be alarmed
to see access logs containing so many unfamiliar names. (The patient might expect
to see the name of her doctor, but not of the billing clerk who sent paperwork to her
insurance company.) While I agree that this data by itself could be alarming to many
patients, I wonder whether it might be possible for a hospital to provide additional
context to help patients understand what they are reading.
The subject of patients’ understanding of access logs came up in a discussion
of how the organization handles cases where a patient is concerned that her record
is being improperly accessed, e.g., by an ex-spouse who happens to work at the
hospital. The current process for auditing access logs, which can be initiated by the
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institution or by a patient if she has concerns, is conducted entirely in-house; at the
end, the patient is given a simple yes-or-no answer depending on whether the internal
auditor determined that inappropriate access had occurred. While this solution can
be an effective way to address patients’ concerns in such a situation, it is neither
particularly transparent (thus, some patients might wonder whether a hospital was
hiding something to save face) nor scalable if the number of requesting patients grows
large. Providing users with the access logs of their records would, on the other hand,
be transparent and could scale better. If a patient suspects that an acquaintance is
improperly accessing her medical record, she is likely to be better qualified to perform
an audit, simply because she is the only one familiar with all of her acquaintances.
In fact, this is the exact process that employees of the organization can use to audit
access to their own medical record if they receive care from their employer. While
I understand physicians’ desire to protect their patients from unnecessary confusion
and concern, I worry that this position could, without further data to support it, be
viewed someday soon as antiquated and somewhat paternalistic.
7.5 Results: compliance and circumvention
In comparison to participants in the Corporate Study, employees at Teaching Hospital
seemed hesitant in extolling the role of security technologies while discussing their
organizations. At the outset of the Clinical Study, one physician expressed skepticism
bordering on defensiveness; he said that clinicians in Teaching Hospital were
“... highly interested in security... but not when it prevents us from getting
our jobs done.”
Although participants believed information security was important, and something
the organization should strive for, their experience indicated that it was very hard
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to make systems that were both usable and secure. One infosec professional stated,
with both frustration and chagrin, that
“Many of our clinicians work around [the security software, rather] than
with it.”
The culture of Teaching Hospital differed from that of the Corporate Study or-
ganizations, especially P-Bank. Bankers were quick to speak up when they had a
problem with a computer system, and often went so far as to blame the system and
its administrators from reducing their productivity. As Section 7.4 notes, clinical
participants often seemed afraid that they would make a mistake with computer sys-
tems. Even when users in clinical organizations were confident in their understanding
of the system, they seemed less likely to vocalize their dissatisfaction through official
channels; these users were perhaps more likely to vent their frustration in a way that
resulted in unexpected confrontation or escalation. More often than not, though,
users quietly did what they needed to do to get their jobs done.
During one observation I watched a clinician trying to log on to a system she
rarely used retrieve her password from a binder in a nearby cupboard. She saw me
watching, and told me that
“I know we’re not supposed to write them down, but if they want us to
get in...”
She recognized that what she was doing was against organization policy, but I got
the impression that if I had not been there she would not have thought twice about
it.
7.5.1 Under-entitlement
Although participants from Teaching Hospital do not describe under-entitlement us-
ing the same terminology as participants in the Corporate Study, they recognize the
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problems it poses. Indeed, given that timely access to medical data can allow clin-
icians to save lives, they consider avoiding under-entitlement to be of paramount
importance.
In describing their goals for future security systems, one infosec professional said
that they “want to increase control without losing flexibility”. The number of pro-
grammatic controls present in THERS was minimal in comparison to the systems
discussed by participants of the Corporate Study. This surprised me: I expected
(perhaps because I have read so many access-control papers that use medical exam-
ples to motivate the need for the new access-control models they describe) that access
to an individual patient’s records would at least be restricted to the set of clinicians
working to provide care to that patient. However, as discussed above, the number of
hospital staff members who legitimately need access to medical data in the course of
providing care is large, and includes a significant number of non-clinicians. Partici-
pants reported that these non-clinical users’ access was carefully restricted to a small
subset of patient data using a classic RBAC scheme. (Note that I did not have the
opportunity to interview, for example, an administrator tasked with billing insurance
providers, so have no data on whether these users experienced under-entitlement or
circumvented controls to get their jobs done.)
Break-glass protection
Participants also reported that restricting clinicians’ access to patient data with-
out compromising patient care had proven to be unsolvable with the available tools.
THERS thus implemented break-glass controls, which guarantee clinicians’ ability
to view patient data without intervention by a third party (e.g., an administrator).
Break-glass was implemented in the following cases:
1. For records containing sensitive information, such as HIV test results,
2. For records belonging to high-profile patients, such as celebrities,
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3. For other records, determined by individual clinicians at their discretion.
Records in THERS were visually marked when under the protection of a break-
glass control. Users3 who attempt to access a protected record encounter a dialog
that 1) Notifies them the record is under break-glass protection, 2) reminds them
that their access will be logged and responsible clinicians will be notified, and 3) Asks
them to confirm that they want to proceed with the access.
Control challenges
Participants of this study reported that their organization experienced challenges in
deploying more proactive controls for some of the same reasons reported in the Cor-
porate Study. One basic criterion for controlling access to patient records — whether
a clinician has a care relationship with a patient — is challenged as in finance by the
tremendous churn that hospitals experience in staff assignments. Several classes of
users change departments as a normal course of their work, including medical students
rotating through departments as part of their training, and residents in specialties
such as anesthesia which require them to roam from one inpatient department to an-
other while on call. Even outside of teaching hospitals, “floating” nurses can change
assignments daily, physicians are frequently asked to consult or provide a second opin-
ion on one others’ cases, and all clinicians establish temporary care relationships with
patients in a colleague’s absence.
Participants identified additional properties of the healthcare environment that
would challenge an effort to control access to subsections of a patient’s medical record.
Whereas a database — a resource commonly under access control in the financial
3I unfortunately did not discuss further details on the break-glass feature during interviews with
participants, and thus do not know answers to several questions that one might ask about its
implementation. For example, if a user chooses to access a protected record, will she be prompted
to break the glass upon future access attempts? When a clinician adds break-glass protection as in
case 3, can he provide a whitelist of users who should not be prompted to break the glass? Aside
from the physician who imposes protection in case 3, who is notified when the glass is broken, and
can that list be specified or changed?
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industry — is organized according to a well-understood schema, clinical data is often
highly unstructured.4 More significantly, it is difficult to know ahead of time whether
particular information from the patient’s record is going to be relevant in future
situations. We might not expect that the notes from Jane’s podiatrist five years ago
will help her neurologist diagnose her condition today, but participants report that
the availability of any piece of data may be critical important in providing effective
care.
7.5.2 Deauthentication and styrofoam cups
While the infosec team of Teaching Hospital largely perceived themselves successful
in providing usable and secure authentication, they had identified the problem of
deauthentication: how do you make sure people log out of a computer system when
they are done using it? Here as in the high-stress financial environment mentioned
in Chapter 5, the standard approach of applying inactivity timeouts was met with
strong user opposition. For every timeout value the infosec team tried, it seemed like
there were departments for whom the value was too short (users complained that they
were logged out while still using the system) and others for which the same timeout
value was too long (compliance checks in revealed logged-in computers that were left
unattended).
At the same time, the nature of the healthcare setting left workstations exposed
to large numbers of people not employed by the organization — and made it harder
for employees to clearly identify strangers in their work environment. (The number
of people regularly seen on an individual floor of a financial institution is easily both
smaller and more stable than the crowds of patients and clinicians coursing through a
hospital department in any given day.) Although financial organizations have stricter
4Participants reported that the large amount of unstructured data is a significant barrier in
reaping the benefits expected from electronic medical records, but that clinicians in the past had
ignored or actively fought efforts to impose increased structure on their data-collection process.
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timeout policies, reliable de-authentication would thus seem to be more important in
healthcare, where it can be harder to spot an opportunistic outsider.
Proximity sensors
In an effort to solve the deauthentication problem, the infosec team of Teaching
Hospital deployed to a set of its workstations a special sensor designed to detect the
close proximity of a human. Thus, when a user walked away the proximity sensor
could detect her departure and sign her out if necessary. Like timeouts, this approach
was met with widespread user complaints5; many said the sensors logged them out
while they were still standing there, or were confused by people walking down the
hall. Eventually some clever user realized that the sensors had no minimum detection
distance, and thwarted one by putting a styrofoam cup over it. The solution spread
throughout the organization, and shortly thereafter the infosec team removed the
devices.6
On closing tickets
Both clinical and IT participants reported that the infosec team encouraged users to
deauthenticate by closing their active Kerberos ticket7. Because the organization used
Kerberos to mediate access to all its sensitive resources (electronic medical records,
email, and department-specific systems), closing the ticket should, theoretically, be
the best way to de-authenticate quickly. However, as one savvy clinical user pointed
out (and others confirmed later), users who comply with this exact guidance can
actually experience more frustration than users who de-authenticate from each indi-
5Participants practically shuddered remembering the feedback they received during this experi-
ment. It seems that users were vitriolic and quite aggressive in expressing their discontent — to the
point that at least one device was literally ripped off of the workstation to which it was attached.
6At least, the ones that angry users had not already broken.
7Kerberos tickets manifested on the workstation’s screen as a small window containing the au-
thenticated user’s name. Some users chose to minimize it, as it stayed in the foreground and they
found it got in the way. It could be closed like any other window with a standard mouse click to the
appropriate corner.
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vidual application (i.e., using a Logout menu or button). As the observant clinical
participant demonstrated to me, if user u terminates her session in THERS by some
mechanism other than that application’s native logout flow, user n + 1 must wait
while THERS restarts — a process that can take multiple minutes — before she can
log in. Thus, at least in some departments, users exerted negative social pressure
on their peers who followed the IT department’s deauthentication advice. I do not
know how much this pressure impacted users’ deauthentication habits — are there
some who gave up trying to authenticate in exasperation? — but I did observe cases
of users who viewed this mismatch between official advice and practical realities as
evidence that the IT department did not really know what it was talking about.
7.5.3 Compliance checks
Following the removal of the proximity sensors described above, the hospital staff
decided to pursue a solution to the deauthentication problem that was not rooted in
technology, but based instead on user education and periodic compliance audits. An
intern who collaborated with me in this research joined a member of the hospital’s
infosec staff in performing one such compliance audit; over a period of a few hours
they checked roughly 225 workstations to identify ones that had been left unattended
while still possessing a valid Kerberos ticket.
The compliance check was conducted as follows:
1. The staff member had a list of physical regions of the hospital he was going
to target and a time period in which he was going to conduct the check. This
allowed him to achieve systematic coverage in his audits over time.
2. The staff member walked around the designated region of the hospital. For each
computer, he marked down its state:
(a) in use by an employee
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(b) unattended without a ticket open
(c) unattended and with a ticket open
3. For each machine that has been left unattended with an open ticket, he per-
formed the following steps:
I. Sent an email to the user from their own email account with a standardized
message informing them of the situation and offering guidance for the
future.
II. Logged the user off (closed the Kerberos ticket).
III. Used the workstation’s web browser to open to an internal webpage that
explained why the unattended ticket was closed.
IV. Placed a pen light printed with the message “Log off before you walk off /
Thank you for protecting patient information” at the workstation.
The auditor’s definition of “in use” seemed a bit loose, in that machines with open
tickets were considered to as such if there were clinicians in the same hallway — even if
those clinicians were not directly interacting with machines. This situation represents
one core of the organization’s de-authentication issue: throughout my observations, it
became clear that clinicians frequently alternate between interacting with a stationary
computer and performing non-computer tasks. A clinician believes that she is still
using the computer while performing other tasks, because she intends to come back to
it within a matter of minutes. Similarly, the frequency with which she must alternate
between computer and non-computer tasks is precisely what drives her to consider
logging out and then logging back in again to be so burdensome.
Given this context, it is not surprising that the IT staff member chose to apply
a somewhat broad categorization of “in use”: indeed, I think that his choice reflects
an understanding of users existing perceptions of that term. Moreover, a more strict
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interpretation of the de-authentication policy would be viewed by users as being
antithetical to their goal of providing efficient patient care.
The intern who observed the compliance check noted the infosec staffer seemed
highly conscious of clinicians’ perceptions and opinions in general, to the point that
the intern noted him to be “on a bit of a PR mission”. The use of pen-light giveaways8
is consistent with this attention to user perception, and indicates a recognition that
improving user de-authentication habits is difficult if one simultaneously inspires ha-
tred for the IT department.
7.5.4 Compliance budgets
The compliance behavior that is documented here supports Beautement et al.’s the-
ory of compliance budgets (which is discussed in Chapter 2) [4]. As those authors
observed of their study participants, the users of Teaching Hospital “value security,
both for themselves and for the organization they work for”. At the same time,
participants chose whether to comply with deauthentication policies based on the
costs and benefits they perceived as being associated with that compliance — and
we can tell from their behavior that they perceived differences in interacting with
break-glass controls, reacting to timeouts vs. manual compliance checks, and using
proximity sensors (which quickly maxed out their compliance budgets and inspired
physical expressions of their frustration). Like Beautement’s participants, hospital
users expressed that “their primary work task dominates their perspective whereas
the security goals of the organization are subordinate”: at a high level, the primacy of
patient care dictates that under-entitlement is unacceptable, even if the only workable
solution results in probable over-entitlement.
8The staffer reported that they used to give out stress balls, but that “people threw them at”
him in their frustration.
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7.6 Results: the Phalanx Problem (or: bands of rov-
ing doctors)
In discussing access control — particularly authentication — with participants from
Teaching Hospital, they brought up a number of usage scenarios that seemed to push
the bounds of what current technology can cope with. As described above, they
struggled with user deauthentication: neither inactivity timeouts nor the proximity
sensors they deployed seemed to be good solutions; biometrics were appealing, but
fingerprints were thwarted by medical gloves, facial recognition by surgical masks,
voice recognition by noisy clinics, and the iris scans by the high equipment cost. The
possibility of using RFID tags to solve deauthentication also came up, but there they
raised the question: if you have a group of doctors within several feet of a computer
when an authentication request is made, how could a system identify which doctor
to authenticate?
While one can imagine technical solutions that address this particular conundrum,
the question inspired a discussion about patient rounds, which in a teaching hospital
can involve a whole team of doctors, residents, medical students, nurses, and other
clinicians moving throughout an inpatient ward. During rounds the team makes
its way from patient to patient, discussing each case, taking notes on the patient’s
condition, quizzing clinicians-in-training, and generally providing care.
However, the dominant paradigm of human-computer interaction has long been
focused on a single user: if there was a single computer being used during rounds to
interact with the patient’s electronic medical record, which individual should be the
one who authenticates to the EMR? Moreover, why should the system be limited to
authenticating and logging the actions of a single user when it is in fact a group of
clinicians who are actively participating? In these situations it is usually a resident
who records the notes and orders, yet it is the attending physician who is legally
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responsible for the group’s decisions and the subsequent care the patient receives. To
complicate matters yet further, any clinician participating in rounds may reasonably
need to access that patient’s data later, if just to further their professional develop-
ment; in some sense they are authorized to see it by virtue of the simple fact that
they were present for the examination.
As noted above, Teaching Hospital relied on break-glass controls to restrict clin-
icians’ access to sensitive data. A solution for this challenge of authenticating and
dynamically provisioning groups of clinicians — which we have taken to calling the
Phalanx Problem9 — could provide a more advanced authorization system with valu-
able data about which clinicians have been participating in a particular patient’s
care. Indeed, without a mechanism for automatically gathering such data — and
automatically provisioning them, or allowing one to “inherit” a subset of another’s
entitlements — it would seem impossible to support more finely-grained controls on
clinicians’ access to patient data without incurring tremendous administrative costs.
I believe that more time should be spent studying the data-access and data-
generation patterns exhibited by clinicians conducting rounds, as well as other dy-
namic groups of professionals whose actions transcend the current one-user, one-
machine authentication paradigm. Chapter 11 goes into a more detailed exploration
of potential future work in this vein.
7.7 Conclusions
This study lends additional weight to many of the results of the Corporate Study, and
offers further insights into the human factors that impact the success of access-control
systems. The users of Teaching Hospital possessed a diversity of skill levels, depths of
understanding, and degrees of comfort with computer systems, but discussions with a
9A phalanx was an ancient greek military formation; the phalanges are the collection of bones
that collectively form the fingers of a hand.
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small set painted a coherent picture of the limitations of current access control tech-
nologies and policies in their environment. Although I believe these results support
the hypothesis that human factors are at the root of why access-control systems fail,
I believe they also indicate that human users cannot be blamed for this failure. The
users I interviewed and observed At Teaching Hospital have the best interests of their
patients and their organization at heart, and work consistently to comply with infosec
policies while meeting the constraints of their professional environments. The failure
of access control lies instead with us, the researchers and technologists who design
access-control systems and policies that fail to take into account the basic realities of
human workflows. It is thus that I propose in the next chapter that we fundamentally
reboot our understanding of the access-control problem.
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Chapter 8
Old assumptions and new wisdom
Chapters 4 through 7 have documented the findings of my fieldwork studying large
organizations in a variety of industries, including a deep and systemic dysfunction in
the practice of access control in the real world. In this chapter I attempt to diagnose
the root of this dysfunction. Section 8.1, “Old Assumptions”, is a revised version of a
text co-authored with my advisor that appeared as “What’s wrong with access control
in the real world?” in IEEE Security & Privacy in 2010 [82]. The second section,
“New Wisdom”, is new with this document.
8.1 Old assumptions
Access control is a fundamentally hard problem. Analog human systems (e.g., cor-
porations, partnerships, families) use countless mechanisms to encode and enforce
standards of resource use. Most of these mechanisms are what computer scientists
would consider “informal”: together they form a complex ecosystem of sociological
incentives and psychological motivators that are wholly divorced from the (often)
provably secure computer protocols our community treasures.
At some point over the decades, the resources moved to electronic settings —
and the problem of how to provide the appropriate access control came under the
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domain of “computer security”. To gain traction representing these complex policies
in formal computer terms, the infosec research community approached the challenge
as any good scientist does: first one starts with a simplified model. One assumes that
the world is less complex, convinces oneself that one can solve the problem in this
simplified world, and then moves on to the complexity of the real world.
However, I worry that somewhere along the way our community forgot that the
simplifying model was not the same as the real world. We (as a community) decided to
implement the systems based on assumptions our simplifying model made, and forgot
to make allowances for real-world messiness. (The academic research community,
with its focus on occasionally provably secure systems and new, elaborate schemes
for expressing increasingly complex access-control policies, is particularly responsible
for this focus on the theoretically “secure”.)
Now, when a physicist’s empirical results deviate from those predicted by her the-
oretical model, she does not simply ignore the deviation: she mines it for information,
because she knows it can help her validate and refine her model. In particular, she
does not castigate the universe for being uncooperative or not sufficiently well-trained!
However, when our implemented computer security policies go awry, we often do
not seek to understand why. First, we cope with the resulting crisis; next, we argue to
interested parties that our system did, in fact, follow all accepted best practices, and
that the failure was due to some uncontrollable, external factor, such misbehaving
users.
Organization-wide doublethink
The result of this collective habit is nothing short of organizational doublethink.
Everyone on the inside knows that the systems are not working, but admitting this
knowledge in and of itself opens them to liability — the perceived success of the
system depends on ignoring the problems.
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Professionals from multiple large financial institutions have acknowledged this
doublethink off the record; one (whom we refer to as Alice) related one particularly
telling anecdote. While undergoing an audit by federal regulatory authorities, Alice’s
team worked to demonstrate that the company met the government’s data security
requirements; the auditors asked the expected questions, and ticked the expected
boxes on their checklists. Alice was elated that the reviewers seemed satisfied her
team’s answers — until it dawned on her that those auditors were asking the same easy
questions when they evaluated the security of other financial companies, including the
banks to whom she trusted her own personal finances. At that moment, she said, she
wanted to grab the reviewers and tell them what questions they should be asking, to
say “Hey, aren’t you curious about this information over here?” Of course, because
she knew the organization that employed her did not have satisfying answers to some
of these more revealing questions, she restrained her urge.
Clearly, the actual success of a security system depends on thinking honestly about
it; in this situation, we must first admit the doublethink is doublethink. As a step
in that direction, this section tries to enumerate some of the simplifying assumptions
the security community has made in its effort to gain traction with the access control
problem. For many environments, there seems to be a dramatic and painful mismatch
between these simplifying assumptions and reality. I therefore argue in the second half
of the chapter that effective security in these environments may require rethinking
these assumptions.
8.1.1 The nature of policy
First, I offer a few words on what exactly we mean by “policy”. In the classical way
of thinking about computer security, we think about subjects (the entities that do
the acting) and the objects (the entities that get acted upon); we draw a matrix with
rows for each subject and columns for each object, and fill in the boxes with the
150
permissions: what is a given subject allowed to do with a given object. (Yes, this
is a simplifying model.) In many real-world enterprises, these permissions are called
entitlements.
In the real world, the subjects are typically real people and the resources those
things they need to use to get their job done. In the computer rendering, these
become computer users and programs and data, governed by some type of access-
control system. Our community worries about how to craft this system so that it
does the right thing — that is, so that it matches the enterprise’s real requirements.
Hence, we might start by calling out the implicit assumption that this goal in fact
possible.
• Assumption 1: There exists a correct access-control policy for every organi-
zation.
Maybe such a policy exists. But maybe it does not — or maybe the language we
use to render the computerized policy is ineffective at capturing the “it depends” gray
areas in the real world.
• Assumption 2: The correct policy is human-decidable.
Our community gives enterprises an access-control system with a set of knobs.
Even if a “correct” setting of the knobs exists, is it feasible for a human organization
identify it? One infosec officer chortled about how computer security researchers
believe that it is actually possible for an enterprise to stop what it is doing for two
weeks, put everyone in a large room, and work out the policy.
Even weaker versions of this assumption can be problematic.
• Assumption 3: The correct policy is human-recognizable: a human can effec-
tively audit a previous decision.
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• Assumption 4: The correct policy is human-constructible: a human can say
ahead of time whether (user,action,resource) should be allowed.
In the real world, access-control questions often lead to the answer “it depends”. “It
depends” requires context. Will the context be available to the parties doing policy
creation or auditing? (Our lab has heard of a critical control room door that was
password-protected — because it needs to be secure — but has the password written
on it — because if there’s an emergency, one must gain entry.)
8.1.2 Organizational structures
I now consider assumptions our community has made about human organizations
themselves. The human components of secure systems are foreign territory for many
computer scientists; unlike the finite instruction sets that guide the execution of
deterministic machines, the principles that govern the action and interaction of a set
of people are often beyond the understanding of any one individual.
• Assumption 5: Resources (and therefore policies) are managed centrally.
Our community typically expects centralized control — but reality often shows
that the further one is from the action, the less one understands the real issues.
• Assumption 6: A corporate organization is structured like a tree, with a small
number of decision-makers at the root and quantities of specialist employees at
the leaves. Control and decision-making flows in a deterministic manner, one
way, along the edges of this tree.
At a first approximation, modeling the structure of a human organization with a
tree is appropriate; management researchers and corporations themselves often use
it. However, a tree represents the relationships relevant only to the most formal of
decision-making processes; for example, a tree can help understand the mechanism
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by which a university crafts and approves its annual budget. In contrast, in many
domains the decisions made by most employees on a day-to-day basis proceed along a
more ad-hoc path; influence is determined more by a person’s effective job role than
their official title, and thus individuals who are not formally vested with power (for
example, administrative assistants) often have a surprising hand in the outcome of
small decisions.
The departure from the traditional tree view of an organization is also mani-
fest in larger sub-organizational units. For example, the clinical arm of a hospital
may theoretically be managed by a Medical Director or other executive to whom
individual departments must answer. However, no individual is qualified to directly
oversee the detailed operations of Radiology and Neurology and Oncology; each de-
partment requires a specialist leaders who can make decisions appropriate for the
work that department does. This distribution of authority (combined with cultural
factors common with a highly-educated workforce) makes the organization’s process
for choosing computer systems or crafting access-control policies deviate significantly
from the tree-shaped representation.
I have occasionally encountered computer security colleagues surprised by this
questioning the existence of a centralized hierarchy for policy making. I suggest such
colleagues contact the business management community, who have been discussing
such a “matrixed” organizational structure for years.
8.1.3 Knowledge of the users
Unfortunately, security professionals are so confident in their belief in the sufficiency
of existing schemes that they at times blame the user when things seem to go wrong.
• Assumption 7: With sufficient training and commitment to their jobs, well-
intentioned users will follow the organization’s formal rules, including information-
security policies.
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• Corollary: Only ill-intentioned users will circumvent control mechanisms.
In the real world, I have repeatedly found users who circumvent the system not
because they are evil, but because they are conscientiously trying to get their jobs
done! One medical clinician even asked us “are you trying to build a better policeman,
or do you want to help patients?” Inglesant and Sasse documented [41] that unusable
password policies alone can decrease user productivity and negatively impact the
organization; a recent medical journal article [48] provides a wonderful case study
of a clever computerized resource control system — and all the ways that clinicians
worked around it in order to save patient lives.
• Assumption 8: The possible negative repercussions of over-entitlement are far
greater than the possible negative repercussions of under-entitlement.
Our community touts the principle of “least privilege”: the access permitted by
a computerized policy should be a tight-as-possible superset of the access required.
However, this thinking can easily lead to a computerized system that is too restrictive.
Perhaps in national security environments, erring on the side of under-entitlement
may make sense — but in the domains I’ve looked at, such errors may result in
missed market opportunities and in patient death.
The computer security community laments when passwords are written on sticky
notes or under keyboards — but I posit that this phenomenon is often an understand-
able effort by end-users to tune a suboptimal access-control system. An organization
quashes this tuning at its peril; rather than punishing users, we need to develop
systems and policies that help them get their jobs done efficiently without exposing
sensitive data to passers-by.
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8.1.4 Knowledge of the system
Is it even possible for security researchers and practitioners to understand the system?
This conundrum is reflected also in the complexity of economic systems (and the
economic meltdown that experts are still trying to understand and reverse). For
access control to be manageable by humans, we implicitly simplify.
• Assumption 9: The information relevant to making access-control decisions
(who has what responsibilities) changes slowly.
In organizations where the tasks are complex and require professional judgement
(e.g., clinical settings) or where the nature of the work is highly dynamic (e.g., in-
vestment banks, where bankers are constantly reassigned to new accounts), it may be
simply not possible to know ahead of time whether a given operation is going to be
acceptable. After his initial comments on policy crafting, the infosec officer I alluded
to earlier chortled further that, even if a correct policy could be created, members
of our community are deluded in thinking that the policy would remain correct for
more than a few days.
We need to adopt a practice of rigorous auditing. We must define boundaries
of how much we trust an individual user, and allow them to operate broadly within
those boundaries, but honestly evaluate what they are actually doing.
• Assumption 10: Supervisors (or even users) know what entitlements individ-
uals legitimately need.
IT professionals across domains recognize the practice of copy-paste provisioning :
a manager Carla will admit that when David joined her group, he will clone the
entitlements Bob has — since David’s job seems to be similar to Bob’s and Bob can
manage to get his done. Neither Carla nor Bob actually know which are the magic
combination of permissions, nor are they likely to take valuable time from their actual
work to figure it out.
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During one organization’s entitlement review (an effort to reduce over-entitlement),
administrators presented users with a list of their entitlements, and incentivized them
to voluntarily give up ones they deemed unnecessary. The administrators were thrilled
when users reduced their permissions up to half — but, of course, dismayed when the
permission changes went live and the users could not access the data they needed to
get their jobs done.
8.2 New wisdom applied to old assumptions
Although I offered counter-examples for many of the assumptions presented in the
previous section, I do not think we should abandon them entirely. In this section I
seek to identify those that can still hold for some organizations, while also developing
supplemental or alternative maxims for situations that the old assumptions do not
cover. In general, I believe that some of the classic assumptions can hold true in
settings that are well-suited to access-control schemes with classic pre-defined policies;
in Chapter 9 I discuss alternative schemes.
8.2.1 Fundamental properties of humans and organizations
Some of the assumptions discussed in the previous chapter apply to the very nature
of human systems. Here I offer what I believe to be more accurate maxims on the
topic, which I hope will shape our understanding in a more constructive way. Note
that the order in which I consider the classic assumptions differs from the previous
section, but I retain the same numbering scheme here to facilitate cross referencing.
Assumption 7: User adherence to policy as an expression of intent
Contrary to Assumption 7, even well-intentioned users will circumvent controls. They
truly wish to do the “right” thing, but the system inadvertently rewards them for
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circumventing those rules in cases where circumvention helps them get their jobs
done. Some of these compliance problems may be addressed with user training, but
there are other issues that user education cannot solve. Assumption 7 could only hold
if all these issues were resolved and the system was guaranteed to allow legitimate
users to always complete their jobs — a standard that no practical system is likely
to achieve.
• Maxim 1: In the vast majority of cases, the vast majority of users truly want
to do what is best for the organization.
• Maxim 2: An unusual policy violation may be a sign of malicious intent.
Frequent policy violations are an indication that some aspect of the control
system is broken (e.g., that there is an edge-case that the policy-maker did not
take into consideration).
Assumption 6: Organizational structure and decision-making
Our society commonly uses tree structures to abstract aspects of a human organi-
zation’s operations, and this structure may accurately reflect some organizations;
Assumption 6 may hold e.g. when applied to the military chain of command. How-
ever, the workflows and decision-making processes that financial, healthcare, and
software-industry practitioners find challenging — the access-control edge cases and
exceptions — are exactly those that do not fit into this rigid hierarchy metaphor.
• Maxim 3: Authority and decision-making in a human system can take on a
variety of forms.
• Maxim 4: Humans are in many cases well-equipped to reason about the ar-
bitrary and dynamic structures associated with human organizations, but com-
puters rarely are.
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Corollary: Access-control systems that depend exclusively on machine rea-
soning are fundamentally limited in comparison to systems that also rely on
humans.
Assumptions 1 and 2: The existence of a correct access policy, and its
human decidability
As discussed in the previous chapter, it can be difficult to identify a single person
(or job function) within an organization that defines the optimal policy. A teaching
hospital comprising diverse departments often struggles to reach consensus among its
leadership; while an executive may choose a policy by fiat, the resulting acceptable
policy may be far from optimal. Given these complexities, it is meaningless to talk
about a “correct” policy for most organizations.
• Maxim 5: There may be no “correct” access-control policy, but there will likely
be several “acceptable” policies.
• Maxim 6: Finding an acceptable access-control policy is the most expensive
aspect of designing an access-control system.
Part of the expense inherent to policy development stems from the massive number
of access scenarios that might arise in the organization. More bothersome still is the
possibility that a policy-writer might effectively ignore scenarios. As the number of
relevant environmental variables increases, it becomes functionally impossible for a
human to anticipate every scenario. Assumption 2 can thus only hold in cases where
the number of variables is small enough to guarantee a human can reason through
each combination of their values; I expect that no large organization will fit this bill,
but small organizations with relatively simple access-control needs might.
• Maxim 7: A human cannot always deliver an accurate access-control verdict
before the request is made and the context is known.
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8.2.2 Scoping the old wisdom and expanding with the new
The remainder of the assumptions hold some truth, at least in at least a subset of
environments.
Assumptions 3 and 10: The recognizability of a correct access-control
policy, and supervisors’ understanding of employees’ access needs
Even though my fieldwork indicates that large organizations’ optimal access-control
policies are not human-decidable, they may be human-recognizable — i.e., it may
be possible for a human to determine whether an access should be allowed at or
following the moment of the request. Organizations whose policies are not reasonably
decidable cannot depend fully on classic access-control schemes, but will likely benefit
alternative approaches, as discussed in the following chapter.
• Maxim 8: Policies may not always be human-decidable, but they are human-
recognizable.
Corollary: It may not be possible for users to generate an acceptable policy,
but they can recognize whether an access was acceptable after the fact.
Assumptions 5 and 9: The centralized management of policy and re-
sources, and the rate at which access-control information changes
All human organizations change, and a majority of the challenges in access control
relate to the need to evolve the policy to accommodate changes in the organization.
Some organizations (or parts of organizations) change slowly, but others — particu-
larly those in dynamic and highly competitive sectors — change quite rapidly. I think
that it is possible for even fast-changing organizations (those that violate Assumption
9) to have effective access-control systems, as long long as those systems are designed
to evolve with the organization.
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• Maxim 9: All accurate access-control policies evolve.
A centralized management scheme will be more or less appropriate (and Assump-
tion 5 more or less accurate) depending on the size of the organization, its rate of
change, and its central management’s ability to react to that change in a reasonable
way. Of the organizations I studied, not a single one observed a strictly centralized
resource- or policy-management strategy. That said, none of them observed a strictly
decentralized strategy, either: each organization found its own balance between the
rigidity of the former and the relative chaos of the latter.
• Maxim 10: Some resources and policies within an organization will be man-
aged centrally. Others will be managed in a decentralized fashion.
• Maxim 11: It takes non-trivial time to alter a centrally-managed policy. De-
centralized, local policy management can react more quickly.
Crafting and maintaining an access-control policy incurs overhead costs based on
the number of stakeholders involved, as each stakeholder must negotiate a policy that
will be acceptable from her perspective.
• Maxim 12: Classic access-control policies are well-suited to being managed
centrally, but are expensive to maintain in a decentralized fashion.
• Maxim 13: Policies that are likely to need change frequently should be man-
aged in a decentralized fashion.
Assumption 8: Repercussions of over-entitlement vs. under-entitlement
While over-entitlement exposes an organization’s data to a certain risk of compromise,
under-entitlement can prevent members of an organization from completing vital
tasks. The subset of organizations that value the completion of such tasks over
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avoiding data compromise will functionally tend toward over-entitlement rather than
under-entitlement (and thus violation of Assumption 8).1
• Maxim 13: It is sometimes better for a user to violate policy if it helps them
get their job done. In these cases, no amount of education or grandstanding
from a security professional will change this prioritization.
• Maxim 14: An organization that has an accurate record of policy violations
can move toward improving its policy or its processes.
Corollary: When an organization drives its users to hide their policy violations,
it shoots itself in the foot.
8.3 Conclusions
Given that computer science is descended from mathematics, I find our community’s
pursuit of rigorous formal models understandable: we like being able to say that a
system is “secure”, and have proofs to that effect. However, pretending that security
is a binary property — that it really is possible to sign off on a system or policy
as being “secure” — is driving us to ignore the subtleties of the real world. We are
making a best-guess effort when we make a security policy, but too often we then
stick our heads in the sand before we can see what the results of our effort were. As
Linda Cureton (CIO of NASA) notes, “policies in and of themselves do not eliminate
cyber security compromises” [14]. If we want to achieve some measure of security, we
need to instead observe our systems constantly, acknowledge their complexity, and
admit to the fact that “security” is a constant process, not a product of finite action.
Unfortunately, this reality seems incompatible with the bulk of the access-control
research literature.
1This tendency seems to be usually informal or organic — and also quite distressing to the




My fieldwork documents problems with access control as it is practiced today in large,
dynamic organizations. As I outlined in the previous chapter, I believe much of the
blame for these problems lies not with those organizations or the users that compose
them, but with the research community.
I argue that this community has not only failed to provide many practitioners
with adequate tools, but that it has (inadvertently) misled many organizations into
adopting an unnecessarily narrow view of access control. Despite these long-festering
deficiencies, the research community seems to have largely stagnated into a state of
continual but incremental elaboration on well-worn themes. While some work (such as
studies into the usability of policy-management tools) truly strives to understand and
mitigate the deficiencies of our current solutions, most contributions consist of small
extensions to existing formal models. The authors in the latter camp often fail to
motivate the need for their work in the context of real-world applications, and doubly
fail to meaningfully evaluate it using any metrics other than its (mathematically)
“provable” security properties.
In this chapter I aim to turn that pattern on its head. Rather than trying to
improve the the state-of-the-art by adding yet another layer to the towering edifice
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that is the literature on formalized access control, I propose we raze the ivory tower
down to its narrow footing — or, at least, ignore the existence of the tower for a
short time, so that we can attempt to craft a new foundation. This foundation
should offer a clear definition of the basic access-control problem — the real-world
conundrum that we try to address with access-control models and systems (and,
thus, the fundamental goals of access control). It should have an expansive vision of
the solution space — a recognition of the larger universe of solutions that real-world
practitioners can employ to address their own instances of the access-control problem.
This vision should, importantly, recognize and embrace the role that human users
play in the maintenance and evolution of access-control systems. Finally, this new
foundation for understanding access control should offer insight into the suitability of
these solutions for different settings.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows.
• Section 9.1 recasts the problem as being one of access mediation, and describes
— for the first time, to my knowledge1 — a functional representation (which I
refer to as the Portunes Function2) of access-mediation systems, which unifies
understanding of previously disparate models (classic policy-based access con-
trol, Optimistic Security, and Reactive Access Control) under a single frame-
work.
• Section 9.2 examines types of errors that can occur in crafting inputs to the
Portunes function.
• Sections 9.3 through 9.6 describe the three broad classes of access-mediation
1Although members of the research community have called for a “meta-model” to attempt to
unify existing models [22], I think their interest is more oriented toward proving formal equivalence
between these models than on providing on a high-level description of the space of possible solutions,
which is what I try to do here.
2Named after an ancient Roman god associated with keys, doors, and livestock. Although I am
sure that frustrated information security practitioners might draw parallels between this last domain
and their own efforts to herd members of their organization into the constraints of access-control
policies, I choose to focus more on the keys and doors.
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systems (ex ante, ex post, and uno tempore), their attributes, and how they
relate to models from the literature that implement them.
• Section 9.7 offers concluding perspectives on the contributions presented in the
chapter.
9.1 Reframing the problem
What is the basic problem that access-control systems are supposed to solve? To
answer this question, consider for a moment what would happen if access control had
never been invented: in their absence, what new concerns would P-Bank or Teaching
Hospital have? I believe that we can summarize their worries thus: that users would
enact accesses to the organization’s digital resources that are not advantageous to the
organization (i.e., that either do not further the organization’s mission or outright
hamper it).
How would organizations go about allaying these concerns? In particular, what
functions or tasks could they build into computer systems3 to achieve this goal?
Unencumbered by the historical focus on “provably secure” solutions, and mindful
of the complexities inherent in large socio-technical systems, I believe there are two
basic strategies:
• Monitoring : track users’ accesses in order to hold them accountable for their
actions afterward (and make sure they know that this monitoring happens)
• Checkpoints4: make it difficult for users to perform the detrimental accesses in
the first place, by serving as a gatekeeper for every access they wish to perform
3Computer systems are not the only way to accomplish this goal, but a reboot of the alternatives
(such as user education) is beyond the scope of this work.
4Here I make reference checkpoints found at international borders, not those found in the fault-
tolerance literature.
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Given that an organization could choose to use either or both of these techniques,
the task of deterring users from doing detrimental things is not one of just controlling
access (which would seem to refer only to the “checkpoint” approach) so much as more
generally mediating access. I thus use the term “access mediation” for the remainder
of this document to refer to this more-inclusive vision of the potential solution space
to the problem at hand.
9.1.1 A functional representation of access mediation
A good access mediation system will probably employ both strategies — checkpoint
and monitoring — at once. We build toward a functional definition of a system that
uses both by first offering definitions of systems that employ each strategy individu-
ally. We can then use the parts of this functional representation to discuss some of
the deep challenges uncovered by my fieldwork.
The basics: subjects and accesses
Any system that mediates access must accept as one of its inputs a representation of
the access it is to mediate. I therefore use A to denote an access, and define it to
include three pieces of information:
• Action: the operation being undertaken (e.g., read, append, or sign)
• Subject: the entity performing the action
• Object: the resource upon which the action is being performed
There are a large number of ways that an individual system can represent each of
these pieces of information. To facilitate later discussion and without loss of general-
ity, we assume that A’s representation possesses the following properties:
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• Intelligible: the representation uses units and formats that are comprehensible
to a human; e.g., the representation of an object would consist of a filename
rather than a filesystem-block identifier.
• Specific: while being abstract enough to achieve human intelligibility, the rep-
resentation is particular enough to be unambiguous. For example, even if the
system was able to determine that the user jane was part of the group students,
A would include the username rather than the group identifier (which are con-
veyed in the context, discussed below).
• Stable: in addition to being intelligible and unambiguous, the representation
of a given action, subject, or object remains relatively static over time; i.e., a
given digital object will be represented by the same identifier throughout its
existence.
Checkpoint systems
I now define CP as a function that represents a checkpoint system. In addition to
A, CP accepts as input additional contextual information C that the system needs
to make a decision. C can contain supplementary data about the subjects, objects,
and actions referenced in A (i.e., jane is a member of the students group, or has
been assigned the TeachingAssistant role), but also information external to A (i.e.,
the university is in its final exam period). Whereas A contains information that is
specific and stable, C contains information that applies to multiple elements in the
access-control system or the organization, and that can change on a regular basis.
Given an access request consisting of A and C, the point of a checkpoint system is
to evaluate that request and return a verdict v, which indicates whether the system
says the access is permissible. We can thus represent a checkpoint system in the
following manner:
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CP : (A,C)→ v
Note that this formulation does not offer any insight into how the mapping is
actually accomplished. Most existing checkpoint systems are configured with a policy
that defines a set of (a, c) pairs that are allowable, and denies requests that are outside
this set. In this case, we can say that the mapping definition occurs preemptively,
before we even know whether a particular access query will ever be made at all.
However, as described in Chapter 2, reactive access control [58] works on the
principle that some access decisions must be made by humans in near real-time.
While a human decider certainly uses heuristics in evaluating an access request, we
cannot say that she uses a policy in the same way that a computer decider does.
Whether implemented as an interactive system with a real-time mapping or as a
classic policy-based system with a pre-defined mapping, checkpoint systems are only
part of the picture. To complete the functional definition of access mediation, we
next explore how to describe monitoring systems.
Monitoring systems
A “pure” monitoring system would not attempt to control access in any way; it would
merely observe the accesses that users perform and record those observations. Given
that human decision-makers will be reviewing accesses at a later point in time (and
holding a user accountable if they determine that the user acted inappropriately), it
will likely be helpful for a monitoring system, like a checkpoint system, to record as
much information as it can about the context in which the access occurs. This context
in this case could include aggregate historical information about previous accesses,
such as whether this is the first time that this user perform this access (data gathered
by the system itself over the course of time). It could also conceivably act to notify
human deciders in response to an access.
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Our notation for such a pure monitoring system should thus reflect the system’s
ability to both record its observations, and its ability to perform some sort of analysis
and reactionary action in response to the data it gathers. To that end, we defineM
as mapping5 A and C to a reaction term R, which can represent one or more actions
that the system takes in response to the access.
M : (A,C)→ R
As with checkpoint systems, this description offers no insight into how or when
the mapping is actually defined. Given that the point of a monitoring system is to
gather enough information about the accesses that users perform to then be able to
hold users accountable for their actions, it seems clear that the system design should
focus first and foremost on producing a complete and accurate log of the accesses and
the contexts in which they occur. Additional processing can be useful, but only if the
logs are accurate to begin with.
A unified function for hybrid systems
As noted earlier, real-world systems are unlikely to follow just one of the checkpoint
and monitoring paradigms; every organization I studied in my fieldwork had systems
that were a blend of the two. We thus now define pi, a function that combines the
features of picp and pim into a single, general-purpose representation of an access-
mediation system, which I refer to as the Portunes Function:
pi : (A,C)→ (v,R)
In other words, we can say that an access mediation system is one that takes
5We could also say that M maps sequences of (A,C) to a reaction R, in which case R can be
constructed as to involve fewer bookkeeping actions — a nuance that future work involving this
formalism should take into account. For simplicity, we continue here with the more constrained
assumption that the right-hand-side of the mapping consists of a single (A,C) tuple.
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in a representation of an access (containing subject, action, and object identifiers)
and a representation of the context in which it is to be performed, and returns both
a verdict (indicating whether the access can go forward) and one or more reactive
actions (recording the access in various ways or places).
We next explore the concepts of context and mapping more fully, and observe that
they are the root of may of the real-world problems I have documented.
9.1.2 Mapping embodies organization objectives
Earlier in this chapter I framed the purpose of an access-mediation system as decreas-
ing (relative to the absence of such a system) the probability of an organization’s
users performing accesses that are detrimental to the organization. However, it can
be practically challenging to decide whether an access is “detrimental to the organiza-
tion”, especially since any particular access may offer both benefits and drawbacks6.
Moreover, ignoring this mixed nature and asserting that an access can be uniformly
detrimental or beneficial to an organization would risk violating the “no absolutes”
principle, and could mask some of the very challenges we are trying to understand.
The objective view
Let us thus get a bit more specific, and describe access-mediation systems not just
in terms of discouraging nebulously-defined “detrimental accesses”, but accesses that
are detrimental with respect to a set of particular goals.
An organization seeks to mediate users’ access in order to attain a set of business
objectives O. An access A in context C is beneficial when A facilitates achievement
6For example, an access may earn the organization money, but may also expose it to financial
risk. The organizations I observed often baked these competing interests into the organizational
structure, such that different divisions (investment traders and compliance officers) were required to
negotiate and determine what was ultimately “best” for the organization. As the financial crisis of
the late 2000s indicates, this process is not perfect, and the “best” course of action can often prove
to be far from optimal; yet again, it is important to remember that there are no absolutes in this
game.
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of O, and detrimental when it impedes that achievement. We can denote an access-
mediation system that supports achievement of O as piO.
We note that A in C can be beneficial to some objectives while being detrimental
to others: for different objectives O[j] and O[k], piO[j] 6= piO[k]. In other words, given
the same A and C, systems designed to implement the individual objectives would
return a different v or R.
The Portunes mapping is what much of the access-control literature refers to as
policy, but I argue that my formulation presents a couple of important advantages.
First (and as noted multiple times earlier in this document), the classic conceptu-
alization of access-control systems assume that there exists a single “right” policy. I do
not necessarily expect an organization to sit down and explicitly list its diverse objec-
tives while defining the Portunes mapping for an access-mediation system7. However,
it is a distinct positive step to simply recognize that there can exist competing ob-
jectives within an organization, and that figuring out what the “right” mapping is in
the presence of such conflicts is one of the major challenges of access mediation.
Second, the “policy” terminology forces us to accept the view that only official
policymakers can assert what is “right” for the organization, but the mapping termi-
nology encourages us to consider other perspectives — those of the users — as valid,
too.
The role of humans
As discussed in previous chapters, during my fieldwork I observed multiple instances
where policymakers did not understand the real-world environment in which users
were operating. Part of this mismatch comes from the fact that the sets of objectives
7In practice it is difficult for an organization to reliably enumerate its objectives beyond a high
level: “make money for shareholders”, “stay in business”, “don’t get in legal trouble”, “maintain a
positive reputation with customers”, especially as the organization slowly changes over time. The
next chapter presents a framework to help an organization identify what its access-mediation needs
are even without developing a detailed picture of its diverse objectives.
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that individual, well-intentioned users are trying to achieve as part of their day-to-
day jobs (e.g., OMark or OAlice) overlap with — but do not exactly match! — the
set of objectives O that the organization is trying to achieve as a whole. While we
can try to help individual users see the big picture and act in the interests of the
organization (i.e., align OAlice with O), practical realities conspire to make these sets
of objectives diverge. When an individual’s perceived objectives diverge from that of
the organization, so too does her expectations for how the access mediation system
should behave (piOUser ).
In a situation where the actual system pi diverges from the user’s expectation
piOUser , my fieldwork indicates that there are two broad classes of outcomes (also
depicted by Figure 9.1):
• In cases where the organization recognizes the user’s perspective as being valid
(as was the case with the assertive investment bankers) and provides an easy
mechanism for them to provide feedback that will be listened to, there is an
opportunity for pi to be tuned to more closely match piOUser (or, if O and OUser
are irreconcilably incompatible, to find some way to help the user adjust OUser).
• On the other hand, in cases where the organization does not expect pi to require
constant tuning and does not assume that there is something to be learned from
its mismatch with piOUser , the user is incentivized to subvert the system to make
it meet her expectations, or demoralized and frustrated because she cannot do
her job properly.
By allowing for the possibility that users can also have valid opinions on access-
mediation decisions, the mapping terminology I propose allows us to consider and
describe the way that humans evolve the behavior of access-mediation systems over
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Figure 9.1: Potential outcomes when a user Alice perceives a conflict between the actual
system pi and the her expectation piOAlice .
On timing
Another nuance of the access-mediation problem that the mapping terminology allows
us to discuss is the timing with which the mapping occurs. Before computer systems,
the most basic form of access mediation involved having a human being calculate
the (A,C)→ (v,R) mapping in real time as accesses are attempted (providing uno-
tempore decisions). Digital access-control policies allows us to timeshift the decision-
making, and define the mapping before the access even occurs — thus delivering
ex-ante decisions. Monitoring systems that allow accesses when they are attempted
but re-evaluate them later (with the goal of holding users responsible for harmful
actions) can be viewed as conducting an after-the-fact remapping, or ex-post decision.
I discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches — these
different verdict timings — in Section 9.3.
9.1.3 Context embodies organization state
Just as the Portunes mapping embodies the organization’s objectives, context em-
bodies the organization’s structure (who has what role, who manages whom, etc.)
and state (who has accessed what, and which tasks are in the process of being ac-
complished).
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The history of access control is paved with increasingly-expressive models that
build toward this goal. From RBAC (which seeks to make access management more
wieldy by informing the system about aspects of the organization’s structure) through
ABAC (which incorporates current attributes of users and/or objects) and on to
hosts of models that include additional descriptive details (e.g., GEO-RBAC’s geolo-
cation [5], TRBAC’s temporal constraints [45], or the explosion of attributes available
with XACML [64]), the community has seemed focused on the idea that more data
will make for more perfect access mediation.
However, real-world practitioners have not adopted these increasingly rich mod-
els.8 By abstracting away the details of what information is contained in the Portunes
context, I aim to focus our attention on the challenges that are inherent to the man-
agement of contextual information — challenges that I believe come to bear in all
access-mediation systems.
Context sourcing
Perhaps one reason that real organizations have not adopted models as rich as those
described in the literature is that the real challenge in teaching machines how to make
use of complex contextual data is not in crafting the internal logic so much as it is in
gathering and channeling the data itself. For a datum (“User Jane has the student
role”, or “a smartphone belonging to user Alice reports a geolocation of [43.70708,-
72.28712]”) to be useful to an access-mediation system, that datum must be made
available to the system, either by having a human provide it as input directly (when a
system administrator adds Jane to the student role) or by being measured by some
8There may be a deeper reason for this; work in psychology indicates that attentive delibera-
tion — gathering data and making a carefully-reasoned conscious choice — may actually lead to less
satisfactory outcomes for consumers than “unconscious deliberation” when making complex purchas-
ing decisions [19]. It would be interesting to see whether this dichotomy between background and
foreground reasoning could explain some of the challenges associated with crafting complex ex-ante
policies, where the outcome of the decision is judged not just in terms of the individual’s satisfaction,
but by its impact on the organization.
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connected computer system (such as a smartphone’s GPS).
With the exception of human-to-computer authentications (which are by definition
measured by machines), the majority of the contextual data used by the access-
mediation systems in my fieldwork was input by humans.9 Furthermore, once input,
most of this was also maintained (i.e., updated and/or removed) through manual
human action.
Errors
As the amount of data that is maintained by humans grows large — because there are
many types of data, because the organization’s dynamism requires it to be updated
frequently, or simply because there are many humans and objects for which data
is tracked — so too does the time investment necessary to maintain it. Humans
will inevitably introduce errors while adding or updating data — because they are
overburdened, bored by the repetitive work, or simply because humans are fallible
creatures. Again, as the amount of human-sourced data grows large, so too will the
number of errors that are (quite naturally and understandably) introduced.
System designs that rely heavily on human sources of contextual data must ac-
commodate these inevitable errors. Organizations that deploy such systems must
recognize that they place significant burden on the humans in question, and devise
mechanisms to mitigate that burden. Where possible, the system design should be
optimized around re-using data that has already been input (e.g., by sharing parts
of a central HR database rather than creating a new one to track users’ names and
office assignments) and on automating updates if at all possible.
Section 9.2 looks at the things that can go wrong with the context, including flaws
that can be introduced by human users adding or updating it.
9In several cases the data was relayed from one computer to another before it reached the access-
mediation system, but its origin was with a human being taking manual action to create the data
in the first place.
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Human-driven updates
As with mapping, human users are going to disagree with the system’s notion of
context, which in turn is going to cause the user’s perception of how the system
should be behaving to be different than what the system is actually doing.
Also as with the mapping, when a machine and a human disagree, an astute
organization will try to harness the user’s opinion as a signal that perhaps something
has gone wrong in the context management — i.e., that a certain type of data should
have been updated, or should generally be updated more frequently than it currently
is.
Contexts through time
The amount of contextual information that is available to the system can change over
time. One strength of an ex-post approach to access mediation is that there may be
more information available to humans reviewing the access after the fact than there
was to the system at the moment the request was made. On the other hand, if the
access-mediation system is unable to capture all the relevant contextual information,
waiting too long to perform a review risks having it fade in the memory of the humans
storing it.
9.2 Types of input “errors”
Ideally, the data input to an access-mediation system will be the “right” data — i.e.,
the data that the system needs to deliver a verdict, or that the organization needs
to do an accurate post-facto analysis of the access. Of course, there can be several
problems with the information that is input. Some of these problems may have their
root in the system design (or in the tradeoffs that the designer made). Others may be
unanticipated by the system design, either because they are emergent phenomena or
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because they result from a machine or human doing unexpected things. The following
represents an initial attempt to identify the problems that can go wrong with inputs
to an access-mediation system.
9.2.1 Omission
Errors of omission occur when a system fails to measure or record one or more types
of information that are relevant (either in delivering a verdict at the time of the access
query or in weighing whether the access was appropriate after the fact.)
9.2.2 Granularity
Errors in granularity occur when the correct type of information is being measured,
but when the units of measurement are either too coarse (resulting in a loss of useful
information) or too fine (resulting in redundant information, which overwhelms or
confounds the human users ultimately responsible for making meaningful decisions
with it).
9.2.3 Freshness
Data that is not updated frequently enough will produce verdicts that are based on
a partially-outdated picture of the organization. Data that is updated too frequently
generates unnecessary work for the system (or its human components).
9.2.4 Reliability
Independent of granularity and freshness, a data stream is reliable if the data it
delivers is an accurate representation of the real-world phenomenon of which it is a
measurement. Damaged or flawed equipment can introduce accuracy problems while
measuring data, as can human error or intentional subversion.
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9.3 Choosing a deterrence approach
In Section 9.1 I noted that we can describe access-mediation systems as coming in
three flavors, according to when the organization decides whether the access is desir-
able:
• Ex ante: the organization decides before an access request is received by defin-
ing and encoding a Portunes mapping ahead of time. The system acts as a
checkpoint, allowing some access requests but denying others.
• Ex post: the organization deters undesirable accesses by holding users account-
able after-the-fact. Access decisions comes after an access request is received
and after the access is already executed. The system acts as a monitor, allowing
all accesses with provisions to permit the organization to review them and make
a decision later.
• Uno tempore: the organization makes decisions after an access request is
received but before the access is executed. The system acts as a checkpoint in
that it can allow or deny access requests, but it does not require a Portunes
mapping to be defined before it can start operation.
To my knowledge, this categorization, which unifies a number of disparate access-
mediation schemes10 into a unified framework, is both novel and useful for thinking
about the different approaches an organization can take to the access-mediation prob-
lem.
The following sections explore the attributes of each type of system, with an eye
toward highlighting the factors that an organization should consider in deciding which
approach to take. With the exception of the last subsection, the discussion is focused
10Classic policy-based access control, Optimistic Security, and Reactive Access Control, each of
which is addressed through the course of the section.
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on “pure” versions of each type (i.e., the attributes of a system that uses only ex-
ante decisions, with no ex-post or uno-tempore ones). I expect that the majority
of real organizations will find hybrid systems — systems that incorporate all three
approaches for different types of data — to be most effective in practice, but this
presentation will allow future researchers to perform a more informed and systematic
consideration of hybridization approaches by first nailing down the basic forms.
9.4 Attributes of the ex-ante approach
The ex-ante approach is “classic” access control: it requires an organization to define
an exhaustive Portunes mapping (traditionally called a policy) before the system
begins operation.
9.4.1 Potential for rigorous protection
Ex-ante schemes were designed for the purpose of protecting sensitive data. When
they operate as designed, they can do a good job at averting irreparable damage that
other forms of deterrence are likely to prevent — e.g., preventing a terrorist from
gaining access to nuclear launch codes.
9.4.2 Known quantities
Ex-ante schemes are good for organizations that are able to enumerate all the possible
values of s, a, o and C — and, moreover, for organizations where the sets of subjects,
actions, and contexts remain relatively constant over long periods of time. In other
words, ex-ante schemes are good for organizations where the universe of legitimate
access cases is well-known and relatively static.
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9.4.3 Costs of mapping
A basic disadvantage of ex-ante systems is that the process of crafting good access-
mediation mappings can be quite expensive, and so is cost-prohibitive to repeat fre-
quently. This, in turn, can lead to mappings being out of sync with the current needs
of the organization.
9.4.4 Organizational change
This means that ex-ante systems are not well-suited to environments in which there is
a large amount of organizational change. Unix groups and later RBAC were designed
make it easier to manage ex-ante access policies as organizations underwent certain
types of predictable changes. By grouping subject and access identifiers or creating
abstract sets of users and permissions, implementing modifications associated with
employee promotions and transfers became less tedious (and therefore less expensive
and less prone to errors).
Thus far, however, there does not seem to exist a mechanism to increase the
manageability of ex-ante policies for organizations that frequently redefine the tasks
associated with a particular job function (or split one job function into two), or that
regularly enter into new business domains (e.g., buy acquiring another company). An
environment in which a particular request can map to ALLOW one day and DENY the
next — and where such changes are commonplace11 — can be ill-served by a purely
ex-ante system.
9.4.5 Cost of false negatives
Ex-ante systems can also incur a high cost when false-negative verdicts are generated,
largely because the process for overruling a verdict involves a human decider. This
11E.g., in a hospital where nurses move from department to department every few months.
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cost is experienced by the business, but most palpably by end users. Over time,
this in turn drives overworked administrators to err on the side of over-entitlement
in assigning permissions; an observer incorrectly believes upon cursory inspection
that the rigorously classic “default-deny” wisdom is being followed, but in reality it
is undermined with every small change the organization undergoes. In short, the
organization falls prey to all of the problems I documented during my fieldwork.
9.4.6 Highest priority: minimize over-entitlement
Given the high cost of false negatives, ex-ante access schemes would seem to be suited
to organizations where the damage that could result from over-entitlement is deemed
to outweigh the cost incurred by under-entitlement.
9.5 Attributes of the ex-post approach
Ex-post systems are a good deterrence option when an organization already has a
high confidence that their users will generally act in the interests of the organization,
or when the cost of under-entitlement is greater than the cost of over-entitlement.
Some of these properties, such as organizational culture, may be somewhat mutable
through user education, etc., but a few are more intrinsically related to the nature of
the data to which access is being mediated:
1. the magnitude of the benefit the user could reap from interacting with the data
in a way that is against the interests of the organization,
2. the severity of the repercussions the organization can impose upon the user in
comparison to (1),
3. the magnitude of harm to the organization that could result from users taking
negative actions.
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Ex-post systems are poorly suited to organizations for which the values of (1) or
(3) are great, or the value of (2) is small — i.e., if the motivation for an individual to
act against the interests of the organization is decidedly greater than the deterring
consequences, or if great harm could come from negative user action.
9.5.1 Flexible without false negatives
Perhaps the greatest strength of an ex-post approach is that it enables an access-
mediation system to seamlessly accommodate changes in the organization as it evolves
over time. This is useful in situations where organizational change would induce
false-negative verdicts with an ex-ante scheme; for that reason, the ex-post approach
is advantageous where false-negatives are particularly costly or dangerous.
9.5.2 Potential for abuse
The flip side, of course, is that the default-allow scheme of ex-post approaches poses
a higher risk of allowing malicious insider activity to go on unnoticed, especially if
the organization’s system or processes for reviewing the accesses that occur is not
comprehensive or takes a long time.
9.5.3 Costs for set-up and review
Ex-post systems do not deliver DENY verdicts, so do not require an initial investment
to define a mapping between access query inputs and verdicts. However, this does
not mean that the ex-post approach is some kind of low-cost panacea; investments
are still required to:
1. build mechanisms for gathering appropriate contextual input data (i.e., to cap-
ture the circumstances under which the access occurred), which is necessary for
meaningful ex-post access decisions
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2. build systems implement the Portunes reaction to an access (i.e., to filter or
pre-process data about accesses and reduce the burden of manual review)
3. build systems or define organizational processes to facilitate the manual reviews
4. conduct reviews
Items (1) through (3) represent largely up-front costs, but will certainly require
additional investment as the organization, its digital resources, and the organization’s
understanding of its access-mediation needs all evolve. The cost associated with item
(4) will depend on the design of the previous items, but will need to be ongoing as
long as the access-mediation system is in place — the need to at least periodically
review accesses will never go away.
9.5.4 Break glass
The electronic medical system described in Chapter 7, THERS, uses ex-post access
mediation to make sure that clinicians have access to the data they need, while also
deterring them from accessing data for reasons other than patient care. The system is
largely world-readable by clinicians, and the organization performs reviews of accesses
performed on a given patient’s medical data if requested (e.g., by a patient who feels
that her data may have been inappropriately accessed).12
This hospital system also uses a break-glass13 mechanism to provide an extra layer
of protection for particularly sensitive clinical data. Asking a user whether she wants
to “break-the-glass” — and annotating the access log to highlight that the glass has
been broken — is an implementation of a Portunes reaction to an access request. In
this manner, break-glass mechanisms can also be used in ex-ante systems to allow
12While Teaching Hospital felt that this type of “on-demand” review was sufficient for their pur-
poses, I suspect that they might not be opposed to taking a more proactive approach if tools existed
to help them perform additional analysis in a less labor-intensive way.
13Break-glass is described more extensively in Chapter 2.
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users to escalate their level of privilege and access things that the pre-defined verdict
mapping would not normally allow — and thus create a hybrid system by adding a
measure of ex-post mediation.
9.5.5 A history of clinical reviews
The driving factors in THERS’s access-mediation design were primarily 1) the diffi-
culties of coming up with an ex-ante mapping and 2) the high costs of false negatives,
but an ex-post approach corresponds to a permission model that has long been estab-
lished in the medical community: clinicians are expected to operate independently,
and allow their actions to be guided by their training14 and professional judgement.
(In other words, organizations have a high degree of confidence or trust that clinicians
will generally do the right thing.)
At the same time, regular reviews15 take place to make sure that the decisions
being made are reasonable. In cases where the reviewers determine that a decision was
not in the best interests of the patient, the clinician is subject to censure, including
revocation of their medical license and legal action. These reviews are relatively
rare, and end up covering a relatively small number of the medical decisions made
by practitioners. However, it is still an interesting model of a non-digital system for
performing ex-post reviews of actions taken by individuals within an organization
— and holding individuals accountable when they have acted against the interests
of the organization (which in these situations follow the interests of the patients).
Perhaps the historical use of this model is part of why ex-post (or hybrid break-glass)
approaches seem more psychologically acceptable to clinical organizations than to
14The depth of clinicians’ knowledge about medicine is precisely what allows them to make in-
formed tradeoff decisions while providing patient care. If we could similarly find a way to help
security laypeople reason about parallel tradeoffs, perhaps a larger diversity of organizations could
come to trust its members enough to adopt ex-post schemes. Unfortunately, the pedagogical exper-
tise of the security community is centuries behind that of the medical establishment.
15These include reviews after major negative events (like the death of a patient), which closely
parallel the ex-post audits, but also second opinions, which have a somewhat uno-tempore flavor.
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their peers in other sectors?
9.5.6 Optimistic security
A form of ex-post access control was described in the literature by Dean Povey as
optimistic security [70]. This prescient work, which I discuss more in Chapter 2, is
an almost-perfectly general model of ex-post access mediation. The one place that it
falls down16 is in the requirement that all mediated actions must be “recoverable”:
“Accesses which write, modify or delete data must be able to be rolled back
to ensure that a user cannot irreparably damage a system. Actions which
have external behaviour (e.g. firing a missile, sending a letter) should be
associated with compensating actions to restore the system to a stable
state (e.g. abort the missile, send apology letter). [...] In general it is
assumed that for any transformation on data or security properties of that
data (confidentiality, integrity etc) there is a compensating transaction
which exists to reverse this transformation. [...] Where this situation does
not exist, it would be inappropriate to use an optimistic system anyway.”
While I think that this requirement is reasonable for many situations, and makes
sense in the context of Povey’s effort to show that an optimistic security system can
be “provably secure”, it is important to also note that there exist situations in which
actions are not always recoverable, but where ex-post access mediation may still be
the best option. Indeed, many of the actions that clinicians undertake are impossible
to recover from, but that has not stopped their organizations from using an ex-post
approach in both the digital and pre-digital worlds.
16In its generality, not in its reasoning or overall quality.
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9.6 Attributes of the uno-tempore approach
An uno-tempore system would theoretically strike a balance between the strengths
and weaknesses of the ex-ante and ex-post approaches. In its pure form, such a system
would require a human being responsible for making access decisions — i.e., a person
who would otherwise define the verdict mapping in an ex-ante system or perform an
ex-post review — to respond in real time to every access request the system receives.
This approach in its pure form is clearly not scalable in the settings I studied:
with thousands of investment bankers accessing a financial database and dozens of
clinicians and support people accessing an individual medical record, the latency of
human decisions alone would cause these organizations to grind to a halt.
9.6.1 Reactive access control
However, it is possible to bring an uno-tempore flavor to ex-ante systems by making it
easier for a user to request access to a resource, and by providing access deciders with
a mechanism for modifying verdict mappings in real-time in response to an access
request.
Described most recently by Mazurek et al. [58]17 as reactive access control, this
approach is currently used by products such as Google Docs18, which I have made
extensive use of. When I navigate to a Google Doc for which I do not have read
permissions, the application provides a link to “Request access” from the file’s owner.
Reactive access control is essentially a hybrid of the ex-ante and uno-tempore
approaches. I am optimistic that it could be deployed to help mitigate some of the
problems I have documented, but am cautious in this optimism because the research
into its effectiveness has thus far focused on relatively limited situations, in which the
following conditions held:
17Discussed in Chapter 2.
18A web-based word processor, currently available at https://docs.google.com
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1. access deciders receive a relatively low volume19
2. the resources being protected are discrete resources (text files, photos, physical
resources, etc.) of which humans have a good intuitive understanding
3. the requestors are all people that the access deciders knew personally
4. the resources being protected belong to the decider, or the decider otherwise
has the contextual knowledge to make a reasonable decision
I have found using Google Docs in a corporate setting that condition (3) has
not always been true, since the company in question is large and collaboration with
other teams is frequent (although the company provides tools for quickly learning
about what projects other employees work on), and (4) is not strictly true as the
documents belong to the company rather than to me personally (although I have
been the document owner). Given that my experiences have largely met the conditions
under which reactive access control has been studied, I am not surprised that I have
had a generally positive impression of it; at the same time, I know that many of the
resources to situations in which large organizations seek to mediate access will not
meet these conditions. In Chapter 11 I call for further work to study the applicability
of reactive access control in a broader diversity of settings.
9.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to reboot our basic understanding of “access control”
— abandoning that term in favor of the more realistically-minded “access mediation”
— and presented a framework for thinking about solutions to this problem, one which
accommodates models that were previously disjoint and unrelated.
19A maximum of fifteen requests per day, as described by Mazurek et al.
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This formulation allows us to meaningfully consider important factors — such as
the role that users can play in helping a system evolve with an organization, and the
limits of how much contextual information an organization can realistically gather and
maintain about itself — that have hitherto been ignored by the literature. I believe
that this ignorance is part of what has contributed to the problems documented in
my fieldwork.
The next chapter addresses another neglected factor that plays a role in the chal-
lenges faced by real-world organizations: the organizational characteristics, types of
organizational change, and external factors that should inform the design and imple-




The task of evaluating the suitability of an access-mediation scheme for a particular
organization requires that we check the compatibility of two radically different sys-
tems. On one hand we have the human organization — with its goals, its physical
and financial resources, its sensitive data, and its human properties; on the other, we
have an access-mediation scheme with its verdicts, information requirements, reactive
action, and its technical limitations.
This chapter offers a catalog of the facts and properties of an organization that im-
pact the success of any access-mediation approach. Combined with an understanding
of the strengths and weaknesses of the ex-ante, ex-post, and uno-tempore approaches
as described in the previous chapter, I believe that this catalogue will help practition-
ers understand the access-mediation problem and ultimately build systems that are
easier to manage and that actually meet their organizations’ access-mediation goals.
Attribute categories
I start this catalog by first identifying categories of attributes that have the strongest
role in determining the success of an access-mediation system. An organization can
influence some of these properties (such as the budget and resources available for
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access-mediation management), but are unlikely to incite significant change in others
(e.g., the rate at which the organization’s mission and structure changes).
It is important to note that for some attributes (e.g., some aspects of false negative
verdicts) we must focus on aspects of the access-mediation system, either as it operates
today or as it is proposed to operate in the future. Other attributes (e.g., resources and
budget) may exist largely outside of current or potential access-mediation systems,
and can thus be evaluated independently as being more inherent to the organization
as a social system.
False positives If the verdict delivered is ALLOW but an optimal verdict would be
DENY, how much damage could the resulting access generate? Moreover, how easy is
it to recover from that damage? For example, the consequences of a false positive in a
military weapons installation could include the launch of long-range missiles against
a hostile country, which would cause irreparable human, material, and diplomatic
casualties.
False negatives Similarly, if Alice receives a DENY where an optimal verdict would
be ALLOW, her ability to access data and take action will be sub-optimally limited.
If she is a doctor attempting to provide care to a patient in critical condition, this
limitation could negatively impact the patient’s health — in the worst case, it could
be fatal.
Organizational change All organizations undergo change. Large companies that
strive to react to dynamic market conditions are particularly susceptible: with each
new opportunity comes the need for different data and access patterns. Even orga-
nizations whose mission and workflows remain static experience employee turnover,
and users may come to be responsible for duties beyond the ones they are officially
assigned.
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User accountability What disincentives are in place to discourage the user from
taking damaging actions? Can the organization leverage some proportional control
over the user’s future? (To draw an example from healthcare: when a doctor is found
to have acted inappropriately, their medical license may be revoked.)
Contextual information availability Access-mediation decisions rely on having
an accurate picture of the state of the organization at the time of the access. Dif-
ferent types of this contextual information may be harder or easier for computer
systems to track. Depending on what information is relevant to delivering accurate
access-mediation verdicts, an organization may find that gathering some context is
inexpensive, but gathering other context is functionally impossible. Context informa-
tion availability is therefore determined by both the access-mediation system’s need
for data and the cost of gathering and maintaining that data.
Resources and budget Organizations that are able to dedicate more human-hours
to the access-mediation problem will generally have a leg up on organizations whose
resources are limited. Participants in healthcare struggled to fit all important projects
in their limited priority queue, whereas participants from the investment banking
industry seemed practically willing to burn money if it had the hope of reducing the
firm’s exposure to risk.
Attributes and notation
In Sections 10.1 through 10.6 I break these categories down into individual factors
or attributes, summarized in Figure 10.1. This presentation becomes more concrete
in Sections 10.7 and 10.8, which offer profiles of a prototypical teaching hospital and
investment bank, and discussion of each of these attributes in those contexts.
For each attribute or factor identified in Sections 10.1 through 10.6 I characterize
a range of values that an organization might experience, from “high” to “low”. For
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False positives User accountability
A. Probability of damage M. Available consequences
B. Gravity of damage N. Proportionality of consequences
C. Permanence of damage O. Consistency of consequences
P. Awareness of consequences
False negatives Contextual information availability
D. Scope of obstruction Q. Organizational understanding
E. Magnitude of obstruction R. Function homogeneity
F. Time to correction S. Simplicity of necessary data
G. Cost of correction T. Availability of contextual data
H. One-off corrections
Organizational change Resources and budget
I. Turnover rate U. Resourcing priorities
J. Function turnover V. Progressive metrics
K. Function dynamism W. Trust and resource flexibility
L. Technical change
Figure 10.1: A summary of the properties described in Sections 10.1 through 10.6.
example, if the attribute were “Number of employees”, we would use the following
visual representation:
The organization has hundreds of
thousands of employees.
⇐⇒
The organization has less than a dozen
employees.
high low
This conveys that an organization may find itself anywhere on the spectrum of
states between the two extremes that are listed; in this example, an organization can
have anywhere from “less than a dozen” to “hundreds of thousands” of employees.
10.1 False positives
If a particular false positive verdict v has the potential of resulting in damage d,
the organization must consider the probability of d occurring, its gravity, and the
organization’s ability to recover from it.
Note that for any given organization and any given piece of information there
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may be many types of potential damage; a complete profile of these false-positive
dimensions should ideally consider a variety of different threats.
10.1.1 Probability of damage (A)
In the case that false-positive verdict v is delivered, how likely is it that d will actually
result? For example, imagine that a pharmaceutical company is worried about a
competitor getting access to a drug formula. If a v inappropriately gives Mildred
access to that formula, what is the probability that Mildred will form an agreement
with a competitor and successfully get the formula to them?
Damage will almost certainly occur ⇐⇒ Damage has a low probability of occurring
high low
10.1.2 Gravity of damage (B)
If damage were to occur, how consequential would it be? This could be measured in
time, dollars, or more exigent currency. For example, the damages resulting from a
false-positive verdict in a defense organization could impose a couple hours’ cleanup
time (if an inexperienced user accidentally corrupted a database) or in the loss of
human life (if a malicious insider leaked state secrets to a terrorist organization).
Damage would be catastrophic (result in
the death of a large number of people)
⇐⇒
Damage would be a minor inconvenience
to a small number of people
high low
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10.1.3 Permanence of damage (C)
How well could the organization bounce back from the false positive and resulting
damage? From the previous example, a corrupted database can likely be repaired
with time and patience, but human deaths cannot be reversed.
Damage would be impossible to roll
back or recover from
⇐⇒
It would be easy to return the
system to a non-damaged state
high low
10.2 False negatives
If a particular false negative verdict v has the potential of causing some obstruction
o, the organization must consider the scope of o, its magnitude, the time and cost of
the necessary corrections, and the probability of one-off corrections.
As with false positives, a complete analysis by a real organization should include
a broad catalog of obstructions that can result from a particular false negative.
10.2.1 Scope of obstruction (D)
How many different people or tasks would the occurrence of v obstruct? Note that
this is more a property of the system (current or candidate) more than a property
of the organization, as the scope of false-negative obstruction can depend largely on
whether the system uses groups or roles to help manage permissions. (In this sense,
the scope acts as a sort of “multiplier” for the other variables associated with false
negatives when evaluating their overall impact.)
For example, if a university’s access-mediation system is reconfigured to disal-
low all members of the “graduate student” role from modifying a database of student
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grades, teaching assistants would be unable to enter grades. The scope of the obstruc-
tion would include all teaching assistants who would normally perform that task.
Many people would be obstructed
in completing all of their activities
⇐⇒
A couple people would be obstructed in
completing one or two tasks
high low
10.2.2 Magnitude of obstruction (E)
What tasks would they be unable to do, and what would the larger effects of those
tasks not being done have — what action would be altogether blocked while they
could not perform that access?
In the previous example, teaching assistants would not be able to enter student
grades, which could prevent students from accessing their final grades for the term
through the online interface. However, teaching assistants could still inform students
of their final grades via another channel, such as email.
In contrast, if an investment banker is obstructed from selling a stock that is
rapidly losing value, the obstruction could cost the organization millions of dollars.
The obstructed tasks are of critical
importance to the regular operation
of the organization
⇐⇒
Failure to complete the obstructed tasks
would have little to no effect on the
organization
high low
10.2.3 Time to correction (F)
How quickly could the system be righted to properly allow access? This dimension
will depend on the nature of the access-mediation system — is there a mechanism in
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place to allow users to appeal a verdict? How long does it take an administrator to
evaluate the appeal and navigate the system interface? — and on the number and
availability of system administrators.
A reactive system, such as Google Docs, is optimized to allow false-negative ver-
dicts to be corrected quickly: the document owner is notified by email that a user has
requested permission to access the document, so the time to correction will depend
on the speed with which 1) the owner receives and checks email, 2) gathers additional
information, if necessary (e.g., by looking the requestor up in the personnel database
or chatting with them to determine why they want access), and 3) navigates the
approval interface.
The obstruction is permanent, or
takes months to remove
⇐⇒
The obstruction can be cleared within a
matter of minutes
high low
10.2.4 Cost of correction (G)
What would the cost of the correction c be? This will probably be determined pri-
marily by the amount of time it takes the administrator(s) to weigh an appeal and
navigate a software interface to make a correction (and thus depends heavily on the
system being used), but in extreme cases could also include costs associated with
re-issuing credentials like smartcards.
An organization might also weigh the cost of potential future errors that could be
introduced when a correction is made. In the university example, if an administrator
fixes the problem of teaching assistants not being able to access the undergraduate
grades database by giving all “students” access (as opposed to just members of the
“graduate students” role), over-entitled undergraduates could cause problems in the
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future.
Correction c would represent a
sizable portion of the organization’s
operating budget
⇐⇒ The cost of c is negligible
high low
10.2.5 One-off corrections (H)
Given that v has already been generated and corrected, what is the probability of
a similarly incorrect v′ — another verdict generated on parallel inputs, modulo any
changes made to the Portunes mapping or the organization — occurring in the future?
In general, a one-off correction could happen because the larger system is not
able to learn and adapt to prevent similar false negative verdicts. In the context
of the university example, imagine that Anthony is the first teaching assistant to
discover that he cannot enter his grades. If the administrator reacts to his complaint
by manually adding Anthony as an individual to the list of permitted accessors —
rather than all members of the “graduate student” role, or more optimally (but more
expensively from the administrator’s immediate point of view) to a new “teaching
assistant” role — this one-off solution will not fix the situation for the other teaching
assistants.
Incorrect verdicts similar to v will
almost certainly occur
⇐⇒
It is practically impossible for verdicts




An organization should consider several factors relating to its own dynamism, includ-
ing a couple different types of employee turnover and its rate of technical change.
10.3.1 Turnover rate (I)
What is the rate of employee turnover — how often do users leave the organization
and are replaced? (Or, for organizations that are in a period of growth, how many new
employees are joining the company?) This is significant because new employees must
be provisioned, and that provisioning requires work. In cases where it is difficult
to determine what provisions a new user should have, a high volume of new users
can overload the administrative workflow and increase the probability of provisioning
errors.
For general context, the national monthly rate of employee turnover in the United
States varied between 2.8% and 4.3% from 2001 to 2011 [9]. I contrast this with
the experience of one field study participant, who reported that a department in his
organization experienced a turnover rate of about 25% (and that managing entitle-
ments for this department was a source of tremendous difficulty). This is evidence
that different organizations experience very different turnover rates.
Annual turnover rates exceed 25%. ⇐⇒
Employee turnover is so small as to be
barely measurable.
high low
10.3.2 Function turnover (J)
How long to individuals stay in a particular function — i.e., how often do users
transfer jobs within the organization? When transfers happen, how different are the
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new functions?
In one large software company with which I have experience most employees seem
to change positions within the company every couple of years (but are unlikely to
change job titles other than being promoted — e.g., a software engineer usually
remains a software engineer, although the software they are engineering may be very
different). In teaching hospitals, medical students change functions every few months,
nurses may change departments every couple of years (except for “floater” nurses, who
may change daily!), but doctors rarely change their core job functions1.
Most employees change job
functions every year or two, and
some every few months.
⇐⇒
Almost all employees are in the same
function as when they joined the
organization, with the bulk of changes
being promotions within the same
department or division.
high low
10.3.3 Function dynamism (K)
How quickly does a particular function’s responsibilities evolve? In a retail bank,
the daily tasks of a teller have remain largely unchanged for decades (although the
technical systems he uses to perform those tasks may have evolved). In a consulting
firm, the responsibilities of an individual consultant can change radically from week
to week, depending on the needs of the client and the availability of other consultants
in the organization.
1A doctor in a teaching hospital may play a more or less active pedagogical or administrative
role, but is unlikely to switch from one clinical specialty to another
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The duties of individual job
functions evolve slowly, and remain
virtually unchanged for years at a
time.
⇐⇒
The duties associated with an individual
function change every few months, such
that a person’s daily activities will be
dramatically different from one quarter to
the next.
high low
10.3.4 Technical change (L)
How often does the organization deploy new computer systems? How often do existing
computer systems receive major updates that change the workflows users traverse in
performing their jobs? New systems or features can impose additional administrative
costs (including managing new entitlements) and can make it difficult for users and
administrators to know who should have what entitlements — and how to request or
provide them.
The organization rolls out major
new systems or introduces new
features regularly.
⇐⇒
The organization’s technical systems are




Several factors determine an organization’s position on the spectrum of user account-
ability, including the consequences it can inflict and its practices and culture around
consequences. As described in Chapter 2, some of these factors were envisaged by
Beautement et al. in their discussion of compliance budgets [4].
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10.4.1 Available consequences (M)
What consequences can the organization impose upon the user if she acts inappropri-
ately? Are the possible consequences varied enough to encourage their application in
cases of inappropriate user behavior? (An organization whose only recourse is to fire
the user could be understandably hesitant to do so for a minor, first-time offense.)
The organization has few
consequences to choose from, and
their application is reserved
exclusively for severe cases.
⇐⇒
The organization is easily able to impose a
variety of consequences, including those
for both minor and severe infractions.
high low
10.4.2 Proportionality of consequences (N)
Given the magnitude of the potential damage2, are the consequences sufficient to deter
users from taking the damaging action? The threat of losing one’s medical license may
be enough to deter a clinician, but few consequences exist that could deter malicious
access to military resources by individuals possessing a suicide-bomber mentality.
The potential damage from an
action is so severe that no
consequence could deter the type of
user drawn to take that action.
⇐⇒
The organization has consequences
available that are significantly more severe
than the potential damage.
high low
2Of course, what the organization views as “damage” may be more accurately described as “profit”
from the perspective of a malicious user.
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10.4.3 Consistency of consequences (O)
Are users regularly held accountable for instances of inappropriate access or actions —
even small ones? This depends both on the organization’s ability to actually enforce
consequences (i.e., to notice there was an inappropriate access and catch the user
responsible) and on whether the organization has a culture of following through with
the consequences it has laid out.
Jérôme Kerviel [47] alleges that his managers knew about the trading activities
that eventually lost Société Générale billions of dollars, and that the practice of
exceeding one’s trading limits was commonly allowed because of the potential profit
that could be made.
The organization is sometimes
aware when inappropriate access
occurs, but the consequences it
implements vary wildly from one
instance to the next.
⇐⇒
The organization recognizes and reacts to
the vast majority of inappropriate access
with well-defined and consistent
consequences.
high low
10.4.4 Awareness of consequences (P)
Are users cognizant of the consequences that the organization will impose? This
can tie into the organization’s cultural expectations for users; for example, based
on personal conversations with members of the American intelligence community,
it seems that they work in a culture that is keenly aware of the risks associated
with inappropriate access, and the personal repercussions of violating organizational
policies. On the other hand, healthcare participants in my study seemed to have no
idea what (if any) penalty the organization would impose for violating policies by,
e.g., writing down one’s password or walking away from a logged-in computer.
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A small number of users who work
in the compliance department are
aware of the consequences.
⇐⇒
All but the newest employees can
accurately identify the consequences
associated with a given type of
inappropriate data access.
high low
10.5 Contextual information properties
Of the dimensions on which an organization might define itself with respect to access
mediation, I believe that its use and relationship with contextual information is one of
the least understood. Important factors include the organization’s own understanding
of its access-mediation decision, the degree of functional diversity among users with
the same title, the amount of context information necessary to make a decision, and
the availability and freshness of that data during the process of decision-making.
10.5.1 Organizational understanding (Q)
Can the organization identify the variables that are relevant to making a particular
access decision? Are those variables well defined and documented, or are they only
understood implicitly by the humans who deliver access decisions — or worse yet,
guessed at during system implementation?
For example, what information is relevant in mediating access to a university’s
registrar system (the repository for student grades and transcripts)? This type of data
is relatively simple, highly structured, and usually managed by a single department.
However, when one considers all the circumstances under which one might want to
access it, the amount of information the system must maintain to both protect the
integrity of the data and the student’s privacy grows large. For example:
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• Submitting final course grades. (Can only professors submit them, or can a
professor’s teaching assistant? Do they need to be reviewed before being com-
mitted to the system? Who can perform the review, and how is it noted as
being performed?)
• Changing a grade in a student’s transcript. (Is there a time window in which a
grade can be changed? Can anyone other than a professor of the course change
a grade, i.e., if the professor has left the university? Does a department chair
or dean have to be notified? What about the student?)
• Reviewing a student’s grades. (Is the student only allowed to see their grades
after a certain period? What about a student’s parent, and how is a person
authenticated as a being particular student’s parent? Can professors review
their advisees’ grades? Can a department chair review a student’s grades —
only for classes taught in their department, or for all classes? Under what
circumstances can a law-enforcement official review a student’s grades, and how
are those circumstances identified?)
For each additional action or restriction, more data must be maintained by the
system to implement it: how easy is it for an organization to identify all these variables
as being important to accurate access mediation?
The organization has a hard time
identifying what information is
important to making all but the
most trivial of access decisions.
⇐⇒
System implementors and decision-making
personnel can clearly agree upon and
identify what information is relevant to
making a particular access decision.
high low
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10.5.2 Function homogeneity (R)
Are users’ duties homogenous throughout a single function, or are there e.g. many
“software engineers” occupied by disparate tasks depending on what software product
they are currently engineering? In cases where job titles are not distinguishing, are
there other sources of information within the organization that will help administra-
tors or other users understand the nature of an individual’s work?
Job titles are vague, and it is
difficult to determine what an
individual’s job consists of.
⇐⇒
Job titles are distinguishing, or other
information about an individual’s tasks is
readily available. It is easy to tell what a
particular user works on.
high low
10.5.3 Simplicity of necessary data (S)
How many different variables should go in to making an access decision? Are there
some obscure factors that do not matter for most decisions, but when they occur
cannot be ignored?
In the registrar example described above, I expect that several of the example
actions (e.g., access by law-enforcement officials) are implemented not by providing
direct access, but by requesting a copy of the data from the staff of the registrar’s
office. This allows system designers to offload recognition of unusual situations that
are hard to identify with confidence (whether there’s an emergency that warrants
police access) to humans.
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Decisions often require a host of
variables, perhaps because the
system must accommodate special
cases (e.g., don’t provide access
unless it is an emergency) that a
smaller number of variables cannot
capture.
⇐⇒
Every access decision can be made with
one or two variables (e.g., a username and
a time of day).
high low
10.5.4 Availability of contextual data (T)
How many contextual variables are automatically measured (e.g., “Jane’s RFID card
has been scanned at the front door”), and how many are decided and manually up-
dated by human administrators (“Jane is assigned to a weekend shift”)? For infor-
mation that is input manually, how completely and how quickly does it propagate
throughout the organization’s technical systems (must Jane’s shift assignment be
manually entered at several different points)?
The majority of context data is
gathered manually, and takes a
period of days or weeks to
propagate through the system.
⇐⇒
Most contextual information is gathered
automatically; even manual updates to
contextual information propagate within a
matter of seconds or minutes.
high low
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10.6 Resources and budget
Although many system administrators would embrace additional funding, the simple
financial sum is but one among several resourcing factors that can impact the success
access-mediation efforts. In particular, I believe that the relative priority the organi-
zation places on access mediation, the methods it uses for measuring the impact of
its investment, and the flexibility in resourcing practices are also important.
10.6.1 Resourcing priorities (U)
The priority that an organization’s leadership places on funding its access-mediation
efforts will likely be influenced by the relative importance of access mediation to
achieving its central goals. Priorities may therefore be largely consistent across orga-
nizations within a single industry.
From my fieldwork, it seems that investment banks (for whom the protection of
data provides a competitive advantage) place a higher priority on access mediation
than healthcare institutions (for whom access mediation is viewed as a mechanisms
for protecting patient privacy, but not a leading factor in their ability to provide
quality patient care).
The organization’s executives view
access mediation at the bottom of a
long list of priorities, and are
consistently grudging in resource
allocation.
⇐⇒
Access mediation is critical to the central
mission of the organization, and is at the
top of the list during resource allocation.
high low
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10.6.2 Progressive metrics (V)
Executive funding decisions are often driven by the expected return on investment
(ROI): if we make improvement x, how much money will we save in the long run?
Organizations who recognize the inherent challenge of measuring the impact of in-
fosec investments — the lack of catastrophic compromises that may never have oc-
curred anyway—will fund access-mediation efforts differently than those who demand
classic, concrete ROI evaluation. Furthermore, an organization that recognizes that
access-mediation improvements can involve much more than simple software purchase
and deployment — i.e., the restructuring of critical business processes — will estimate
resource requirements more accurately than those who expect costs to resemble those
of a server upgrade.
The organization allocates resources
according to classic, concrete ROI
metrics, and funds access mediation
similarly to how it funds software
deployment efforts.
⇐⇒
Executives recognize that access mediation
is a process, not a product, and budget
accordingly. They make funding decisions
based on long-term security posture rather
than short-term return on investment
numbers.
high low
10.6.3 Trust and resource flexibility (W)
An access administrator cannot always predict what resources she will need ahead of
time — and it can be the timely response to unpredictable circumstances that de-
termines the success of an access-mediation system. At the same time, organizations
with limited resources are hesitant to offer arbitrarily abundant funding to teams
without some ROI guarantees.
One investment bank addressed these dueling needs by employing 1) a small,
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highly-trusted team of specialists responsible for identifying infosec problems and
building appropriate tools, and 2) teams tasked with the regular operation and main-
tenance of those tools. The limited-engagement methodology of the first team re-
stricted the resources dedicated to higher-risk IT ventures, but the adoption by opera-
tional teams allowed for regular budgeting and resource allocation for the experiments
that worked out.
Budgets are strict and are rarely
changed once approved. Previously
unanticipated resource requests for
improving access-mediation systems
are not granted except in cases
where there is a clear and
significant security threat.
⇐⇒
Access administrators have built a positive
reputation among the organization’s
executives, and are quickly afforded wide
resourcing latitude when they request it.
high low
10.7 Example application: healthcare
I now use the characteristics described in previous sections to offer a preliminary
profile of a prototypical American teaching hospital and its management of clinical
(as opposed to research or administrative) data. This exploration is informed by
my fieldwork in Teaching Hospital, but is intended to be broadly applicable to other
similar organizations in the sector.
I offer this analysis as an initial example of how organizational profiling could be
useful to practitioners who seek to identify suitable access-mediation systems for their
organizations, and — in combination with the contrasting analysis of a hypotheti-
cal investment bank in the following section — useful to the research community in
















Figure 10.2: Profile of a prototypical teaching hospital, particularly its use of clinical data.
The organization is rated as “low”, “medium”, or “high” for each characteristic (labeled A-W
and described in Sections 10.1-10.6). Where a characteristics is likely to vary greatly from
one organization to another (or among departments within an organization) it is rated with
a larger range (“low to medium” or “medium to high”).
nizations.
As noted in Chapter 11, future work is needed to identify a concrete process to
help organizations develop, validate, and make use of this type of profile.
Figure 10.3 depicts a graphical representation of the profile presented in this sec-
tion. For each characteristic described in Sections 10.1 through 10.6, the organization
is rated as “low”, “medium”, or “high”; characteristics that are likely to vary greatly
from one organization to another — or among departments within an organization
— are rated with a larger range (“low to medium” or “medium to high”).
10.7.1 Consequences of false positives
While I recognize that medical data is sensitive, and believe that all healthcare orga-
nizations should strive to protect it from inappropriate access, my fieldwork observa-
tions lead me to rate a teaching hospital as being “medium” or “low to medium” on
each of the false positive scales.
I rate the probability that damage will result from a false positive verdict as
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being “medium” because there are few cases in which a malicious user could reap
significant financial or other personal benefit from gaining access to clinical data.3
One exception could be medical identity theft, in which one person uses another’s
identity to gain access to medical care. Another exception is the case of celebrity
patients; the EMR system used by the teaching hospital from my fieldwork allowed
hospital administrators to place an extra layer of control on the records of patients
deemed to be of public note.
In cases where damage does occur, I rate its gravity from the perspective of the
organization as being currently “low to medium”. Repercussions that a healthcare or-
ganization can face from a privacy breach include 1) regulatory fines or other sanctions
from governmental or professional bodies, 2) private lawsuits brought by patients, and
3) reputation damage done by news coverage on the breach. In general, I get the im-
pression that the state of information security in healthcare is rough enough that
regulatory agencies target organizations who seem to have a fundamental disregard
for patient privacy. Compliance with HIPAA is somewhat self-determined, in that an
organization defines its own plan for protecting patient data, and is measured against
how well it adheres to that plan. And, as always, the imposition of repercussions —
either institutional according to regulations or ad-hoc, like a lawsuit — depend on
the breach being noticed in the first place.
I also rate the permanence of damage done by false positives as being “low to
medium”. Financial sanctions or settlements could potentially bankrupt an organi-
zation, but are more likely to represent recoverable damage. Regulatory probation
periods can restrict an organization for an extended period of time, but are designed
to help the organization integrate better information security practices into its regu-
lar operation, not to prevent the organization from accomplishing its mission. While
3I am targeting principally clinical settings, since that was the focus of my fieldwork, but other
types of data may be of greater value to potential attackers. For example, a hospital participating
in a field trial of a promising new drug could be a target of industrial espionage.
210
a hospital’s reputation is important, I believe that most people would be willing to
overlook a past privacy breach if they felt that the hospital provided good medical
care.
10.7.2 Consequences of false negatives
I rate the scope of the obstruction resulting from a false negative verdict in a clinical
setting as being “medium”. As noted earlier, this property is highly dependent on the
size of the system and whether it uses user groups or roles. In healthcare, large
organization-wide systems that implement RBAC could easily experience a large
scope of false-negative obstruction, whereas specialized departmental systems with
few users would be likely to have a smaller such scope.
I rate the magnitude of the obstruction to be “high”. If a clinician is providing
time-sensitive care and is unable to get access to the data she needs, the repercussions
of the false negative on the patient’s health could be fatal.
I also rate the time to correction as “high”. I observed in my fieldwork that clini-
cians are incentivized (by the sum of their situation, not by an intentional design of
policymakers) to work around the access-mediation system rather than pursue a fix
through official channels. The time to correction will thus be delayed by users not
reporting false negatives, and by organizational cultures that tend to reject user feed-
back as simply “users not complying with policy”. A further delay may be introduced
if the user needs to receive explicit approval from one or more supervisors within the
organization.
I estimate the relative cost of correction as being “medium to high”, and attribute it
in large part to the general bureaucratic overhead (which are reflected more directly in
the “resources and budget” category below) — does the administrator responsible for
implementing the correction have all the data she needs to be sure it is an appropriate
change? How many different stakeholders have to take part in the decision-making
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process? Beyond the decision making process, the decision implementation also in-
cludes a certain amount of cost: how usable is the policy-authoring tool? If there
is a QA process to validate the sanity of a new Portunes mapping with respect to a
previous version, is that evaluation automated in any way, or completely manual?
Of course, the cost of an individual correction may be more on the “medium” side
if the administrator simply adds a one-off exception to the mapping. In this case,
however, the probability that the correction will percolate throughout the structured
mapping such that it “sticks” for future users in similar situations is small — thus a
“high” ranking for “one-off corrections”.
10.7.3 Organizational change
I rank the employee turnover rate for a teaching hospital as “medium”. Many clinicians
and support staff may work at the same institution for decades, but this longevity
is tempered by the constantly cycling population of students. I do not have data to
back up this assumption, but it is something that an individual organization could
easily measure about itself.
I rate the functional turnover as being “medium”. The student/long-term employee
disparity will impact this metric among clinicians as it does the overall turnover rate;
I imagine that this rate of change would be somewhat lower for support staff, but this
remains to be verified in future work. However, I rate the functional dynamism in
healthcare settings as being generally “low”, because the job descriptions of a user in
a particular function (e.g., a dermatology nurse) are not likely to change much over
time.
Finally, I rate the technical change experienced by the organization as “medium”,
and here again it is an average of two extremes. On one hand the goals of clinicians’
workflows do not change rapidly, and the time and energy a hospital must put into
the selection and deployment of a new large system makes the amount of technical
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change small. On the other hand, the number of semi-autonomous departments
within the hospital means that new small systems may come online frequently across
the organization.
10.7.4 User accountability
Consequences for inappropriate action in a healthcare context could include incremen-
tal steps toward termination of employment (including verbal or written warnings),
termination, revocation of one’s medical license, civil lawsuits, and criminal charges.
All of these options would be reasonable if the action compromised the quality of the
medical care that the organization provides. Large privacy breaches could warrant
termination or civil lawsuits. However, only incremental steps toward termination
seem appropriate for small privacy breaches (which my fieldwork indicates are likely
to constitute the majority of inappropriate accesses), which are hard to detect.
For these reasons I rate the availability of consequences in a clinical settings as
“low”, consequence proportionality as “medium”, and consistency of consequences as
“low”. My fieldwork indicated that users were aware of cases where they were acting
against the organization’s policy (like writing down passwords), but did not express
awareness of how they might be held accountable for this choice. I thus also rate user
awareness of consequences in clinical settings as “low”.
10.7.5 Contextual information availability
Based on my fieldwork, I believe that the structure of a teaching hospital — dis-
tributed into departments, each of which has specialist computer systems — makes
it difficult for the organization to develop a good understanding of itself in detail.
This specialty-oriented structure means that a “nurse” in one department may have a
very different job description from one elsewhere. For these reasons, I rate categorize
organizational understanding and function homogeneity as both being “low”.
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The practice of health care is full of extenuating circumstances. Unexpected twists
in a patient’s condition, the need for consultation by colleagues in other departments,
and other factors make it difficult to predict what contextual information will be
necessary to make a meaningful access decision. I thus categorize the simplicity of
necessary contextual data as being decidedly “low” in a healthcare context.
The large amount of potentially-relevant contextual data combined with a poor
degree of self-understanding makes it difficult for a teaching hospital to identify con-
textual data in the first place (much less make much contextual data available to the
system in an automated fashion), so I also rate the availability of relevant contextual
data in an access-mediation system as being “low”.
10.7.6 Resources and budget
I believe that healthcare organizations make patient care their top priority. Unless
otherwise mandated by regulatory bodies, I believe that they will tend to place a “low”
priority on resourcing access-mediation efforts. Given limited resources (included
staff to perform analysis on security technology), I believe that these organizations
are likely to adopt more classic metrics for judging the impact on patient care and
the organization’s bottom line, and therefore rate their use of progressive metrics as
tending to be “low”. I believe that the limited resources tend to also drive down the
flexibility a healthcare IT group has with respect to resource use, but that the small
size of IT organization can also allow them to foster a strong working relationship
with the leadership. I thus rate the IT trust and resource flexibility in a healthcare
setting as being “low to medium”.
10.7.7 Implications
The low ratings on false positive properties combined with the high ratings on false
negative properties indicate that a teaching hospital would be a good candidate for
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an access-mediation system that employs ex-post verdicts rather than ex-ante ver-
dicts. This is further supported by the low levels of organizational understanding and
context availability, both of which would make it hard for the organization to craft
meaningful ex-ante policies. However, the low levels of user accountability would
seem to indicate that a post-facto solution would not be appropriate: defaulting to
ALLOW seems imprudent if one cannot incentivize users to choose to act in the best
interests of the organization. On the other hand, the medical community has dealt
with a situation where users (clinicians) are provided with relative autonomy in mak-
ing decisions about patient care, and seems to be able to hold them accountable when
they take damaging actions. I believe that this accountability comes less from the
potential punishments of noncompliance, and more from the cultural norms imbued
during the long process of user training.
As with any ex-post system, it would be important for the organization to be
able to have sufficient data about the circumstances under which a particular access
was performed in order to judge whether that access was appropriate. Given that
the data necessary to make a decision is neither simple nor particularly available, it
would be difficult for the access-mediation system itself to paint a sufficiently rich
picture. Here, too, the medical community’s experience with evaluating the propriety
of medical decisions could help an organization in its efforts to evaluate the propriety
of a particular access.
Unfortunately, the organization’s generally “low” resources could indicate that it
alone would not be able to develop sufficiently powerful auditing tools to analyze
access logs and identify potential anomalies for further evaluation by humans. As
I observed during my fieldwork, when the tools are insufficient and the number of
access decisions very large, it can become impractical for an organization to conduct
audits at scale (and lead them to only check access records when a complaint is filed).
















Figure 10.3: Profile of a prototypical large investment bank.
for future commercial tools to perform this type of ex-post evaluation.)
10.8 Comparative example: investment bank
In this section I offer another example profile, this time of a hypothetical investment
bank. To avoid repetition of observations stated in the previous section, I focus
primarily on the differences between an investment bank and a teaching hospital.
As with the previous example, this profile is extrapolated from my fieldwork ob-
servations, but not meant to be a profile of a single participant organization. Future
work is needed to expand and refine this profile based on the experiences of practi-
tioners from a variety of investment-banking institutions.
10.8.1 Consequences of false positives
In comparison to healthcare, false positives are generally more concerning to invest-
ment banks. I rate the probability of damage as being “medium to high” — medium
because the sheer number of systems and entitlements mean that false-positive ver-
dicts probably happen relatively frequently without causing any damage, but high
because when users to get access to information they could exploit, the potential
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financial upside is so large that they are strongly incentivized to take advantage of it.
Similarly, I rate the gravity and the permanence of damage as being “medium to
high”, because potential damage can range from minor corruption of data by unwitting
users to the bank losing millions or billions of dollars — which can cause unrecoverable
damage to the world economy if the bank is large.
10.8.2 Consequences of false negatives
In contrast to false positives, false negatives are somewhat less concerning to invest-
ment banks than they are to teaching hospitals. (Ironically, investment banks spend
significantly more resources trying to reduce false negatives, these institutions put a
high value on user productivity, in part because of the high opportunity cost when
users’ actions on the financial markets are delayed even briefly). This is in part be-
cause the increased complexity of financial systems mean that there is likely to be
a greater diversity of obstructions that can be experienced, depending on the type
of data for which a false negative is delivered — unlike in healthcare, where simple
systems (with relatively coarse access granularity) mean that a false negative can
prevent a clinician from doing her job (i.e., accessing a patient’s record) altogether.
The scope and magnitude of obstruction depend heavily on the data in question,
but I rate them generally as “medium to high” for investment banks. Factors that
can increase the scope for some types of data include the matrixed interdependence
between users in fulfilling their jobs and legally-mandated use of roles. The magnitude
of the obstruction can vary from preventing a single user from performing a non-
essential task to costing the company large amounts of money because a critical
trade cannot be executed in time.
The time (“low”) and cost (“medium”) of correction depend heavily on the access-
mediation system in place, but investment banks seem to try and optimize for these
factors. however, more complex system can result in a higher cost of correction,
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because it is harder for an administrator to find a fix that will not break other parts
of the whole. This, in turn, increases the probability of one-off corrections (“high”).
10.8.3 Organizational change
Despite the medical-student turnover rates, I believe that organizational change is
generally higher in investment banking than in teaching hospitals, as it is more com-
mon in the financial industry for an organization to evolve into new sub-sectors, take
over other companies, and adopt new technologies. Individual users in finance are
also more likely to hop from company to company, change specialties, or shoot up
the corporate ladder than those in healthcare. I thus rate overall turnover, function
turnover, and technical change as all being “high”, and function dynamism as be-
ing “medium to high” (this latter depending on the nature of the work the user was
initially engaged in).
10.8.4 User accountability
I believe that user-accountability factors in investment banks are approximately on
par with those in healthcare. The availability of consequences is slightly higher (“low
to medium”) because it is a more competitive environment for employees, and getting
written up for doing something bad can have a larger impact on promotion or bonuses.
Proportionality of consequences are lower (“low”) because although some investment
bankers professional licenses, they are not as critical as medical licenses for finding
work in the sector. Also, the potential upside to malicious users (stealing money or
getting promoted for making the company money) is large. I rate the consistency of
consequences as “low” because banks do not seem to have a good way for detecting
many undesirable user behaviors4. Awareness of consequences, especially external
4This may be due more to technological lack than sociological truth, as improved tools might
make it easier for financial organizations to detect undesirable behavior. On the other hand, I think
that these organizations have already invested heavily in such detection, over a long period — with
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consequences like being arrested, are slightly higher (“low to medium”) because in-
vestment bank employees receive more compliance training about the repercussions
of being caught performing illegal acts such as insider trading.
10.8.5 Contextual information availability
As with healthcare, I rate the an investment bank’s organizational understanding,
functional homogeneity, and simplicity of contextual data as being “low”. I believe
that the major contributing factor is the size and complexity of the organization and
its systems, and the agility of its workforce. I rate the availability of contextual data
as being “low to medium” which is slightly higher than in healthcare (“low”) because
investment banks have spent more time instrumenting business processes to make
some of this information available.
10.8.6 Resources and budget
I rate an investment bank’s resources and budget factors as being generally more favor-
able than those of a teaching hospital. The financial industry perceives a competitive
advantage in the confidentiality of some kinds of information, but also sometimes
takes a check-off-the-checkboxes approach to designing its access mediation systems;
I thus rate its resourcing priorities as “medium to high”. Because executives are habit-
uated to thinking about many parts of the business in terms of return on investment
(but some IT leaders are successful at making the case for systems that cannot be
adequately evaluated this way), I rate the progressiveness of an investment bank’s
metrics as “low to medium”. The more sizable budget of a financial IT department
and its greater importance in protecting critical resources requires investment bank
executives to place more trust in their IT managers, and I thus rate the organization’s




Given that the risks associated with false-positive verdicts are perceived to be greater
than those associated with false-negative ones in an investment bank, a primarily
ex-ante approach does seem advisable. However, for situations where a false-negative
verdict could cause significant damage if not corrected quickly, introduction of break-
glass controls could also be helpful.5 The addition of reactive access mediation in
some situations — where data ownership could be distributed among the user popu-
lation, where the number of access requests would be small (probably no more than
a handful per week), and where data owners could easily gain understanding about
the requestor’s function in the company and reasons for wanting access — could also
make the system better able to cope with changes as the organization evolves, at least
for some resources.
However, if such hybridization were to occur, an investment bank’s complexity
and dynamism first necessitate better tools for understanding itself and the actions
of its users.6 Rather than buying complicated role-mining technologies in an effort
to shoe-horn the complexity of access mediation into a pure ex-ante approach, these
organizations would do better to invest in solutions that help them analyze the pat-
terns of user access. These tools could then evolve to help monitor the introduction
and operation of schemes with a more ex-post or ex-ante flavor. With time, these
tools could also be used by large organizations in other sectors that do not have the
same degree of capital to invest in their development, such as healthcare.
5I expect that, once introduced, the trick would be to make sure that break-glass escalation paths
were not applied in situations where the damage from false negatives would not actually be critical.
6I actually think such tools are critical even if no hybridization occurred; as documented in
previous chapters, it is too easy for an organization to have a false sense of security in an ex-ante
solution without noticing that it has gone completely off the rails.
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10.9 Conclusions
This chapter represents an initial taxonomy of the factors that determine the success
of access-mediation efforts in the real world. I have constructed this list based on my
fieldwork observations in partnership with a handful of large organizations; as dis-
cussed in Chapter 11, additional work is necessary to further validate this taxonomy.
Additional work is also necessary to help practitioners learn how to build a pro-
file of their organizations, and how to apply this profile in understanding what mix
of access-mediation approaches will help them meet their organizational goals. In
particular, several of the characteristics outlined here will vary from department to
department or resource to resource within an organization; a framework to assist
practitioners in cataloging such diversity and then combining it into a comprehensive
profile would seem to be an important tool in applying this work in practice.
However, even though much work in this space remains, the taxonomy presented
in this chapter is the first of its kind. Combined with the re-framing of the access-
mediation problem presented in Chapter 9, it helps us understand not only why
organizations experience the problems I documented in my fieldwork, but outlines a
path for such organizations to avoid those problems in the future.
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Chapter 11
Future work and conclusions
I believe that there is significant work still to be done if the research community
is going to help real-world organizations build successful access-mediation systems; I
outline in Section 11.1 several lines of future inquiry to that effect. However, as I argue
in Section 11.2, I also believe that the work described in this document represents a
significant first step in the right direction.
11.1 Future work
I offer here but a small sample of the work that could be done to further the cause
of high-quality access mediation in the real world. The vast majority of these ideas
require an interdisciplinary focus, as they would require both technical understanding
and the use of usability studies or qualitative methods to understand the complexities
inherent to socio-technical systems.
11.1.1 Direct extensions of my research
I propose further exploration of the ideas I have presented in the previous two chap-
ters. In particular:
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Validate the generality of the Portunes function. I believe that the Portunes
Function presented in Chapter 9 is a foundational framework that can be used to
describe any access-mediation system. Future work is needed to validate its generality,
and identify whether there exist models1 it cannot encompass.
Characterize hybrid systems. I have distinguished the three “flavors” of access
mediation, but expect — or at least hope — that the majority of real-world systems
will come to implement different flavors to protect different types of data. A break-
glass control is a good example of a hybrid ex-ante/ex-post system, and Reactive
Access Control hybridizes ex ante and uno tempore. Are these the only hybridizations
of these flavor combinations? What other schemes can be devised, and in what
situations will they be useful? What framework should we use to characterize hybrid
systems?
Existence of “pure” systems. Is it even possible for a purely ex-post, uno-
tempore, or ex-ante system to be successful in a real organization? Do any examples
exist in the wild, or is it the case that all organizations actually employ a blend of
the three approaches — that pure ex-ante systems are in fact hybrids for which only
the ex-ante aspects have been recognized or supported by management tools?
Profile-taxonomy completeness. I have constructed the taxonomy of factors de-
scribed in Chapter 10 based on my fieldwork observations, but further work is neces-
sary to determine whether there are other relevant factors that should be considered
by organizations, particularly those in industries I have not studied.
1Note that when I say “models”, I really mean “potentially practical models”. I am confident that
it is possible to define a formal access-control model whose implementation could not be described
by the Portunes Function, but models that will only ever exist for the purpose of proving theorems
and publishing papers do not interest me.
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Profile-taxonomy application. My taxonomy describes a large number of dimen-
sions on which organizations can differ from one another, and I have characterized
how I believe investment banks and teaching hospitals diverge on some of these di-
mensions. Are there other types of organizations that can be characterized using
these two profiles? Can organizations in general be characterized by a small set of
profiles, or will they diverge beyond any recognizable profiling pattern?
11.1.2 Ex-post evaluation
Aside from extensions of my own work, I would like to see the community put much
more energy into exploring the use of ex-post access mediation schemes.
Usable tools. What tools, techniques, or other strategies could we develop to help
organizations perform meaningful ex-post evaluation? Of the techniques that have
been developed, how might we apply a deeper understanding of human factors to
make them more useful?
Understanding log ignorance. The organizations I studied do not analyze their
access logs except when a breach is suspected. Is this true for many other organiza-
tions? What incentivizes or discourages an organization to engage with meaningful
logs analysis? Are there improvements outside of tools themselves that could make
the practice more common?
Recognize existing instances. I have documented some real-world examples of
ex-post access mediation, but there are surely others. In particular, existing efforts to
detect data breaches seem to hold similar goals and may even involve the same types
of system logs. Could we not therefore view these and other information-security
efforts as a form of ex-post access mediation?
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Patient auditing. As described in Chapters 2 and 7, systems have been proposed
to provide patients with access logs for their medical data, yet clinicians are concerned
that patients would not understand or be able to make use of such information2. Is this
true? Could filtering or improved usability of interaction design help improve patient
understanding of access information? How many patients would take advantage of
such a feature? Would it give them greater confidence in the care they were receiving,
or in the overall security of their medical data?
General stakeholder auditing. In a similar vein: how well does ex-post stake-
holder evaluation work in general, particularly when the resources in question may
be more sensitive from the organization’s perspective than the perspective of the in-
dividual user? Systems that rely on uno-tempore mediation will fail noisily, because
users will complain when they cannot access something or are receiving inappropri-
ate access requests. Will the failure state for ex-post systems involving distributed
manual evaluation be too quiet to be effective?
Ease of use: ex post vs. ex ante. It seems to make intuitive sense that it is
easier for an administrator to reason about the acceptability of an access after it has
occurred (if they are provided with sufficient contextual information) than it is to
write an ex-ante policy that accurately covers all corner cases. Is this true? Could
one find a way to meaningfully compare the ease with which we complete each task?
Policy rewriting. Although I hypothesize that it is easier to evaluate an access
after the fact, it may still be easier for an organization to write an ex-ante policy
(perhaps an imperfect one) than it is to define an efficient post-facto evaluation pro-
cedure. Could we create a tool for re-writing ex-ante policies into ex-post evaluation
2I am also concerned that patients would have trouble if provided with the raw data, but as
I noted in Chapter 7, I believe that patients may be better equipped to evaluate some access-log
information than clinicians give them credit for.
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schemes? This would be particularly useful for an organization considering a switch
from an ex-ante approach to an ex-post one.
Feeding other schemes. There are myriad ways in which a small amount of ex-
post evaluation could go a long way toward improving ex-ante or uno-tempore parts
of an access-mediation system. Of course, the results of an organization’s ex-post
analysis should feed into its ex-ante policy (but doing so in an reliably automated
fashion is an open problem). Ex-post review of distributed uno-tempore access grants
could help central administrators gain confidence that members of the organization
are being judicious in authorizing access. Further work is necessary to integrate these
workflows into existing and future access-administration systems.
11.1.3 Logs analysis
Logs access Although some researchers have been able to obtain organizations’
access logs for study (as summarized in Chapter 2), broader access to more data is
necessary if researchers are to understand users’ access patterns — or identify meta-
patterns that may exist across different organizations and industries. This involves
a number of challenges, including data anonymization and some way to compare
data from disparate sources. Could current efforts on logs analysis for data-breach
detection be applied in this space, too?
Organization self-study. Once researchers have enough data to allow the devel-
opment of meaningful tools, they might partner with organizations to perform self
studies of access patterns. This, in turn, could further refine our understanding of the
access-mediation problem, even for organizations that are not willing to share their
data with external researchers.
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Application to system definition. Given appropriate tools for studying an or-
ganization’s access logs, how should an organization go about translating its under-
standing into a useful access-mediation system? In particular, how could an organi-
zation currently practicing ex-ante mediation use logs analysis to identify places for
mediation hybridization?
11.1.4 The Phalanx Problem
In Chapter 7 I defined the Phalanx Problem: how does one mediate access to digital
resources not just by an individual, but by a dynamic group of individuals, whose
membership is fuzzily defined? (The motivating example was a group of doctors and
medical students doing rounds at a teaching hospital.) Wireless technologies such as
Bluetooth proximity beacons might be used to detect the presence of clinicians, but
other challenges remain.
Automated authentication. What tools can be developed to allow users to seam-
lessly join a phalanx — i.e., inherit at least a subset of the entitlements possessed by
its members — without requiring them to be manually added to an access list?
Record-keeping and delegation. How does one record the actions of a phalanx
when multiple members are present? Access logs that record an action taken by a
resident are not meaningful if the attending doctor is the one who ordered the action
be performed.
11.1.5 A grand challenge
Much of the work I have described in this section is driving at a deeper question: how
does one measure the quality of an access-mediation system? How can an organization
tell ahead of time whether a particular system will work well for them? My research
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has documented many ways in which access-mediation systems work poorly today,
but we still need an understanding of what it means for an access-mediation system
to work well within a particular organization, and how to help organizations identify
and choose systems that meet these criteria.
I suspect that over time we will come to understand that a “good” access-mediation
system is one that is both correct (i.e., optimized to simultaneously facilitate desirable
accesses and prevent undesirable accesses) and sustainable (i.e., optimized to minimize
the setup and maintenance necessary to preserve correctness over long periods of
time). I hope that future work will bear out my observations regarding the three
flavors of access mediation, and that our community will find ways to help real-
world organizations successfully hybridize these three approaches according to their
individual needs and profiles — in part by recognizing the diverse ways in which
uno-tempore and ex-post approaches are already being used.
11.2 Conclusions
To conclude, I now offer a brief summary of the contributions contained in this doc-
ument, and a few last words of commentary. I structure the summary by grouping
Chapters 2 through 10 into three broad themes: background observations, fieldwork
report and analysis, and my reboot of access-control thinking.
11.2.1 Background content
Chapter 2 offers a broad overview of prior work related to my research, including
observations on the development of access control since the“protection boom” of the
1970s and 1980s. It notes that the access-control models from that era were crafted to
provide “provably secure” protection to critical military and intelligence information,
at a time where the number of people interacting with digital data — and the amount
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of data actually being protected — was small by today’s standards.
This chapter also notes that developments in access control since the protection
boom have been (with a few exceptions) dominated by extensions to those first few
models (MAC, DAC, and particularly RBAC), and built according to the same basic
requirements of the (now decades-old) protection boom. Although the research com-
munity has been eager to propose new extensions, it has paid very little attention to
validating whether these new models actually help real-world organizations achieve
their access-control goals. More critically, almost no attention has been paid to un-
derstanding what organizations’ real access-control goals are, how well existing tools
perform, or how one even goes about measuring whether an access-control solution
performs well in a given setting.
As a precursor to the fieldwork chapters, Chapter 3 offers a survey of second-
factor authentication devices. It also describes PorKI, a project from early in my
graduate-school career, which sought to make users’ PKI-based authentication cre-
dentials portable by placing them on the user’s smartphone, and thereby make au-
thentication via PKI more usable and relevant to real users. My goal in starting
the studies described in later chapters was to try and build a similar solution —
something that was more usable and relevant by real-world practitioners — for au-
thorization management.
11.2.2 Fieldwork and analysis contributions
My fieldwork consists of two studies: a Corporate Study (described in Chapters 4
through 6) and a Clinical Study (Chapter 7). These studies use social-science methods
to elicit information about access-control as it is experienced by administrators and
end users at two large investment banks, one software-development company, and one
teaching hospital. I interviewed and/or observed a total of 52 subjects across the four
participant organizations.
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Whereas other researchers have documented some challenges that real-world users
experience with access control, the depth and breadth of my research offers a unique
and valuable perspective on the state of the art as practiced in large, dynamic settings.
My fieldwork observations lead me to believe that it does not suffice to say that
access control is “challenging”: I believe that the problems I have documented to
be so systemic, so deep, that it is more appropriate to say that access control is
“fundamentally broken” for these types of organizations.
Some of the symptoms of this dysfunction that I present include:
• Inevitable over-entitlement. Operational realities (complex systems, un-
intelligible policies, and rapid organizational change) drive administrators of
classic access-control systems to over-provision users, even if this is considered
damaging by the organization.
• Availability matters. In some organizations and for some types of data, avail-
ability is more important than confidentiality (i.e, under-entitlement is more
damaging than over-entitlement). Few solutions exist that recognize this prior-
itization.
• Understandable circumvention by users. Access controls prevent users
from getting their jobs done, which drives users to circumvent the controls. Even
non-technical users can find ingenious ways to break the system and achieve
productivity, but the users who do so are rarely ill-intentioned.
• Access control breeds a false sense of security. Organizations remain
blissfully ignorant of users’ circumvention, because the organizations have no
scalable way of monitoring users’ actions. access-control systems provide orga-
nizations (and regulatory bodies) a false sense of security.
• Impossibility of self-understanding. Organizations have very little under-
standing of themselves (e.g., what employees work on what tasks, who is re-
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sponsible for what data). Organization dynamism makes it tricky to take a
meaningful “snapshot” of the organization for an entitlement review, because
by time the review is complete, the organization has changed out from under-
neath the reviewers.
• Product vs. process. Organizations expect to be able to buy software
that will allow them to manage users’ access. However, some have learned
the hard way that there is no perfect system; moreover, developing a good
access-management solution requires iterative improvements and continuous in-
vestment — both in the technology and in the business processes — over time.
I argue in Chapter 8 that the present-day dysfunction is rooted in assumptions left
over from the protection boom. The research community takes for granted that the
requirements of that domain and era apply universally to organizations today, and
this simply is not the case.
Some of the most damaging assumptions I identify — many of which conflict
directly with my fieldwork observations— include:
• Damaging assumption: organizational understanding. The process by
which an organization develops self-understanding may be somewhat expensive
or time-consuming, but a comprehensive, centralized understanding is classically
assumed to be at least possible.
• Damaging assumption: organizations change slowly. A slow rate of
organizational change allows basic components that are expensive for adminis-
trators to update (e.g., the definition of what entitlements a role maps to) can
change slowly, too.
• Damaging assumption: confidentiality trumps all. For the organizations
that drove the protection boom, it was better to err on the side of under-
entitlement than to risk over-entitlement.
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• Damaging assumption: a single policy. It is classically assumed that it is
possible to develop a single “correct” access-control policy for any organization.
Most importantly, I argue through these chapters that the dysfunction of access
control is not the fault of the organizations or of their users. The fault lies with
the research community, for not seeking to understand the full diversity of access-
management needs experienced by these real organizations.
11.2.3 “Rebooting” contributions
In Chapter 9 I attempt to “reboot” our understanding of access control. Rather than
continue to build on the protection-boom assumptions, I try to create a fresh and
expansive definition of the problem that access control seeks to solve.
This includes abandoning the term “access control” in favor of the broader “ac-
cess mediation”, which allows for schemes that seek to protect a digital resource by
performing ex-post monitoring of users access instead of (or in addition to) assert-
ing ex-ante control over it. Access mediation also allows for uno-tempore schemes
that provide dynamic policy tuning, without the burden of ex-ante policy-writing or
ex-post auditing. To accommodate this more expansive set of solutions, I introduce
the Portunes Function, a generalized meta-model which describes access-mediation
systems in terms of their data inputs and outputs.
The Portunes Function and its supporting terminology allow me to describe under
a unified umbrella the three basic flavors of access mediation: ex ante, uno tempore,
and ex post. Until now, discussions of alternative approaches (e.g., Optimistic Se-
curity, Reactive Access Control, and Break-Glass models) was largely disconnected
from “classic” ex-ante understanding.
Of the Portunes Function’s inputs, I identify the contextual data as being critically
important to making an accurate access-mediation decision (in either the ex-ante or
ex-post timeframes.) The availability and manageability of contextual data were two
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of the many factors that determine the success of an access-mediation scheme within
a particular organization, and are included in the taxonomy of such factors that I
present in Chapter 10. I also offer in this chapter an initial demonstration of how the
taxonomy might be applied by an organization to help it understand its access-control
needs. I believe that this preliminary foray into an organization to elicit requirements
indicates that the three flavors of access mediation — ex ante, uno tempore, and
ex post — might be blended to help organizations better blend their data-protection
aspirations with the reality of their functional limitations. Furthermore, I believe that
intentionally blending these approaches into a coherent whole would be far better than
current informal or ad-hoc arrangements, which recognize only the ex-ante aspect as
sanctioned, and thus allow other aspects to be practiced in an uncomfortable state of
semi-approval.
11.2.4 Final words
In this document I catalog painful real-world experiences, call out false assumptions,
and attempt to reboot a field that has been in development for the past forty years. In
the first part of this chapter I identify directions for future work that I have uncovered
during this research; among them I wish to emphasize that we — both researchers and
practitioners — must focus more on understanding how users actually access data.
If we were to invest (in both research-hours and organization-dollars) half as much
in the development of innovative monitoring, auditing, or other ex-post technologies
as we currently do in role-mining solutions, we might have a chance of making the
reboot I propose successful: we might actually learn how to bring the full range of
possible access-mediation solutions to bear in real organizations. Without data on
users’ access patterns — for a large variety of resources, organizations, industries, and
over a long enough period of time that we can watch the organization as it evolves
— we are flying blindly. Without this understanding, we will be forced to stand idly
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by while countless organizations invest staggering amounts of money in technologies
that simply do not deliver what they promise.
Of course, even once we have taken the time to really understand users’ access
patterns — even once we have made the critical and feasible improvements we have
before us — I doubt that it will be possible to build a software product that makes
the problem of managing users’ access to data easy. Access mediation is a problem
firmly rooted in a socio-technical system, and its solution must therefore be sought
not just among software products, but also among business processes. On some level I
wonder whether this dual nature of the problem is why other computer scientists have
not perceived the profound brokenness of current solutions until now: perhaps only
through the (admittedly unplanned, in my case) application of both social-science
and computer-science methods could one both recognize and diagnose what has been
going so wrong for so long?
In that vein, I hope that other computer scientists who aim to study this problem
seek out partnerships with researchers who are well-versed in social science methods.
For any system that involves both humans and computers, it is critical that we in-




An academic perspective on password
policies
A.1 Common policy components
Password policies govern the the entire password lifecycle, from creation to expiration.
Password policy components fall in five broad categories, outlined below.
1. Password Entropy
Passwords are knowledge-based authenticators; if an attacker guesses or deduces
what a password is, the security of that password is compromised. We discuss
the resilience of a password to this sort of attack in terms of the password’s
entropy, or randomness [99]. In practice, password policies often substitute
complexity for entropy, and proactively check users’ passwords to make sure
they satisfy specific rules designed to increase password complexity.
• Password Length: One way to increase the complexity of a password is
by making it longer. The longer a password is, the more time it will take
an attacker to crack (use a machine to repeatedly try to guess) it.
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• Password Content: Another way to increase the complexity of a pass-
word is to require that it draws from a larger character set (i.e., numbers
and punctuation in addition to letters).
• Human Words: Because it is easier for human users to remember strings
of characters that are memorable or meaningful, such as words, many pass-
word cracking programs start by performing a dictionary attack against a
password. Dictionary attacks often first target words that humans fre-
quently use as passwords (e.g., “password”) and other strings derived from
these words (e.g., “password123”).
All efforts to increase password complexity (or, ideally, password entropy) ul-
timately protect against the “cracked password” threat model, discussed be-
low. Increased password complexity does not protect against attacks
involving recorded, phished, or reused passwords. Many security re-
searchers agree that these latter attacks are more concerning to organizations
today than the traditional “cracked password” threat model.
2. Login Attempts An attacker rarely knows exactly what a user’s password is,
and must thus try out a variety of different passwords before stumbling on the
right one. (Attacks that rely on actually cracking a password require hundreds
of billions of guesses.) Many password policies thus require that accounts with
multiple failed login attempts be suspended or otherwise limited.
Limiting the number of failed login attempts can help protect against all
of the threat models discussed below. While this sort of constraint is
therefore critical, the number of failed login attempts that trigger suspension
can be tuned to accommodate users who are forgetful or poor typists, without
significantly compromising the security of the system [7].
3. Password Change Frequency The longer a password remains valid, the
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larger the window an attacker has to perform an attack against it. Requiring
users to change passwords can protect against all the attacks dis-
cussed in Section A.2. However, there is scarce hard evidence on the efficacy
of mandatory password changes on improving system security, especially since
frequent password changes encourage users to compromise password complexity
in favor of memorability. This type of policy component therefore makes sense
in principle, but it is difficult to perform a cost-benefit analysis on its
actual value in practice.
4. Password Re-Use Some password policies require that users not re-use pass-
words across mandatory changes; if the user alternates between “1password23”
and “7password89”, any benefit from the mandatory change is significantly re-
duced. However, proactive password checkers usually cannot enforce
rules against re-using passwords across systems; this common practice
can open a system to phishing and re-use attacks, as described below.
5. Password Assignment and Reset
• Initial Password Assignment: Although initial password assignments
may not be part of many organizations’ formal password policies, they
can have a significant impact on the overall security of the system. (For
example, assigning all users an initial password of “password123” could
allow a knowledgeable attacker access to the system before an individual
user has a chance to change her password.)
• Password Reset Mechanism: The procedure an organization uses to re-
set a user’s password when she forgets it can also impact the overall security
posture. Organizations that rely on human controls to enforce password
reset policies (e.g., helpdesk staffers) are vulnerable to “social engineering”
attacks. Following work that demonstrated vulnerabilities with relying on
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the user’s mother’s maiden name as an authenticator (e.g., [33]), many
organizations use a variety of “security questions” as part of the password
reset process, or as a secondary authenticator in general. Some research
has been done into the use of such questions by commercial banks, but the
broader usability and long-term viability of this mechanism is not estab-
lished [71].
A.2 Threat models
In building security systems, we identify attack scenarios that we want to protect
against. We characterize these scenarios in terms of an adversary (traditionally named
“Eve”) who possesses a defined set of data, and who is trying to accomplish a certain
goal.
• The Guessed Password: Many users reason, “I’ll use my dog’s name and
my daughter’s birthday. Eve won’t guess that!” Although there are cases of
attackers successfully guessing passwords of high-value targets (e.g., Sarah Palin
during the 2008 presidential campaign), the research community believes that
this sort of attack is rare against average users.
• The Cracked Password: This is the threat model that the vast majority of
password policy components strive to protect against. Password entropy makes
this attack more difficult; as a result, the research community believes that
higher-entropy passwords have forced attackers to turn to alternate attacks.
• The Recorded Password: As passwords have become more complex (and
therefore less memorable), many users have tried to compensate by writing
their passwords down. An attacker who has physical access to the user’s work
environment may use these recorded passwords to gain access to the system.
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Password policies that require users to push the boundaries of their memory
capacity actually increase the organization’s vulnerability to this attack.
• The Phished or Keylogged Password: Unlike cryptographic keys, pass-
words have the “barn door property”: when Alice authenticates to Bob using
a password, she has permanently revealed that password to him. Thus, if Eve
can listen in on Alice’s authentication (e.g., using a hardware or software key-
logger), or convince Alice to enter her password into a fake version of Bob’s
login window (otherwise known as “phishing”), Eve knows Alice’s password un-
til the next time she changes it. The phishing and keylogging threat models
have quickly become a top priority for many organizations, and are generally
considered harder to protect against than the traditional “cracked password”
threat.
• The Internally Re-used Password: If an attacker knows or can discover a
user’s old password, and the user re-uses that password across multiple manda-
tory password periods, the attacker has a higher probability of gaining access to
the system using the old password. This may also be true for partial password
reuse (e.g., “password1”, “password2”, etc.).
• The Externally Re-used Password: Users who re-use a password from one
system to another may allow Eve to create a “pivot point”. With this model, Eve
leverages her successful attack on a low-value system to compromise a higher-
value system. For example, if Alice uses the same password for her Facebook




There exists a tension between the rigor of a password policy and the usability of
the resulting system; academics have been discussing the associated tradeoffs for
decades [62].) Recent studies indicate that requirements on password complexity in
particular experience diminishing returns [16].
More generally, the academic community has come to doubt whether traditional
password policy components really make sense in the current threat climate [26], es-
pecially given the rise of phishing and keylogging attacks over classic offline password
cracking attacks.
Some work has been done to assist users in creating passwords that are both more
secure and more memorable (e.g., mnemonic passwords [50]). While these efforts
are interesting and promising, it is still not clear whether the improvement in overall
security they bring is ultimately worth the time and effort to implement them [27–29].
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